FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY, 1929

The Threat of Anglo-American Naval Rivalry	*Allen W. Dulles*	173
Latin America, Europe and the United States	*F. Garcia Calderon*	183
The Rhineland Occupation	*Wilhelm Marx*	198
Twenty-Five Years of Irish Nationality	*"A. E."*	204
Curzon	*Harold Nicolson*	221
In Soviet Russia:		
The Crisis of the "N. E. P."	*Paul Scheffer*	234
The Government and the Communist Party	*Victor Chernov*	242
The Politbureau		255
The New Communist Bible		259
Icelandic Independence	*Vilhjalmur Stefansson*	270
Arbitration in the Western Hemisphere	*Antonio S. de Bustamante*	282
The Grand Council of Fascism	*Gaetano Salvemini*	292
The Three Latin Sisters	*Salvador de Madariaga*	301
The Winning of Czechoslovak Independence	*Robert J. Kerner*	308
The Strategy of Singapore	*Nicholas Roosevelt*	317
The Guatemala-Honduras Boundary Dispute	*Raye R. Platt*	323
Some Recent Books on International Relations	*William L. Langer*	327
Source Material	*Denys P. Myers*	340

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Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 Ferry Street, Concord, N. H. Editorial and Business Offices, 25 West 43rd Street, New York, N. Y.

Subscriptions, $5.00 a year, post free to any address in the world. The Editors will be glad to consider manuscripts offered for publication, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

VOL. 7, No. 2.

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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 7 JANUARY, 1929 No. 2

THE THREAT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN NAVAL RIVALRY

By Allen W. Dulles

THE recent Anglo-French negotiations have again focused attention on the problem of the limitation of naval armaments. Nothing is so calculated to whet the appetite of the public as an international agreement of which the existence is known and the text withheld. Now that the text of this agreement has been published the element in it which is surprising is its futility. It is hard to see by what chain of reasoning its authors persuaded themselves that it would afford a basis for a general naval understanding. It is still more difficult to see how they would justify it as a real step toward naval limitation.

The failure of the Three-Power Naval Conference at Geneva in 1927, and now the rejection by the United States and Italy (and by public opinion generally) of the Anglo-French compromise, have served to emphasize that the naval problem ranks with reparation as the most serious of pending and unsettled international problems. The naval problem, to an even greater extent than that of reparation, requires for its solution the coöperation of the American Government. It is distinctly a governmental problem. Informal commissions of inquiry or investigation are less likely to be of assistance here than they have been, and may again be, in the case of reparation.

When the Washington Conference adjourned in 1922 the impression was very generally created — particularly in the United States — that the naval problem had been solved. It was felt that even though certain naval elements were not included in the scope of the Treaty, naval competition of a dangerous character would be eliminated. It is no disparagement of the accomplishments of the Washington Conference to state that all that was expected from the Naval Treaty of 1922 has not been realized. This has been due not only to inability to agree on cruiser and

submarine limitation, but also to advances of science over which treaty makers had no control.

The combat value of the battleship, for example, has undoubtedly been lessened by the development of the aeroplane and the submarine. This fact is reflected in the action of Great Britain in advocating further economies in battleship construction through a reduction in the maximum size and an extension of the replacement age limit for such ships. Also, France and Italy have never fully availed themselves of the right accorded them by the Washington Treaty to construct a limited number of additional battleships. Italy, in its recent reply on the Anglo-French compromise, has even suggested that the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Washington "undertake to postpone until after the year 1936 the construction of those battleships which the Treaty would allow them to lay down during the period 1931–1936." Without taking sides in the heated controversy between the supporters of the battleship and the supporters of the aeroplane, we are safe in stating that in the view of many admiralties the battleship is less important today than it was deemed to be at the time of the Washington Conference. As a result, the European naval Powers are admittedly ready to accept more drastic limitations respecting battleships than those embodied in the Washington Treaty. At the same time added emphasis is being placed on the construction and development of the types of vessels not limited by that Treaty, particularly the cruiser and the submarine.

It was very shortly after the ratification of the Washington Treaty that Great Britain entered upon a considerable program of cruiser construction; and more modest programs were developed in Japan, France and Italy. The United States initiated practically nothing in the way of a cruiser building program. Congress was still under the impression that naval competition had been eliminated at Washington, and our legislators were disinclined to support appropriations for new ships to take the place of other new ships which were being scrapped. In 1926–1927, when Congress became aroused to the naval situation, the President deemed it wise to make a serious effort to effect a general limitation of naval armaments which would restrict the amount of building that might be necessary; hoping that this could be achieved by international agreement, he discouraged the idea of increased naval appropriations.

During this period the Preparatory Disarmament Commission

of the League of Nations, on which the United States was represented, was discussing the limitation of all types of armaments, including navies. France and Italy took the position, first, that land and sea armaments must be considered as a part of an indivisible whole, and second, that naval armaments should be limited by fixing for each nation a global or total tonnage for naval craft of all types, leaving to each Power the right to allocate this tonnage among such types as they desired. On both points France had the following of the continental European Powers; and on both points the United States, Great Britain, and Japan were in opposition.

At the Three-Power Naval Conference in 1927 no procedural difficulties of this character were encountered, and an effort was made to find a common yard stick to measure the navies of the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The effort failed for two reasons. In the first place, the British would not accept any tonnage basis for the limitation of cruisers which did not permit a considerable expansion of their present cruiser strength. Secondly, the British insisted that most of the cruisers to be constructed in the future should be restricted in size to 6,000 tons and carry guns not in excess of six inches in calibre. Stating these same reasons from another point of view, we may say that the conference failed because the United States declined to conclude a treaty on a basis which sanctioned a large expansion in the cruiser strength of the strongest naval Power and which strictly limited the particular type of vessel deemed most important for the United States navy.

After the Three-Power Naval Conference the discussions of the Geneva Preparatory Commission were continued, but without appreciable results. The difference in point of view between the Anglo-American group which favored limitation of naval armaments by categories, and the French and Italian group which insisted upon limitation by total tonnage, was still an obstacle.

Such was the situation when the Anglo-French conversations were initiated in March, 1928. It would hardly be profitable to give much time or space to speculation as to the motives which actuated Sir Austen Chamberlain in his negotiations. Temperamentally he apparently prefers conversations with M. Briand to negotiations with the authorities in Washington. Moreover, after the breakdown of the Three-Power Naval Conference as the direct result of a sharp divergence of view between the United

States and Great Britain, he may have felt it wise to start negotiations in another quarter than Washington. The differences between Great Britain and France over the limitation of trained army reserves and the methods of effecting naval limitation made it unlikely that the Preparatory Commission would achieve any results if it were again convened. Meanwhile, Count Bernstorff, the German representative on the Preparatory Commission, had been quoting the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with insistence and emphasis, pointing out that no steps had been taken toward the general reduction of armaments pledged by that Treaty despite the carrying out by Germany of her agreement to disarm. It was important to get results promptly and Sir Austen turned to France to secure what he may have hoped would furnish a basis for united action at least between Great Britain and the continental European Powers.

It seems obvious that Sir Austen must have considered going ahead without taking the position of the United States into account. In fact, it was the French Government which brought this point forcibly to his attention when M. Briand, in a note of July 20, 1928, stated: "It will not have escaped the notice of the British Government that the agreement so earnestly desired on all sides can only bear fruit if the United States Government, in particular, agree to accept it. M. Briand will be glad to know whether His Majesty's Government consider it advisable to take the necessary steps to this end at Washington." Is it possible that this *had* "escaped the notice" of the British Government?

We are not justified in complaining because Mr. Chamberlain decided to enter into conversations with France on naval matters. In this he was clearly within his right. In fact the American representative on the Preparatory Commission had suggested that points of difference be ironed out by "direct negotiations between the various Governments and between groups of Governments." This was only the suggestion of a normal method of procedure and did not involve sponsoring any particular negotiations. Unfortunately the Anglo-French negotiators, in ignoring completely the American position, have only created new difficulties more serious than those they undertook to solve. It is not the procedure which is objectionable, but the substance of the agreement. If an effort had been made to force through a program on the basis of the Anglo-French compromise, the United States would have been placed in an awkward situation. It would have been

left standing almost alone in opposition to what it would have considered as at best a hollow pretense of naval limitation. With the unfavorable publicity which the agreement has now received, there is not much likelihood that it will be used as a basis for future negotiations. The question of real interest therefore is not why such an agreement was ever concluded, or the motives actuating the negotiators, but rather whether there are any elements in it which can be used to advance the cause of naval limitation. It is also important to consider where these negotiations have left the international situation and what the next move can be.

The Anglo-French naval agreement is so brief that it may be given in full:

> Limitations which the Disarmament Conference will have to determine will deal with four classes of warships:
>
> (1) Capital ships, i.e., ships of over 10,000 tons or with guns of more than 8-inch calibre.
>
> (2) Aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons.
>
> (3) Surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than 6-inch and up to 8-inch calibre.
>
> (4) Ocean-going submarines, i.e., over 600 tons.
>
> The Washington Treaty regulates limitations in classes (1) and (2) and the Disarmament Conference will only have to consider the method of extending these limitations to Powers non-signatory to this treaty.
>
> As regards classes (3) and (4), the final Disarmament Conference will fix a maximum tonnage applicable to all Powers which no Power will be allowed to exceed for the total of vessels in each of these respective categories during the period covered by the convention. Within this maximum limit each Power will at the final conference indicate for each of these categories the tonnage they propose to reach and which they undertake not to exceed during the period covered by the convention.[1]

In the note from the British Ambassador in Paris to M. Briand (July 28, 1928) summarizing as above the points of agreement, the significant statement was made that the British Government was prepared "to accept the supplementary proposals made in the French note, namely, that an equal maximum tonnage for submarines and cruisers should be fixed for the great naval Powers. . . ."

We need not concern ourselves here with points 1. and 2. of the Agreement; they do not deal with matters pressing for immediate consideration. The Powers not bound by the Washington Treaty are not engaged in the construction of battleships and large air-

[1] British Parliamentary Paper, cmd. 3211, p. 26–27.

craft carriers to an extent which could disturb the Washington Treaty limitations.

Points 3. and 4. propose in effect that only large cruisers and large submarines be limited. As a basis for negotiation this is far less acceptable than that suggested by the British at the Three-Power Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 and rejected by the United States. There the British representatives were prepared to accept a limitation for all types of cruisers, submarines and destroyers, though the tonnage limitation proposed for the cruiser class was too high in American eyes to afford a satisfactory basis for agreement. For the United States to accept the British-French understanding would mean a complete surrender of its position at the Geneva Naval Conference and an acquiescence in the view that there should be no limitation whatever of important types of naval vessels — and this in the face of the obvious determination of the British Admiralty to build a large number of the cruisers of the unlimited smaller class once the Powers have been persuaded to restrict other types.

It is rather significant that the British have apparently agreed that the same limitation in the large cruiser and large submarine classes should be applied to all the great naval Powers — presumably meaning all the Powers party to the Washington Treaty. A somewhat similar suggestion had been made at the Three-Power Naval Conference when the British proposed that the three Powers there represented should have the same submarine tonnage. At that time Japan, anticipating that this would cause apprehension in the United States, promptly made it clear that she had not asked for a submarine tonnage equal to that of the United States. In commenting on the Anglo-French agreement, the Japanese note hints at the difficulty of an indiscriminate allocation of the same tonnage to various countries which from the point of view of national security and national economy are differently situated.

The Anglo-French Agreement admittedly contained an element of barter. In exchange for French acquiescence in the British plan for limitation by categories or classes of vessels, Great Britain agreed not to press for the limitation of trained army reserves and accepted the French thesis that the number of small submarines should not be subject to restriction. International agreements can rarely be obtained without mutual accommodation, and this in itself is not open to objection. But in the case under discussion

the public attitude toward the negotiations has undoubtedly been prejudiced by the fact that the bargain involved a surrender of the principle of the limitation of important elements of both naval and land forces.

On one point there seems to be general accord, namely that the Anglo-French Agreement is dead and that the problem must be attacked from a new angle. The questions at issue are serious, and the need for a solution is pressing. It would be most unfortunate if criticism of the agreement or of the tactics followed in the recent negotiations were allowed to create an antagonism which would prevent a calm and considered examination of the central problem. Even unsuccessful conferences and fruitless negotiations can be turned to useful account if they serve to define the exact questions at issue and give clues to possible lines of settlement. The Three-Power Naval Conference and the Anglo-French negotiations have now been submitted to the critical analysis of the press, of public opinion, and in certain cases, of the governments interested. The following points stand out as crucial:

First. A basis for agreement between the United States and Great Britain is a necessary preliminary to any general understanding on naval limitation. Until this can be achieved there is little to be gained by naval discussions such as have been carried on by a large number of Powers through the Preparatory Commission at Geneva or by conversations such as those between Great Britain and France.

Second. No basis would be satisfactory which did not cover all types of effective combatant vessels not already limited by the Washington Treaty.

Third. The tonnage limits fixed as between the United States and Great Britain should be on the basis of parity in each class, should be reasonable in amount, and not appreciably in excess of the present strength of the stronger of the two Powers in any particular class. In the case of certain classes of vessels limits might be fixed below the present levels of construction.

Fourth. In the matter of types, within the cruiser classes, both Great Britain and the United States should be prepared to make concessions in order to bridge the gap between their two points of view. Great Britain should abandon the contention that the United States restrict its cruiser force chiefly to the small type of cruiser or shape its own naval program to suit the asserted needs

of the Empire for this type. On the other hand, the United States might properly be asked to consider the British claim that the use by the United States of its cruiser tonnage for the construction of the larger eight-inch gun cruisers would give combat superiority even though there were tonnage equality; that is, parity of combat strength and not alone parity of tonnage should be considered.

It is not easy to find a formula which takes satisfactory account of the fact that tonnage is not the sole criterion of naval strength. The Washington Treaty fixed the tonnage of each battleship to be built and the size of its guns so that tonnage and combat parity would be achieved. In the cruiser class — and it is only here that the question is acute — an effort might be made to arrive at substantial combat parity by estimating six-inch gun cruisers "at a discount" for the purposes of naval limitation. For example, 100,000 tons devoted exclusively to eight-inch gun vessels would count as 100,000 tons, but 100,000 tons devoted exclusively to six-inch gun vessels might, for the purposes of the limitation Treaty, count as 90,000 tons. These figures are purely arbitrary, and are taken merely to illustrate an idea [illegible] to suggest what may be the relative combat value of the two types of vessels, which at best is a matter of conjecture. Incidentally, a somewhat similar suggestion was incorporated in the draft Disarmament Treaty submitted by France to the Preparatory Commission in 1927, but on that occasion applied to the element of age not to that of gun calibre: "In assessing total tonnage, a fraction only, equal to . . . percent. of the real tonnage, shall be reckoned in the case of vessels of war which exceed the age limit laid down in Article 17."

Another method of attacking the same problem is apparently hinted at in the recent American note on the Anglo-French compromise. The plan suggested is that a part of the tonnage primarily allocated to one class be made available for the construction of vessels of another class. In this way, for example, Great Britain, which desires a considerable number of smaller cruisers, could devote to them a part of its destroyer or possibly even its submarine tonnage. This allocation of tonnage between classes of vessels (originally a French suggestion) could be availed of to help adjust and maintain the parity of combat strength.

If Great Britain is ready to restrict all types of vessels, and to fix reasonable limitations in each class, then the problem of

working out a basis for adjusting existing difficulties respecting types of cruisers should not be insoluble. Certainly a basis can be found if both countries take the common-sense attitude that neither fleet is a menace to the other and that while substantial parity of combat strength should be the basis of any treaty, neither side will insist that the treaty make each of the fleets the replica of the other. There should be a reasonable latitude for each of the Powers, within well defined limitations, to meet its own peculiar naval problems.

Undoubtedly the feeling exists in the United States that Great Britain should take some account of the sacrifices which the United States made in 1922 in order to facilitate agreement. It is not suggested that in so doing Great Britain should scrap cruisers in order to reduce to our level of construction, but only that she put some reasonable limit on her own future construction and that she take account of the fact that the naval problems of the two countries are different and consequently that the United States may have need for a different type of cruiser than the Empire. This would not seem to be too much to ask. The failure to meet the United States on these points will probably mean that further naval agreement between the two nations is unattainable.

The possibility of agreement between the two countries is of course predicated upon the frank acceptance by Great Britain of the principle of parity in all classes of vessels. The record shows this to have been recognized as the basis of negotiation by responsible English spokesmen, but the impression exists in the United States that influential forces are at work in England to prevent the realization of any agreement on this basis and that this is one of the underlying causes of disagreement. Certainly England has as much to gain as the United States from an agreement on the basis of parity. If unrestricted building is carried on in both countries, who can predict whether the United States will be disposed to accept an agreement on the basis of parity ten years hence? The real reason for accepting this basis lies not in a careful weighing of relative naval needs, nor in a consideration of the relative financial or technical resources of the two Powers, but rather in the thought that the possibility of conflict between us should be eliminated in determining naval programs. It was this thought which one hundred years ago led Canada and the United States to their agreement that there should be no naval

forces on the Great Lakes. Unless the same general principle can be applied to the relations between the United States and the British Empire there would be no reason for the United States to restrict itself to the principle of parity with Great Britain.

The passage of pending legislation in the United States, and the construction of the proposed fifteen cruisers in addition to the eight cruisers which are now being built, will only serve towards bridging the gap now existing between British naval strength and our own. It can not be regarded as an effort to secure naval superiority, as under any tonnage limitations which are likely to be proposed (except limitations directed chiefly against the larger type of cruiser) such a program would be permissible. This program need not cause apprehension either to the friends of naval limitation in the United States or to foreign public opinion.

The danger in the situation lies in the continuance of the present acrimonious debate regarding the respective naval objectives of the two Powers. This is serving to create the feeling that, after all, each may be building chiefly with a view to the program of the other. As it seems only too likely that this situation will continue until a basis for a limitation is discovered, no time should be lost in starting the diplomatic interchanges which will serve to show whether agreement is possible. We already have the assurance that the British Government is giving careful consideration to the American note commenting on the Anglo-French agreement. The next move towards unravelling the naval tangle lies with London.

LATIN AMERICA, EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

By F. Garcia Calderon

SINCE the war Europe has seemed inclined to come closer to Latin America; but Latin America, without forgetting the bonds, the interests, the sympathies which unite Americans to the Old World, has been drawing away, striving instead to create a new civilization which will harmonize all the various elements in New World tradition and history. Until recently, Latin America welcomed the influence and accepted the spiritual tutelage of the Old World, admiring everything European with a mixture of naïveté and passion. But at the same time Latin America criticized Europe freely. For all of their revolutions, Latin Americans visualized themselves as destined some day to play a great rôle in the world.

Europe, meantime, had only contempt for these new countries so prone to anarchy. The South American republics had no part in the first Hague Conference of 1897: they were not considered capable of joining a union of civilized peoples.[1] Any number of European authors might be quoted in this sense. In Le Bon's monumental work on the psychology and evolution of race, the Spanish-American peoples were credited neither with energy nor will-power nor even with morality. How great their contrast with the English race, which had also been transplanted to America — a race so firm of will, so sure of itself, so merciless toward the weak, a race of true latter-day Romans, dominating others through qualities of character! In the South, Latin decadence — there, left to themselves, "the Latin American republics would revert to barbarism!" In the North, Le Bon pointed to the great energetic republic, a land of liberty (but not of equality and fraternity — "those two Latin chimeras"), always progressing, and destined perhaps to rule the world. Vainly did Spanish America copy the Constitution of the United States — the history of a people depends not on its legal institutions but on its racial character! Though alike in their laws, though blessed with an equally rich soil, though possessing a territory equally vast (twice as large as Europe), "these republics, without a single

[1] Though at the second Hague Conference, in 1907, men like Ruy Barbosa, Drago, Perez Tirana, took a distinguished share in defending the principle of compulsory arbitration.

exception, are perpetual prey to a most bloody anarchy," and "founder, one after the other, in spoliations, bankruptcies, despotisms." "An experiment is being tried in the New World and that experiment is inexorably condemning the South American democracies to death!"

Pan-Germanic writers had an equal scorn for states "where man had everything but liberty." According to Tannenberg, "it would be a blessing for these backward peoples to fall into the hands of Germany" and be saved from tyrants who "strip them of their wealth and spend it abroad and who supplant each other, through continual revolutions, while bankruptcy ever impends." Houston Stewart Chamberlain's famous "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," read and recommended by William II, set forth that nowhere, not even among the savages of Australia, could one find human beings less worthy of respect than the unhappy Paraguayans, Peruvians and others, who, "if it were not for the presence of foreigners among them, would fall into a bestial barbarism." For Reimer, the "half-breed New World" had no redeeming feature; it was "chaos and nothing else." From Harvard University, a German philosopher, Hugo Münsterberg, could see in those democracies only an "absurd masquerade, without liberty, without trustworthy principles;" and he urged the German Government to establish in South America colonies "which would furnish the United States no greater cause for complaint than similar German colonies in Africa."

The best that might be said is that at the end of the nineteenth century Spanish America was either unknown or despised in Europe. As the *Temps* recently put it: "Lacking direct and accurate information on South America, Europeans were resigned to ignorance about that very considerable portion of the human race, or indeed were ready to substitute for such ignorance any legend or fairy tale that came to hand."

A world tragedy, then impending, was to change this situation. During the Great War, the Spanish American continent, young, generous, romantic in its ambitions and in its beliefs, offered lavish coöperation to the peoples of Europe, above all to France — moral coöperation for a time, it is true, but before long it was a question of blood. South America sent to European battlefields a true élite of her sons, an élite made up especially of intellectuals, who fought in the ranks of the Allied armies and helped by heroic example to rouse their home governments to participation. The

principles involved in the struggle were clearly drawn. It was a question of autocracy and democracy. Predatory empires were seeking to crush the liberty of democratic peoples. Militarism, the cult of war, organized industrial feudalism, a new mysticism of State, claims of a natural ethnic supremacy on the part of the Germans! There was a fundamental opposition between the dogmas of the Central Empires and the professed beliefs of the New World.

The bonds thus established between Latin America and Europe in the World War were very close. They were sanctified by blood and grounded in history. Did this mean that Latin America would return to the European fold?

Peculiar circumstances, the new order of things born of the war, stood in the way of such an outcome. It has been charged that in order to gain favor with the United States, which seemed to be in a restless mood and fearful of clashes of doctrine and race on American territory, the Allies abandoned Spanish America to its fate, in other words to its moral isolation, and thereby recognized the hegemony of the United States as the one great power among the all too divided American republics.

Who was supposed to have instigated this manœuvre? No one knows. Perhaps England, a nation bound to the North American republic by ties of common civilization. In a story circulated in those days the English government was reported to have used Washington as intermediary in communicating with a South American government. This choice of a roundabout route was regarded as significant. It was said that in London's estimation the United States had received a virtual mandate for South America and was to be considered its natural spokesman. England, the great creditor power, was yielding her ground, handing over the profits of South American management to the United States!

This Machiavellian policy was no doubt never carried very far. On the contrary, it gave way to thoughts of closer coöperation, especially between France and certain of the South American republics. It is hard to say just how official such ideas may have been. They were undoubtedly played with by many French diplomats. France had won the war in the name of the great principles of justice and liberty. She stood face to face with England, likewise victorious and surrounded with a brood of Dominions. France should take the lead, powerful through her

prestige in the League of Nations. The formation of a *bloc* of Spanish-American peoples might assure to France the benefits of victory and meantime facilitate a longer and more arduous task: the promotion of peace not only in Europe but throughout the world, the famous labor of "continuous creation," as it was called in those days.

But whatever the attitude of the French Government toward this policy, it was forced to move in another direction — toward Poland, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, which stood ready to supply France with a different *bloc* more useful from certain geographical and strategical points of view.

II

For that matter, in 1919, such South American states as were to participate in the Peace Congress were classified among the "peoples with limited interests." How could they have expected more, if Belgium herself was in that class and only the Great Powers possessed the secret of the future? The New World republics which had lent moral and material aid to the Allies represented number, to be sure; but that was all. They were said to be "lacking in measure."

In these circumstances, the League of Nations established by the Covenant seemed to be the one remaining refuge for the ingenuous or exaggerated expectations of the South Americans. They were looking, at the time, for the prompt juridical settlement of such American questions as the Tacna-Arica dispute and Bolivia's claims against Chili, in accord with a standard of absolute justice which would uphold the weak and humble the strong. And these questions did attract sympathetic attention, when they were brought first before the Peace Conference and then before the League. But soon it became apparent that many difficult problems would fail of settlement in terms of an inflexible idealism — *summum jus, summa injuria!* Wilsonism gave ground before the old reliable "reason of State." This was a keen disappointment for South Americans who had set all their hopes on the new order proclaimed by the new prophet.

Nevertheless, once the League was founded and at work, the delegates from Latin America were received at Geneva with every mark of distinction. When Brazil decided to withdraw, the Council appealed to the great South American republic and begged her to return, to bear witness by her presence and her support to the

organization's universal and œcumenical character. And at the present moment the position of the South American republics at Geneva is honorable not to say brilliant — the presidency has been offered them on several occasions. Nevertheless, Señor de Narvaez, who is well informed on League matters, has pointedly remarked that the South Americans figure at Geneva in a function something like that of the Grand Eunuch: their posts are distinguished, but their influence is scanty. They sit on the Council but not to consider the affairs of their own continent. They participate, with courteous discretion, in discussions on European affairs. They sign reports. In other words, they act as chorus in a drama where the actors are all foreigners and played on a stage far removed from their world.

And yet the League depends upon the South American members; for the League holds the world scene constantly in view and knows that the representatives from the New World will always sustain the equality of all peoples before the law. On certain occasions, the South Americans have energetically criticized decisions of the League and they can boast of having stood more faithfully than others by the spirit of the Covenant. For example, Argentina in 1920 demanded the democratization of the League, the equality of all nations, and the creation of new seats on the Council. Quite recently Costa Rica, speaking through a former President of that republic, denounced the formation of a Great Power oligarchy within the League, and the same country requested the League to define the meaning and the scope of the Monroe Doctrine.

It is worth noticing that the Paris *Temps*, despite its habitual wariness, lent support to this latter suggestion from Costa Rica. It remarked that the Monroe Doctrine is a unilateral affair, and not one of those "regional understandings," referred to in Article XXI of the Treaty, which are calculated to guarantee peace and are not incompatible with the letter and the spirit of the Covenant. The principle of universality, it insisted, is essential to the League and must be upheld. No restrictions can be made upon it. None of the American republics signatory to the Pact has the right to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in order to evade specific obligations. All such republics have the rights and the duties which belong to nations on other continents. The Treaty is a unit and none of its articles may be abrogated. To be sure, the Monroe Doctrine has changed with the passing years in accord with the

growing power of the United States, with the necessary and natural expansion of that country. But the Doctrine, the *Temps* contends, can not be regarded as an obstacle to the action of a World League, nor can it set off a territory as vast as the two Americas from the League's beneficent influence.

Such, at present, would seem to be the official opinion of France on the possibility of a clash between Pan-Americanism and the League of Nations. A former French Ambassador at Washington, M. Jules Cambon, has meantime considered "The State of the Monroe Doctrine in 1928," in an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. In regard to the same possibility he remarks: "A certain number of South American States are members of the Pan-American Union and at the same time have seats in the League of Nations. A highly important rôle devolves upon such Powers. They are the connecting links between the two worlds. It is their task to prevent, as between the two great instruments of world accord, the maturing of any differences which may under certain conditions turn into antagonisms."

III

The *bloc* which France refrained from attempting to form at Geneva seems, meantime, to have attracted the interest of Spain. Spain has complained of the opposition to be noted between the rising nationalism of the various South American nations and the spirit and practice of Hispano-Americanism. She views that opposition as a danger to the close and enduring ties that exist between the "mother" state and the South American republics. "The Spanish American sentiment," writes E. Gomez de Baquero, "is by no means stronger than the national sentiments of those peoples."[2] Accordingly, when Spain and Brazil put forward their candidatures to permanent seats in the Council, they did not find very warm support among the Spanish American nations. And this aloofness was due, as the same distinguished writer admits, not to any lack of sympathy, but to the influence of an opposing principle of policy. The South American nations refuse to be represented by anybody else. They do not recognize any hegemony. Jealous of their independence, they assert their national pride against any attempt at federation. At the very best, such feelings are strong enough to determine the course of diplomacy. The hope of creating extensive political systems in the

[2] "Nacionalismo e Hispanismo," Madrid, 1928.

Spanish world, of raising an Hispanic *bloc* in opposition to the Anglo-Saxon *bloc*, a United States of Spanish America against a United States of English America, must for the moment be deemed illusory.

Hispanism is a super-national sentiment. Several nationalities have arisen within the organism of a great country. They have become independent States, but without forgetting their origins and retaining a sense of mutual kinship derived from the use of a single tongue. Language is the fundamental bond between the various sections of the Spanish world. Spain's economic relations with South America may be of secondary importance as compared with her interests in other European countries. But the Spanish language is always there. De Baquero, it is true, thinks that Hispano-Americanism is still in its nebulous stage, an affair mostly of after-dinner toasts and poems of racial brotherhood and hope. But it was only after 1898, when Spain lost the last of her American provinces, that she really began to turn to a serious policy of rapprochement inspired by practical objectives.

At the time of the signing of the Kellogg agreement, the *Epoca* of Madrid uttered some noteworthy views on this subject. "Spain," it declared, "is the intellectual home of the nations of Latin America. Our ties with South America are becoming closer and closer; and that should be the keynote of all our policy — we should not vary from it for a single moment. Now the most direct opposition to Hispano-Americanism comes from Monroïsm; and if, in the text of the [Kellogg] Pact there be any reservations, even marginal ones, favorable to the Monroe Doctrine, is it not the imperious duty of Spain to express reservations herself?" The immediate problem, as the *Epoca* sees things, is to organize an Ibero-American *bloc* to include Spain, Portugal and all the American republics. Spain has a place in the European concert, and she is proud to have one. But "solidarity" with the Latin American countries is more important. To come closer to these, to win their confidence, Spain should be willing to slacken her connections with the European Powers.

Among recent steps taken by the Spanish Directorate in accord with the views expressed by the *Epoca* may be mentioned the creation of the Spanish Bank of Foreign Commerce, which will devote special attention to South America and have branches in all the important towns of the New World.

Some Spanish writers of note, sympathizing with this same

policy, think that Spain should strive for an important part in the League of Nations. Since Geneva is at present the focus of certain ambitions of the great society of Spanish-speaking peoples, Spain must be present there and should assume a position of leadership. The Spanish American groups might thus attain to great influence, coöperating in the creation of a political policy of Inter-American, as well as European, scope. Thus in Hispano-Americanism would be found a counter for the Monroe Doctrine.

Spanish intellectuals are busily engaged, meantime, in strengthening and multiplying connections with their "brothers" in the Americas. Their lecturers frequently visit the Spanish-American capitals, where they are welcomed as pilgrims and crusaders. Rough spots occasionally are laid bare in these contacts. Why do South Americans go to Paris when they settle in Europe? France has even been accused of determining such choices by a subtle propaganda of her own. Then, again, it is difficult for a great people which has created a colonial empire to treat its sometime colonists on a plane of strict equality. Also, the Spaniard who has emigrated to South America and returns home with his wealth is often the butt of witticisms in Spanish theatres. On the other hand, in the New World the immigrant from Spain is looked down upon and treated as an inferior by the peoples which profit by his labor. Hence clashes and misunderstandings on both sides, though through them all the trend toward a rapprochement is unmistakable. While the Spanish Court has proved less responsive to such sentiments of brotherhood, the Spanish Universities have begun to devote the closest attention to Spanish American history and affairs. In the Americas a new note is apparent, especially in historical writings dealing with the wars of independence. Those conflicts are now being described as family quarrels between provinces of a Spanish nation, as real civil wars between brothers possessing the same defects and the same qualities. Spanish critics are generously recognizing American influences on their culture. De Baquero declares frankly that "the whole development of recent poetry in Spain has been due to a Nicaraguan, Ruben Dario." Some writers of the Spanish modernist school recently claimed that the South American intellectual was taking his cue from Madrid and might properly be regarded as a provincial of the Spanish intellectual world. This latter concession, however, provoked a hot rejoinder from

Argentina, where the advance guard repudiated any intellectual dependence upon Madrid or upon any other European capital.

There is a school of thinkers in a higher sphere which aspires to a spiritual federation of the Spanish world wholly apart from, and in lieu of, any political relations. In 1896, Angel Ganivet, who with Unamuno has been one of the great forces in the intellectual and spiritual life of Spain, declared: "I am opposed to any political federation, present or future, between the Ibero-American peoples." On the other hand, he believed that a real brotherhood prevailed between the Spaniards of Europe and the Spaniards of America, Spanish genius leaving its indelible mark upon every country it touches. The inner revolutions of the Spanish American democracies he regarded as expressions of youth, signs of a robust abundant life which had not yet found its permanent channels. The remarkable writings of Luis Araquistain also maintain that what is needed is "an Ibero-American organization of an intellectual character which carefully avoids any political or juridical ties." The Spanish Empire of old must come to life again without any trace of its ancient characteristics of violence and oppression. The democratic emperor of this new and free federation must be Cervantes! Not even the type of the English Commonwealth is to be imitated. Every idea of political supremacy must be discarded, along with everything that suggests, even remotely, the colonial past.

IV

London is no longer the only financial center for South American loans. New York has become a real rival. Nevertheless, the prestige of England seems as strong as ever, especially in Argentina and Chile. English capital has everywhere aided in developing the resources of the southern continent, and everywhere British influence has been judged useful and beneficent. South Americans have always admired and loved certain English qualities — English reliability in business, English honesty, English "manhood." In Latin America the masculine code of honor is English, just as the norm of feminine fashion is French. But in spite of the close connections of England with South American independence — "The liberty of the New World," said Canning "was necessary to the stability of the Old" — and despite the great achievements of English enterprise, English engineering and English capital in Latin America, England takes

less interest in things there than does either France or Germany. To be sure, in recent years the London *Times* has been publishing a supplement devoted to South American affairs, but the press at large seems too much absorbed in the Dominions to pay much attention to the Latin republics. English influence has been rivalled by that of Germany and surpassed by that of the United States. It has been content with the ground it already held.

As a matter of fact, England abandoned the policy of resisting the rising tide of the United States in Latin America as early as 1895. At the time of the Venezuelan boundary disputes, Mr. Olney, the American Secretary of State explained to Lord Salisbury that American interests were paramount in the continent to the South. The explanation really contained a threat. England had nothing left to do except agree, yield without bitterness, win every advantage possible in open competition, but otherwise abandon all thought of an English hegemony. Lord Salisbury was defending a position already condemned by history. The Monroe Doctrine, he claimed, had no standing in international law. "It is an international impertinence!" Bismarck had already exclaimed. Vain words, bootless regrets!

Germany, for her part, seems to have forgotten that she was not so long ago placed under the ban of Western civilization. She feels disposed to regain the ground she has lost in South America. The drive made by the German Imperialists before the war to make German influence predominant in the Latin South succeeded in creating a real "menace" in Brazil and Chile: German immigrants in the two states of Santa Catalina and Rio Grande do Sul were estimated at 400,000 and native-born children of German immigrants came to occupy high posts in public administration. Nevertheless this German population caused no trouble to the national unity of Brazil when that country declared war on Germany — another proof that America captivates the European immigrant in the Spanish South quite as readily as it does in the Anglo-Saxon North. At any rate, the war over, Germany promptly resumed relations with the republics beyond the sea. She began showering very particular attentions upon the rare South American writers and politicians who had defended her cause. If the Prince of Wales went to Argentina, the German ex-Chancellor Luther, to mention only one, toured the whole continent of South America. An abundant German literature is

being devoted to the Latin republics, while, through translations of German philosophers and historians made in Spain, the Reich is trying to reach the younger generations in the South American universities.

The Fascist régime in Italy looks with favor upon everything suggesting a closer approach to the nations of the New World. As the *Popolo d'Italia* recently put it, Italy must exploit racial affinities for purposes of commercial expansion. Italian immigrants have contributed in no small measure to the development of some South American countries. Out of a population of thirty-six millions in Brazil, two and a half million are of Italian extraction. The proportion is still more striking in Argentina, where at least forty percent of the population is of Italian origin. Instead of neglecting these remote American markets, Italy must, therefore, advance and win them! She must, in particular, support the nascent South American campaign against commercial penetration from the United States. Meantime she must apply to her emigrant children the famous law of Delbruck, which Germany followed with no visible success: she must keep a finger on the emigrant and prevent him from losing his nationality to the advantage of the country in which he settles.

But this Italian effort bids fair to fail, as did the German effort before the war. The Italians settled in Brazil, in the Argentine, in Uruguay, do not contemplate ever returning to their native land. They love Italy, but they buy property in South America. Next to native-born Argentinians themselves, Italian families, according to the figures of 1924, are the greatest landholders in the Argentine. *La Nación* of Buenos Aires, has gloried a number of times in the sentimental transformation which Argentine patriotism engenders without effort in the immigrant. South America is not afraid of her newcomers.

V

But while Europe, as a whole, has thus been groping for some counterbalance to the supremacy of the United States in the New World, she has been admitting decadence at home. This spirit is widely diffused in Europe. It accounts for the success of books such as Spengler's "Decline of the West." Certain authors, furthermore, especially German authors, have been preaching a rapprochement with Asia, renunciation of a Western civilization which is too much under the influence of materialism,

wealth, the machine. The Italian historian, Ferrero, has addressed—to the "deaf"—an appeal for a sort of modern asceticism which will avert the dangers of this love of power and success by which too many moderns are obsessed. In England, Dean Inge has been prophesying an imminent decline of the British Empire, lamenting the deterioration of the English stock under the influence of socialism, a decay, however, to which he seems personally to be resigned.

Latin Americans have been taking such talk at its face value and instead of continuing to look to the Old World for guidance, they have begun to think of becoming independent in intellectual spheres. It is time, they think, for South America to create an original civilization of its own, something more just and more humane than that of old Europe. It is in this mood of rambling curiosity and love of novelty — instinctive traits in most Spanish Americans — that the Southern republics have been turning from Paris to Moscow in quest of light on the new age now dawning. Since 1917 all South America has been under the spell of the Slavic Messianism, seeking principles of regeneration in a revolution which could not be imitated but which could nevertheless be admired. To be sure, the first thrill has now passed. Even the leaders of the Mexican revolution, who set out along avowedly Russian lines, have declared that they are now concerned only with the needs of the Mexican people and are developing their agrarian policy inside the pattern of a democratic state. To the Andean republics of the Pacific coast and to Mexico, where there is a strong Indian element in the population, the appeal of the Russian revolutions was what might be called "the lure of the East." Some ambitious dreamers went so far as to imagine that Mexico's rôle in history might prove to be that of a melting pot for merging three civilizations into one — the Asiatic, the European, the American. Mexico is already the "bulwark of the race," the "necessary frontier" on the north. As Mexico studies her past, she feels herself drawn closer to Asia.

However vague such theories, however confused such sentiments, they are none the less powerful. Under their influence the down-trodden, propertyless classes of the New World are awakening to self-consciousness. Indeed, a peaceful social revolution is developing within all these Latin American republics, a revolution more or less like what Rathenau, in 1919, described as "the revolution of vengeance." A new oligarchy is rising to

accuse former oligarchies of lack of patriotism, of excessive servility to European ideals. Half-breeds, Indians of pure blood, are numerous; but they are still far from the conquest of liberty. Rather is it a question of a new kind of leadership, of a new social class which is preparing for the conquest of power on the platform of closer attachment to the American soil, of purer American origins, of stronger national sentiments. No one can foretell whether this inner civil struggle is destined to grow keener. What one may safely say is that "Indianism" as it is nowadays being conceived, is tending to accentuate such a struggle by adding elements of a *revanche* of races long subject upon the heirs of their conquerors and oppressors. These classes, naturally less orderly by instinct, like to contrast their rugged and uncouth "virility" with the "degeneracy" of the old colonial families of European culture. They declare that a more homogeneous South American society will emerge after the groups tainted with "Europeanism" are eliminated from power.

Stripping such notions of their unjust and violent exaggerations, one can see that underneath them lies something real. Even in the most cultured circles in Spanish America there will always linger a certain restlessness, a certain sense of expatriation, from an intellectual and moral point of view. Joachim Nabuco, a Brazilian writer who once represented his country at Washington, has subtly analyzed the very peculiar state of mind of peoples who have two countries at the same time — Europe, which is the home of their civilization, America, which is the land of their birth, the land they love and of which they are proud. "In America," he writes, "tradition is lacking in everything, in landscape, in architecture, in life. In Europe, on the other hand, we miss the sense of being really at home, we feel separated from the mold in which each of us was cast at birth. On one side of the ocean, absence of a past; on the other side, absence of a country. Our sentiments are Brazilian, our thoughts are European."

The older colonial classes who suffer most from this sentimental paradox are condemned to exile. The new opposition invent the strangest names to flout their affection for the spirit and for the tradition of Spain. Nice and the Côte d'Azur are becoming a sort of South American Coblentz, a haven of refuge for the South American counter-revolution.

"Eurasia" is the name given by some Russians to symbolize the historic mission they assign to themselves — the coalescence

of Asia and Europe through the agency of a chosen people from Moscow, a third Rome. Ricardo Rojas, an Argentine writer of great repute — he is provost of the University of Buenos Aires — has now coined a word "Eurindia." Eurindia is a doctrine. It is also a gospel, which preaches a blending of European and American civilizations, of cosmopolitanism and Indianism. "The Latin genius," Rojas writes, "is stifled in an atmosphere which is not its own, since, from the historical point of view, that genius comes from Europe. In its turn the European spirit, transported to America, is also stifled in an atmosphere which, from the geographical point of view, is American." The remedy is to combine the two elements. "Our cities are often European, but our rural districts remain American — a *genius loci* protects them, the half-breed controls them. In a word, the Spanish are Hispanizing the Indian and the Indian and the New World are Indianizing the Spaniard. Now New World culture should be different from that of Europe. For the moment it is still in its infancy. It imitates, it is not sure of itself. In the end it will blaze its own trail, a new one."

In drawing apart from the Old World, in submitting Old World influences to a merciless analysis, the Spanish-American is somehow drawn closer to the United States, in spite of the many crises this instinctive friendliness encounters. Something deep-lying — youth, perhaps, confidence in a new vigor, a new enthusiasm, vast wealth as contrasted with a bruised and impoverished Old World, the free prospect of a future untrammeled by traditions — a sense of these seems to bind the North and the South, the Anglo-Saxon and the Spanish-Latin, together.

This crucible of nationalities, this melting-pot of races, is boiling in every zone of the New World. A Mexican statesman, José Vasconcelos, whom all Latin America hails as one of its masters of thought, believes that a new race will be formed in the Americas, the unitary "cosmic" race. In an effort to construct a philosophy of history in which the myth of Atlantis is linked with data more precise, Señor Vasconcelos scouts biological theories which condemn crossbreedings and hybridisms. In his opinion America's rôle is not to exterminate the aboriginal populations, but to merge them in a "fifth race," the best race hitherto known to history, a race possessing all the inheritances of the past. What has been the ambition of the United States? To wipe out the red-skin in order that the white man might rule the American

continents as he ruled in northern Europe — in other words, a repetition of what all victorious nations have done in the course of history. Quite other the "divine" mission of the so-called Latin-Americans, who are to create the synthetic human being, a being who will give adequate expression to "the total ambition of the World." A "prodigious" race, the Nordic. But it has sinned unpardonably in wiping out the Indian, instead of assimilating him as the Spanish conquerors did. The United States will build, at the best, the "last empire of the whites." Whereas in the South, the blood and the genius of all races are fusing in a rich symphony. A vaster vision of the world is growing up. The sense of human brotherhood is deeper and more real. It is for Latin America, the new Atlantis, to create a land of liberty without hatred or contempt alike for yellow, red and European.

This simple faith in the future of South America reminds one of the Americanism dominant in certain sections of the Middle West of the United States. Its manifestations can be seen in the Argentine and Brazil, through the whole length of Whitman's "long, too long America." It is a dream of victory and pride, the overflowing of a health which knows no doubt, no limit, and explodes in a magnificent assertion of power and freedom.

THE RHINELAND OCCUPATION

By Wilhelm Marx

SINCE the day when the German Foreign Minister, Walter Rathenau, closed his celebrated speech at the Genoa Conference with the impressive words "Peace! Peace! Peace!" and since Locarno and Thoiry laid the foundations for the triumph of conciliation, it has been impossible to silence the cry of the European peoples for enduring peace and security. Indeed, the peace movement among the nations of Europe in general has been gaining ground steadily. The underlying principle of the League of Nations, however imperfectly realized in practice, aims at nothing more than the settlement of differences of opinion between peoples in a peaceful way. Unfortunately in many parts of the continent there are unmistakable sources of danger; to those already present before the war, the unhappy Treaty of Versailles has added. Whoever is earnest in wishing for European peace, for world peace, must keep close watch on these points of tension. In particular, who can ignore the danger of military complications between France and Germany which exists today as a result of a whole series of phases in the historical and cultural development of the two nations, as a result even of their geographical situation? For over a thousand years they have waged a bitter struggle, with ever varying fortune. Here is always a glowing spark which only too easily can be fanned into a fierce destroying flame unless it is held rigidly under control.

The German people *want* peace, with that earnestness, that whole-heartedness, that integrity of mind which is characteristic of them. They want peace, not because they are weak, but because they have a clear realization of how intensely the cultural progress of humanity suffers from the scourge of war, and that even the victors do not escape! The German people has shown its will to peace in more than words. It has carried out the disarmament imposed upon it so thoroughly that even the Allied Disarmament Commission has been constrained to acknowledge the fact. It has lived up to the spirit of the Treaty of Locarno and joined the League of Nations. If all the German cabinets since the signature of the Versailles Treaty are considered one by one, it will be seen that not only have they announced their unfaltering devotion to peace but have demonstrated their full sincerity in action.

Paralyzing the honest efforts of the German Government toward understanding and conciliation, agitating and embittering the population at the very time when the European world seemed ripe for reconciliation and quiet, one fact, rising out of the Treaty of Versailles, looms like a great grey ghost on the horizon: the occupation by French, Belgian and British troops of German territory. Like an arrow in the flesh, this military burden has been goading the German people for over ten years, an ever-present menace to peace. The northern part of the Rhineland has been freed from this occupation since January, 1926; the second zone is to be evacuated in 1929; the third zone, however, embracing principally the Hessian and Bavarian Palatinate, is doomed to wear the chains of occupation until 1935. And this with a completely disarmed nation! In March 1928 there were over 67,000 foreign troops on German soil.

It is hard to imagine the depth of spiritual and physical misery which such an occupation entails. To appreciate it, one must have experienced the degradation of it at close quarters. It will be left for future generations to realize the heroism of spirit and the strength of character shown by the population of the occupied regions in patiently enduring the oppression of the last long years — the curtailment of their personal liberty and the enormous financial and commercial losses which individuals and communities have had to suffer. The requisitioning of the best rooms of dwellings for the quartering of troops during months and years, the sharing of kitchens or else their complete monopolization, the continual danger of disputes between the occupying forces and the inhabitants, leading to innumerable trials before foreign courtsmartial and heavy punishments, the difficulties put in the way of trade between one community and another, the prohibition of the singing of the national anthem and of parades — these are a few of the more obvious indignities and difficulties. Even since the two countries achieved better relations through the Locarno agreements there has been no appreciable improvement in these matters. Almost every month there have been incidents due to drunken soldiers and the maltreatment of peaceful citizens.

It must certainly not be lost sight of that the Rhineland Commission as well as individual army commanders have tried to mitigate the confusion and disorder. But they have met with very slight success. Only the severest discipline could have held in check the soldiers, non-commissioned officers and minor officials,

who unfortunately are the very ones to come into closest contact with the population. But the courts of the occupying Powers have shown very little insight in punishing disciplinary lapses. The extent to which this failure has chilled any feeling of enthusiasm for the spirit of conciliation and compromise among the peoples of the occupied territory can hardly be exaggerated.

The figures giving the number of the troops of occupation on German soil speak for themselves.

The official figures show that on December 1, 1921, there were in the occupied territory 138,500 men, of whom 93,000 were French, 25,300 Belgian, 7,800 British and 12,300 American. The numbers of the army of occupation reached their highest peak on December 15, 1923, during the year of the Ruhr struggle; the total then was 163,000 men, of whom 116,000 were French, 36,200 Belgian and 11,300 British. In the middle of 1926 this number fell to about half; of the 84,500 men, 69,100 were French, 7,400 Belgian and 8,000 British. In spite of Locarno and the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations, in spite of the testimony of the Allied Control Commission that Germany had been disarmed, the forces of occupation in the spring of 1928 comprised 67,259 men — 54,900 French, 5,500 Belgian and 6,700 English.

Is it not demanding more than can be expected of human nature that ten years after the end of a war any people should still be called upon to endure such masses of foreign troops camped on their very doorsteps? The statesmen of France could have made a material contribution to the cause of human culture and to the triumph of the spirit of peace had they recognized the needs of the times and acted accordingly.

We are challenged to a comparison with the attitude of Bismarck after the victorious termination of the War of 1870. Bismarck proved himself a great statesman when, taking into consideration the natural sensibilities of a great nation, he met the French wishes half-way and withdrew the German troops of occupation more speedily than the Versailles Armistice and the Treaty of Frankfurt obligated him to do. The last German soldier actually left French soil by September 1873, or scarcely two and a quarter years after the conclusion of peace.

Is there no way, it may be asked, in which Germany may legally protest against the occupation of her territory by foreign troops? Since she has disarmed, entered the League of Nations, participated in the Treaty of Locarno and given many other proofs

of her desire for peace, Germany most assuredly is legally entitled to request the evacuation of her territory. Article 431 of the Treaty of Versailles says: "If before the expiration of the period of fifteen years Germany complies with all the undertakings resulting from the present Treaty, the occupying forces will be withdrawn immediately." The representatives of Germany, and in particular Foreign Minister Stresemann, have repeatedly and emphatically demanded the evacuation of the occupied territories upon the strength of this article. And indeed, if the full range of the negotiations between the three Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and England during the last few years were carefully gone over, passages could certainly be quoted from Briand and Chamberlain recognizing Germany's right to put forth such a claim. It is noteworthy, incidentally, that Lloyd George, who is certainly in a position to judge the matter, declared at the meeting of the Liberal Party at Yarmouth on October 12, 1928, that the provisions of the Versailles Treaty in regard to the obligations of general disarmament were very explicit. They have been fulfilled by Germany both in letter and in spirit. *The continuation of the military occupation of German territory by Allied troops is therefore a violation of a solemn treaty.*

Germany is beyond question in a position to make good her legal claims. But it is only too true that to rely solely on a legal point of view in the presentation of a plea of this kind in no way assures that it will be given consideration. This whole question is a political one, and as such requires something quite impossible to find — a judge capable of rendering a decision on a delicate question of right with the likelihood that his sentence will be carried out. But even from the purely political standpoint the German claim that the occupied territories be evacuated is in the highest degree well-founded.

There have been repeated demonstrations that nothing slows up the development of the spirit of peace and compromise with France so much as the prolongation of the occupation. The German Nationalists, especially when they are in the opposition, never let pass an opportunity of scoring the foolishness of the leading German statesmen who still expect salvation from the Treaty of Locarno; not a single advantage has accrued to Germany, they allege, in spite of every concession on her part — not even the hoped-for "reciprocity;" surely it is high time that the policy of reconciliation was abandoned. Briand's speech at the

last session of the League was admittedly a bitter disappointment to all true friends of peace. It destroyed that spirit of confidence so essential in political as in human relationships — a spirit which had been sedulously cultivated during the past few years by the quiet and consistent way in which Foreign Minister Stresemann conducted all his dealings with France and England.

On whose shoulders, then, lies the chief blame for the evil effects of the occupation of German territory? I am convinced that the answer to this question can only be unfavorable to France. Historically speaking, this is true of the responsibility for the antipathy which for over a thousand years has existed between the two neighbors. And now the present course of events furnishes a clear proof.

It is true that in the first months of the occupation all the Allied armies shared in rigorously carrying out the occupation and the oppression of the population. But the Americans almost at once, and the English shortly afterwards, attempted to make the occupation more bearable by cultivating better relations with the inhabitants of the occupied regions. Soon the Americans renounced all participation in the occupation and withdrew their troops. On that occasion and repeatedly thereafter Great Britain showed signs of being ready to withdraw its men also. Germany, however, preferred to have the British army of occupation remain. Its soldiers conducted themselves quietly and decently; and their presence assured the influence of England in the setting up and functioning of the Rhineland Commission. Excellent relations with the British army of occupation were established in the entire Cologne district. There were considerably fewer excesses among the British occupying forces than among the French troops. Discipline was excellent. Nor did the British participate in the occupation of the Ruhr, which led to especially harsh measures against the population and to the worst kind of encounters. In the few districts still occupied by English troops today their presence is hardly noticeable. Visitors to the famous city of Wiesbaden are almost unconscious of the fact that they are in an occupied city, though the occupation nevertheless is felt by the inhabitants and the city administration on account of the confiscation of rooms and the like.

In German circles it is freely admitted that during the past years England's attitude has been both correct and cordial. A break in this policy was seen last summer in the participation of a

large number of British troops in the very extensive manœuvres of the French army in the Rhine provinces. It is self-evident that trouble and agitation among the population must result from such large military exercises, involving the calling out of army divisions and the use of numerous cavalry divisions.

How can it be denied that the occupying Powers have done all they could to crush the spirit of the German people and to destroy their budding confidence in the possibility of building up of peaceful relationships between nations? It is being made increasingly difficult for the German Government to pursue the policy to which it has held for years in spite of every discouragement. Yet from this policy the Government must not and will not deviate. Like the majority of the German people, it realizes that this policy alone can achieve enduring success and that it must therefore be carried through in spite of every obstacle if one is not to give up hope of the progress of humanity. It is able to persevere with this policy only because it can rely on the firm determination of the majority of the German people and above all on the heroic strength of character of the population of the occupied regions, whose recent declaration, regardless of party affiliations, deserves the admiration of the whole world. The inhabitants of the occupied regions are determined that the German people as a whole shall not undertake any further burden or obligations in order to bring about an earlier evacuation; rather will they drain their bitter cup to the dregs. A people of this sort can be trusted to carry out what it acknowledges to be right. The German people want peace. Clear the way to peace by removing this heavy load from their shoulders.

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF IRISH NATIONALITY

By "A. E."

TO explain Ireland as it is today I must go back rather more than a quarter of a century. I do not think the intellectual character of the Irish revolution has been understood outside Ireland. The cables are in love with battle, murder and sudden death. For all these there is a broad highway, but not for beauty, not for the spirit, not for the cultural forces which are the inspiration of great movements and lie at their inception as the seed at the root of the great tree.

I think if the intimate history of the past quarter of a century in Ireland was truly told it would be one of the most fascinating of stories because of the variety of character, the poetry, beauty, imagination and thought which had been awakened. The heights as well as the depths of national life were stirred. There was heroism as well as devilry in it. Poets, scholars and economists contributed to the resurrection as well as politicians and fighters. There were movements in many directions which seemed dissociated from each other but which worked in a harmony which can now be recognized. The unborn State might have been the invisible captain of the host. They all contributed to the fire which went on blaze in Easter, 1916. I shall endeavor to show what the forces were and their interaction on each other, and later how far the ship of state which was launched found itself and the direction in which it is moving.

It might be thought in a country in which for over a century so many millions of Irish emigrants found a home, that the character of the Irish revolution would be well understood, that these millions would explain everything. But during that century or more in which Ireland sent out so many millions of its people there had been an alien domination over the Irish soul. It had become almost oblivious of its own past. The emigrants could tell indeed of the lamentable state of the country they had left. They could speak truly of contemporary history. But they could not speak about the soul of Ireland, about that which endures from century to century. Why could they not speak about that? Because state policy in Ireland had operated to crush out the Irish culture and language, that is, to extinguish national

memory. Our rulers had not the wisdom to make the country bilingual, to enrich it by knowledge of a language so widely spoken as English, which would have given access to a world culture, while at the same time preserving the national language, which would have permitted access to the ancestral self of the nation. The language faded out from city and field until it became the dialect of a dwindling folk on the western seaboard.

In losing their language the Irish last century lost memory of their own past. They were like a man whom some accident has bereft of memory and who has to begin life over again. A hateful youth was imposed on our people. You may imagine the loss if you suppose of the Romans, Persians or some other conqueror of Greece that they had substituted Latin or Persian for Greek, that the Greeks could not read the records of their own past history and culture, that Homer, Pericles, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Plato had become names without significance and even the scholars could not read them. In the century during which millions of Irish left Ireland the emigrants in the cultural sense were almost denationalized. In the political sense they were passionately national, that is, they desired to be self-ruling. But in the spiritual sense they had lost character, race memory, history, culture, tradition, all that binds a people from century to century and makes the present a unity with the past. Fundamentally it was because of the re-emergence of that cultural and spiritual nationality that the Irish revolution took place. If you are to understand that revolution you must know something of the ideas which were the inspiration of its leaders. The average man may not understand fully the thoughts that move his kind, but he has the same elements in his being and when the banner is displayed he becomes self-conscious and reels after the shepherds who call.

Towards the close of the last century the river of nationality which had been so long submerged, which had run like an underground river, welled up again in shining springs. What had happened? The scholars had been at work. There were many translations from the Irish, and the effect was like the rising of a fog. Instead of a vision blurred beyond almost contemporary history, immense vistas began to open. There are few nationalities in Europe with so ancient a culture. The Latin domination over Europe had obliterated in France, in England, in Spain, wherever it reached, almost all traces of the culture which had preceded it. In Ireland, which was never a part of the Roman

Empire, this was not so. It is a sign of immense cultural antiquity when a nation has its own cosmic and creation myths, and literature in Gaelic is so ancient that its Sagas go back to a period comparable with the Homeric stories in the character of the civilization they reveal. There are three cycles of legends gathering about three periods of that ancient Irish civilization, and there is also a rich mediaeval literature and poetry, and much of that ancient literature stirs the imagination as deeply almost as anything in the Greek mythological cycles. Those who have read Lady Gregory's two volumes of translations, "Gods and Fighting Men" and "Cuchulain of Muerthemore," will realize the beauty and imaginative powers in those ancient stories. Why do I go back thousands of years in order to make you understand a revolution which took place yesterday? Because the men who were the prime agents in that revolution were men in whom that ancient culture had been re-incarnated. I might say of Padraic Pearse, who was the leader of the insurrection in 1916, that he had made his soul out of the Gaelic tradition. He might be called its last militant champion. He and the men who were with him sounded the last trumpet for the Gaels and the dead were raised from the graves of fear, unbelief or despair by their sacrifice.

I confess I did not realize where the new movement was tending, though I became aware of a new spirit in Ireland at the close of last century. Through all that century the Irish people had their eyes turned to Westminster, where they sent a hundred members to state the case for the Irish nation. On the whole they stated it eloquently and well and they did secure many reforms in the government of Ireland. Through them came the downfall of feudalism in Ireland, the acts which brought about the transfer of land from landlord to tenant. That was the greatest achievement of Parliamentary Nationalism. But towards the close of the last century as if by an instinct or a conviction that little more could be accomplished by sending even the most eloquent advocates to the Parliament of another country, a number of Irishmen operating in many different directions began to turn their eyes from England. They did not believe in patriotism by proxy, in electing men for five years to be patriotic on their behalf. They were believers in direct action. It was the beginning of Sinn Fein, which is a word whose significance is self-reliance. That spirit began to manifest in many ways. There was the economic movement promoted by that great Irish statesman, Sir Horace

Plunkett. Instead of talking to farmers about what the state might or should do for them he showed them what they could and ought to do for themselves. He made them self-reliant. He brought over a thousand farmers' associations into being, dairy and agricultural and credit societies, with trade federations binding them together. Those associations were all trying to manufacture and market their products efficiently. Instead of working individually, every man for himself and the devil take the rest, they began to work together, to buy together, to manufacture together, to market together. The agricultural atoms conspired to create an organism so developed that there arose in it that consciousness of identity of interest which was the ancient Greek conception of citizenship. It was not only a great economic achievement, but a great moral achievement, and the spirit engendered in that movement overflowed and affected Irishmen in other movements.

I, as a worker in that movement, went much through Ireland and I became aware of another movement whose agents were also in every county. That was the Gaelic movement which was trying to do in the cultural sphere what Sir Horace Plunkett's Agricultural Organization was doing in the economic sphere. By direct action, by the sacrifice or devotion of young men and women, they were trying to create or rather to revive a native Irish culture. I did not realize what intensity of feeling, what a poetic passion was at the service of the Gaelic League, until about thirty years ago while I was in a little Galway town I found that Douglas Hyde, poet and scholar, the president of the Gaelic League, was there. He asked me to come and speak at his meeting and as I listened to that thrilling voice I realized how great a fire was being kindled. He was evoking the soul of Ireland, bringing into nationalism those spiritual and cultural elements without which politics are arid, bringing into life the beauty for which men are ready to die. Though he was never a politician, to him more than to any other man was due the reawakening of the true spirit of nationality. He is an old man now, but when I see him in his quiet old age I am reminded of Wells's story of the Food of the Gods and of the scientist who discovered it, little knowing what a gigantic brood would arise to dominate the earth. In Wells's story that scientist in his old age was wheeled about in an invalid chair and people pointed him out whispering, "That is the man who invented the Food." When I meet Hyde, for all that he

never was a politician, I see in him the fire bringer, who piled the wood which made so great a blaze when it was kindled.

About the same time Irish literary men began to declare their spiritual independence. Standish O'Grady, Yeats, Synge, Lady Gregory, Douglas Hyde, Edward Martyn, Alice Milligan, Katherine Tynan and later Padriac Pearse, Lennox Robinson, Padriac Colum, Seumas O'Sullivan, James Stephens, Dunsany, Austin Clarke and a score of others grew to repute. The greatest of these found their inspiration not in English tradition but in Irish tradition. I could see the effect upon them. Yeats when he was a boy was imitating Shelley. Then he discovered the Gaelic tradition, he came to himself and out of one of the most famous of Gaelic stories he made his first wonderful poem, "The Wanderings of Usheen," which made lovers of literature know that a great poet, the peer in genius of Shelley, Keats or Coleridge, was living. I remember talking over Synge with Yeats. We believed Synge had talent, but he had written nothing in evidence of that. Then Synge went and lived among the Gaelic speaking people in the Aran Isles and came back with the marvellous "Riders to the Sea," "The Playboy of the Western World," and we knew that Ireland had given birth to a dramatist of genius. Lady Gregory had been writing books of gossip. She also studied Irish, and another great dramatic talent was born out of the contact. James Stephens in his boyhood was imitating Browning. He also, affected by the Gaelic revival, studied Irish literature and wrote those enchanting fantasies, "The Crock of Gold," "Deirdre" and "In the Land of Youth." All these and many others became as people reborn after they had bathed in the Gaelic fountain. Besides these there were other Irish not of that fold, men like George Bernard Shaw and George Moore, who had won international repute, and a new pride was born in Ireland over all these. They were proof of the quality of intellect and imagination in the Irish and Anglo-Irish stock. We knew that no country in the world was producing literature of finer quality than our own, and that fact also was contributing to the new self-confidence of Irish nationality.

An Irish theatre was started which since its inception has produced nearly three hundred plays, many of which have been translated and acted in Europe and some have come to America. I mention the names of Synge, Yeats, Lady Gregory, Edward Martyn, George Moore, Bernard Shaw, Lord Dunsany, Padriac

Colum, Lennox Robinson, Sean O'Casey, T. C. Murray, all of them known outside Ireland. The starting of that Irish theatre, like the starting of Sir Horace Plunkett's agricultural societies, like Douglas Hyde's branches of the Gaelic League, was direct creative action. Ireland had begun to act from its own will and its own centre.

Labor whose organization in Ireland had long been feeble also stirred and began to create a solidarity of itself, drawing into its unions the agricultural workers, and to evolve its own conception of an Irish civilization. All these movements were unconcerned about party politics, yet they were intensely national, and early in the century a journal, the "United Irishman" whose title later was "Sinn Fein," was started by Arthur Griffiths, a man of most powerful and logical intelligence, who, if he had sold his pen, might have made a great fortune for himself; but he had but one idea, the political, economic and cultural resurrection of his country, and for twenty years he labored in poverty and obscurity until the political ideals associated with his journal became the ideals of the majority. He had no hope of achieving political freedom by appealing to Westminster. He also had the conviction that the political salvation of Ireland must be wrought in Ireland itself.

During the first decade of this century every one of these movements had evolved ideals of its own, conceptions of an Irish state, of an Irish culture, of a social order and civilization. The farmers had begun to see the possibility of a rural civilization with its workers organized in a coöperative association for purchase, manufacture and sale, using the profits to build village halls, to endow libraries, creating little village republics with presidents and cabinet directing the business, linked together by national federations into a solidarity of interest and effort. Labor, though far less powerful in Ireland than it is in highly industrial communities, had begun through James Connolly to formulate its own ideals of a coöperative commonwealth, in which the workers coöperatively organized in the cities would link up with the farmers through joint use of the same federations. The manufacturers were founding Industrial Development Associations, while the leaders of the Gaelic revival and of the Anglo-Irish literary movement were trying to create a new soul for the country in which there would be a marriage of the national culture with the new and the aged thought of the world.

At that time, a few years before the beginning of the European war, Ireland was heavy with dreams and imaginings about itself. It was like a cloud charged with electricity from which the flash must soon come. Everywhere there was being stored up that intensity of feeling which must translate itself into action. Men were so obsessed by their ideals that they were prepared to make any sacrifice for them, even of life itself. I began to hear of Irish volunteers, of bodies of young men who were drilling and arming in secret as if they had some inner prevision that the world would soon be at war, and the graves of nationalities might be opened by some miracle, and the buried nation arise if so be there was courage in the living to strike a blow on their own behalf. I have spoken about the cultural and psychic character of the revolutionary Ireland because we were still in the cultural stage, concerned more with what was within than what was without. We had not externalized our culture in a mechanism or civilization, and the leaders of the revolution as I knew them were all on fire with ideals. I confess I did not at first take this militant nationalism very seriously. I was temperamentally a pacifist, more interested in the national culture than in the state. Besides, we had listened to wild talk about fighting for freedom which never came to anything. Most people who heard that kind of oratory had grown cynical. We had no means of gauging the sincerity of these young men who looked back to Wolfe Tone, to Emmet, to Lord Edward FitzGerald and to John Mitchell, the heroes and martyrs of a hundred years before. Then the World War broke out, all Europe was ablaze and the heat was felt in Ireland. It might never have set Ireland in a blaze but for the fact that there were two movements in which men had been brought to despair. Padraic Pearse, the poet and a leader in what I may call cultural nationalism, felt that if another generation passed and nothing was done the national and Gaelic soul of Ireland was doomed. The language would be gone beyond resurrection, and, that gone, the Irish nation would be dead. There would be people living in Ireland of course, but not an Irish nation. He was ready to face death for his ideal. Then there was the labor movement which had just emerged defeated from the greatest strike ever known in Ireland. They were desperate, and their leader, James Connolly, a sombre concentrated man with a powerful character and intellect, felt, I think, that labor, defeated as it was in its own objects, might yet become the

savior of the nation, it might raise its status in Ireland by sacrifice, and it was Connolly and his friends I believe who first determined on an insurrection. These two hopes and these two despairs united. Connolly communicated with Pearse, who, after considering for a day, decided to come in with him, he and all he could influence among the volunteers. I was told this later by my friend Constance Markieviez, who acted as the go-between. But of all that was stirring few people in Ireland were aware, for there were but a few who were wrought up for so desperate an enterprise. There were only eleven hundred men in that insurrection which broke out at Easter in 1916 and who became the masters of Dublin for a week. I had no suspicion of this enterprise. Rumor generally has a thousand tongues in Ireland, but now they were stilled and bragged nothing. I went away to the country for two or three days holiday and returned to Dublin to find a pillar of fire and smoke rising heavenwards from the heart of the city where these few hundred desperate men fought for the freedom of their country against the soldiers of the most powerful empire in the world. I need not repeat the history of that insurrection. The cables are in love with battle and revolution, and the external history was told as elsewhere abroad. So sudden and desperate was the enterprise, so great a shock was it to the nation, that the first general feeling I think was of anger. Then came the execution of Pearse and Connolly, MacDonagh, Joseph Plunkett and other leaders, and the feeling changed. These men had died for their country. None could laugh at them any more. They had spoken greatly, but life cannot utter greater words than it can meet by sacrifice. High talk with them was equalled by high fate. The price was paid, and all over Ireland young men who had thought but lightly of the leaders of that revolution while living, recoiled from their cynicism and brooded on the heroes and martyrs of their country in pride and penitence.

For a year after there was little outward sign of a change of feeling. It might almost have been thought the sacrifice was unavailing. But I knew it could not be so. A year after the insurrection I walked in Sackville Street and looked on the ruins, and remembered that a year before men I had known intimately had been there, and had died for their country, and my heart was melted and I wrote some verses embodying I think the new feeling which had arisen in Ireland about Pearse and his comrades:

Last year at Easter there were faces pale and bright,
For the Lord had arisen from the grave which is fear.
Hearts were airy, eyes filled with inner light;
It was wrought, this miracle, among the ruins here.

Among the ruins here last Easter year awoke
The timeless immortal, and for a sheaf of hours
It was fearless, wilful, laughing, though on it broke
The wrath of the iron age, the weight of the iron powers.

They were not vanquished, the stars were on their side,
The hosts of stars that glitter about their heavenly goal
They see, as torch from torch is kindled, the fires flash wide,
A host of kindling spirits in the dark of Ireland's Soul.

These were a host now of kindled spirits, young men and women, who began again the struggle. The years before the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed in 1921 were terrible years. Through these years Ireland was veritably the country of the Young. Youth dominated the political life of Ireland. Its elders shivered, half fascinated, half terrified by the exploits of youth. There were terrible as well as noble things done. No people can take to war and expect that all their own soldiers any more than those they fight against will be animated by the antique chivalry of legend, by the spirit which made Cuculain and Fardiad pause and embrace in the midst of the combat as told in one of the greatest of Irish stories, or which made the ancient Queen Maeve look over the walls of her city on her enemies encamped about it, and cry out with a glow of heroic admiration, "Noble and regal is their appearance." That ancient chivalry is gone, and nations when they fight claw at the very spirit in their rage, and the smoke from burning cities and houses swirled round the feet of the war god in Ireland. The end of that struggle you know. Our rulers felt they could no longer withhold from the Irish freedom to govern themselves to build up their own civilization, culture and social order, to choose their own heroes and ideals. The price had been paid in sacrifice and the moral conscience of the world was stirred. It felt the quality of unbreakable will in the new Ireland when Terence MacSwiney made that long hunger strike in Brixton prison, dragging himself to death minute by minute, hour by hour, through long terrible weeks while Europe looked on in wonder at that unshaken will, that spirit which burned brightly in the body's lamp to the last thread of the wick. There

were heroic as well as terrible things done. It was the price we were forced to pay because a hundred years of peaceful constitutional action with the whole nation behind it had not brought freedom. Those who charge us with violence must remember that there were one hundred years of constitutional agitation without result. Let those who condemn answer why were those millions denied their freedom when for a hundred years they pursued it by peaceful methods, while it was granted when a few thousand men took to arms. I am a pacifist by temperament, but what can I answer when the failure of one movement with millions behind it is compared with the success of that other movement of force with but a few thousand in arms? I cannot reply.

Yet having aroused the war spirit we suffered from it ourselves, for there was an unexpended militarism after the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed and the Irish Free State came into being. After those agonizing years of conflict with Great Britain we had civil war between those who accepted the Anglo-Irish Treaty and those who held out for the full freedom of an Irish Republic. It is only just that I should say here how much during those years of struggle we owe to the sympathy and the practical help received from the citizens of America and not merely those with Irish ancestry. If there had not been this American sympathy openly expressed I doubt that we would ever have had the Irish Free State. I was in London for a week during the years of struggle and sought out Lord Northcliffe, the proprietor of the *Times*, who remembered that he was an Irishman. He asked me, "What can I do to help?" I said he could bring American opinion to bear upon English opinion, that his vast organization would enable him to get in touch with the leaders of opinion in the United States. In less than a week he had column after column of American opinions in the papers he controlled, the voice of America's prominent statesmen, lawyers and industrialists, and it was so unanimous in favor of Irish self-government that I think it was mainly responsible for the feeling which arose in Great Britain that the Irish question was not only a domestic problem but was a world question. It was due to the lavish generosity of American citizens that our country, so ravished by war, was able to support the derelicts of that war, the wives and children of prisoners, and those whose means of livelihood had been destroyed. Ireland can never forget that America was its

Samaritan. It is one country in Europe at least where there is neither fear nor envy of her greatness, but only gratitude.

It was a great tragedy, that civil war, and it was the greater because it was possible to make a reasonable, even a noble case, for both parties in the conflict. Anyhow, the civil war has now come to an end. Those who defended the Anglo-Irish Treaty and those who fought against it have come together at last and are working the same constitution if for different ends. The will of the majority is accepted by both as the expression of the national will.

What are we to say of this new state which has come into being as the outcome of so many dreams and so much sacrifice and such bitter conflict? This Irish State is the condensation of the fiery cloud, the equilibrium of the storm. Yet the reality appears to many to be so unlike the dream that they are dissatisfied. They do not recognize this as what they fought for, but I think there is a justice in human affairs and it brings to every people what in essence they worked for and loved. A nation is what it loves, and only what it loves can be said truly to be its own. I feel that our love for our own tradition which was so intense had not extended to include with sympathy and comprehension the Ulstermen and their ideals. I think our northern countrymen felt that our claim that they should be included in the Free State was a claim born out of our pride more than out of our affection. They did not feel that Nationalist Ireland understood their economic system or sympathized with their culture and tradition. They thought, I believe wrongly, that Nationalist Ireland would constrain them by force into the mold of the new ideal. They resisted inclusion in our Irish Free State, and so we have two self-governing communities in Ireland. The nation was reincarnated as twins. I believe they are growing friendlier to each other. They are watchful of each other, and in each case with some obscure pride, arising out of their fundamental Irishry, they wish each other well. I believe they can be brought together, but not by force, only by the exhibition in the Free State of tolerance, efficiency and prosperity. Unity must come gradually. I think it will come through some application of the Federal principle, leaving to Northern Ireland its control over things it regards as essential, while joining with the Free State perhaps in a custom union, in agricultural policy, in transport, post and services which do not impinge on culture and tradition, which are strong and diverse in both communities.

But of the Free State itself. What of those rich dreams which

were the inspiration of its revolutionary leaders? What has survived the storm of the conflict with Great Britain, the agony of civil war? Two movements have carried their freight of ideas safe to harbor. One movement is cultural, the other economic. The Gaelic idealists have had their way. In every school in Ireland the Irish language is being taught. The next generation will be bilingual. The nation will have access through Irish to its ancestral self. It will have access through English to the thought of the world. An Irish character will be preserved in Ireland. It can never more be the undiluted Gaelic state. The history of seven hundred years cannot be wiped out, the mingling of Saxon, Dane, Norman, with the original stock has brought about a more complex mentality than our Gaelic forefathers had. No one can say, because it depends on the appearance of that incalculable element of genius, whether the complete wedding of Gaelic imagination with world thought will give us a new literature. With Yeats, with Synge, with Hyde, with O'Grady, there was that element of novelty, of surprise in their discovery of the Gaelic culture which excites the imagination. When all is familiar will the imagination be stirred? Will it turn with more intensity than Yeats, O'Grady, Synge, Hyde, Stephens, or Lady Gregory turned to the Gaelic fountain? I cannot say. It is quite possible that the Irish imagination may reach full saturation point with its own culture, and young men may become more excited about the new or the aged thought of the world. Nothing is more certain than this, that no country can marry any particular solution of its problems and settle down to live happily and unchanged ever afterwards. There is a tendency in each generation to revolt against the ideas of the generation before it. While I hope we shall always keep an Irish character I am sure it will be richer and more creative if it is not altogether self-centered, if it accepts science and the aged and new thought of the world. The tendency of islanders is to develop egomania, to dream of self-sufficiency, but I agree with Trotsky in this, if I agree with him in little else, that "anything is national which vitalizes the nation." I am sure we will not lose what is our own by heredity and character if we open our hearts and our minds to the world.

The second movement which has carried its freight safe to harbor was that created by Sir Horace Plunkett for the coöperative organization of agriculture. It had a long fight, but now is accepted by all parties and it has state support. This is the most

practical movement of any, and in a sense it is as ideal as any. It makes its ostensible objects the complete organization of Irish farmers for credit, purchase, manufacture and marketing, but it employs for such material ends a principle of brotherhood in industry which insensibly yet surely affects the moral consciousness. It unites the man in the fields with his neighbors through an association for business purposes, and it unites the local associations with the nation by their union in national federations. Even if a man be naturally selfish he must begin to place the welfare of the community before his own when he is in an organization so constituted that when it succeeds he prospers, as it fails he fails also.

In an agricultural country the parish is the cradle of the nation and the ideas generated there overflow into the legislature. That identity of consciousness of interest generated among the farmers by their organization will in the end make men truly citizens of their country. Year by year these associations are becoming more efficient in the technique of production and marketing, and as the founder of the movement, Sir Horace Plunkett, grows old, he has found a true foster father of it in the Free State Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Hogan, one of the ablest men flung up by the Irish revolution.

The labor movement has not been so fortunate as those others. Its dreams lie at present in the valley of defeated dreams. In Dail Eireann, the Irish legislature, the labor deputies have now become most able parliamentarians, but the labor unions have, as I think, retrograded and are weaker than before the revolution. The difficulty is not in getting men who can lead, but the rank and file are uneducated, and I fear that labor will not improve its position until a new generation, better educated than the present, takes up the hard task of integrating the workers into the national being.

In literature and drama the creative impulse is still vital. New writers of great ability, Sean O'Casey, Liam O'Flaherty, Austin Clarke, Frederick Higgins, Frank O'Connor, Pamela Travers and others are at the outset of careers which will make them famous.

I have spoken of movements, now I must speak of governments. What of our statesmen? Have they ability? I think Ireland was very fortunate in this, that its revolution threw up at least half a dozen men of great practical ability to form the first government.

They found the country distracted after years of conflict. They have made it as peaceful and crimeless as any country in the world. Part of their inheritance from the old régime was about forty Government Boards. They took these and welded them into a few Departments with a logic and practical reason for their existence — Finance, Education, Agriculture, Commerce, Fisheries, Local Government and Justice. They have lowered taxation. The income tax is lower than it is in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. They were able to abolish duties on tea, cocoa, coffee and to reduce the duty on sugar. They created a new police force, which with extraordinary moral courage they launched unarmed upon the country while it was yet in a state of civil war. They thought that even the armed opposition would not attack an unarmed police force and their confidence was justified. One of the evils foretold of the coming into power of Irish Nationalism was that there would be an orgy of jobbery. John Dillon, the leader of the old Parliamentary party, thought that when Ireland got self-government there would be twenty-five years of the worst jobbery any country ever saw. But the men of the new movement which superseded his were not of that character. They were ready to face death for their ideals and they were equally ready to face life, to risk unpopularity. One of the first things the new government did was to create a Civil Service Commission, which removed the possibility of patronage out of minister's hands — and later came a Public Appointments Commission. All Civil Service appointments, all technical or important posts under local government, are filled by these two commissions. Where examinations can test the merits of candidates there are examinations. When the post to be filled is technical, when doctors, engineers, surveyors, chemists, bacteriologists or instructors have to be appointed there are panels of experts who place in order of merit the men with the highest qualifications, and the first in order gets the post. Never, I think, did a government coming to power after a revolution throw over so completely the doctrine "the spoils to the victors." Not in England, not in Europe, and, I think, not in America has there been such a determination to have honest administration. Where a county council or a city corporation have proved themselves inefficient or corrupt, the government has been ruthless in dissolving it. It supersedes any inefficient or corrupt council or corporation, puts in able and efficient commissioners and when the finances are

restored and the administrators cleaned up, restores the council to the electors once more. This kind of honesty makes enemies. But our ministers have not sacrificed honesty to popularity. I believe they are making a good tradition to replace a bad one and in a generation the civil service and local government will be transformed. In the past popularly elected bodies regarded the powers of patronage as one of their most valued privileges and only too often were votes bought and sold. That has been put an end to, an end attended with great mourning and lamentation by the corrupt, but it has brought confidence in the new order to all honest men.

Is there a dark side to this colored picture? What are the dangers and defects of the new state? Our great trouble arises from the long neglect of education under the old régime. I think about 80 percent of children who attended the national schools left at the age of twelve, when they had learned to read and write, but before they had learned what thinking really means. That is, they left the schools just at the time when real education ought to begin. It is that lack of education which hampers development in all directions. It is not enough to have agricultural experts in every county, because too many of the farmers' sons who come to lectures have not been educated up to the point where they could take full advantage of the instruction given. Politically we suffer because so many of the electors are hardly emerged from the folk state of mind. Their fathers and grandfathers were fed on folk tales, legends of the King of Ireland's Son or of Finn MaCool and other heroes of folk lore. The folk imagination believes anything. It creates ships of gold with masts of silver and white cities by the sea and rewards and faëries, and when that folk mind turns to politics it is ready to believe anything almost. The pleasantest tale, not the truest, told from a platform wins the vote. But our education, political and econcmic, is rapidly progressing. The new state insists on attendance at school up to the age of fourteen, and it is reforming technical education and arranging for continuation classes after the primary school. We have to spend a great deal of money on education because we are so poor. I think our people have plenty of natural intelligence, and when they have an edge put on their minds by a better cultural and technical education I believe they will run their country at least as efficiently as the people do in any other state.

In speaking of Ireland I have dealt with the thought inspiring

it more than with mechanisms or institutions and that was inevitable, because thirty years ago the Irish were the most unorganized people, I think, in Europe. If I had to make a heraldic design symbolic of the people at that time I would have had three figures, the very small farmer, the very small trader, the very small manufacturer, all isolated from each other. We were a late survival in Europe of the cultural state of society, where what is within, the dreams, ideas, imaginations, are more important than what is without. We had not externalized the Irish genius or character in an external mechanism or civilization, as France, Italy, England, Denmark, Holland and other nations had done. We could not do this because the nation could not act from its own will and its own center. It was governed by another country, and as with all submerged nationalities its life was by way of dream and aspiration and action was by subterranean plotting.

The change so long delayed, from the internal to the external, from the cultural to its manifestation in a civilization or economic mechanism, is taking place rapidly. The nation is becoming an organic unity and this process is going on in a hundred directions. It began when Sir Horace Plunkett took the unorganized small farmers and made them combine in dairy, agricultural and credit societies. That began before the Free State came into being. Since its inception the impulse to bring about an organic unity has been accelerated. The farmers are no longer marketing individually or even in societies. They are creating a new marketing association which will market their products nationally. There were half a dozen competing railway companies in the Free State. Now they are amalgamated, there is only one company, and an effort is now being made to coördinate rail and road transport. The small manufacturers are beginning to form combines obeying the law now universal in industry. The government has capitalized a vast scheme by which the water power in the Shannon River will be made to yield electricity for the whole country, and cheap light and power will be distributed from that generating station to every county. The scheme should be in operation by the close of this year, with incalculable consequences to both our economic and intellectual life. Our many political parties have resolved themselves into two groups which have politically swallowed up the rest. The forty odd Boards and Departments are now cemented in a logical structure.

What is happening is that an organic unity is coming about in our national life, a political, cultural and economic organization is being created, the mechanism which statesmen can operate and develop for the well-being of the country. No people in the modern world can prosper economically until they have created such an organization, and in the Free State this is being created rapidly.

When we have made ourselves into the highly efficient modern state, shall we lose the cultural and romantic character, the idealism which made Ireland dear to our hearts? I know that Spengler, whose philosophy of history has influenced so many, holds that the soul of a nation is dead when it has externalized itself in a civilization. I think he sees only one curve in the arc and does not see the contrary or balancing curve. I have no doubt there is some incorruptible spiritual atom in the Irish character which will be lit when there is outer darkness. But undoubtedly we are tired of struggle to-day. The mood which is most widely spread is a half cynical, but rather cheerful materialism. It manifests itself in efforts to organize agriculture, to create industries, to have peace at all costs, and the later writers like James Joyce, Sean O'Casey, Brinsley MacNamara, Liam O'Flaherty are the reaction from the generation which, with Yeats as its chief figure, created the most mystical, romantic and idealistic literature in Europe. I take the writers as weather vanes which indicate the way the wind is blowing, and I see among the still younger writers a dislike of that realism and the beginnings of a new idealistic literature, possibly the germ of a new ideal nationalism strengthened by its temporary descent into matter. But to speculate on that is to prophesy and I started to write this rather as the historian of an epoch. It is tempting to prophesy, but I am sure prophecy is not what the Editor asked from me, and I desist at a time when my article was becoming most interesting to myself.

CURZON

By Harold Nicolson

THE LIFE OF LORD CURZON. By the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Ronaldshay. London: Benn. New York: Horace Liveright. 3 vols. 1928.

WE live today in an age of catch-words and the edges of our daily awareness are blunted to uniformity. We employ these slogans with democratic indolence, scarcely realizing that they possess an affective quality which disturbs our reason. "Imperialist" we say, not pausing to consider what we mean by the expression, too lazy even to discount the depreciatory effect which the word produces. "Reactionary" we say again, confident that we are implying something discreditable, confident that progress is good absolutely, that to be retrograde is absolutely to be bad. Such habits of thought and expression are perhaps inevitable: we are too busy, in this lively world of ours, to resist the temptation of verbal fore-shortening, to struggle against the intellectual label. At times, however, something occurs to arrest our attention: these familiar words, with their trite emotional connections, are by some sudden alteration of lighting, thrown into relief: we see them with fresh eyes, we are bewildered by the altered angle of familiarity, even as we are puzzled for a moment by an envelope which we have addressed to ourselves. "Imperialist" we again murmur, and the word detaches itself from its background; it becomes the symbol of something wider and deeper; it awakes enquiry; it makes us pause and think.

Some such sudden readjustment of values is occasioned in any unbiassed reader by the admirable biography which Lord Ronaldshay has just completed on Lord Curzon of Kedleston. On reading this tragic human history, even the most inveterate victim of the slogan-habit would feel that the scarlet label of "imperialist" was no adequate explanation of the problem; that Lord Curzon's passionate and idealistic conviction of his own mission constituted a psychological mystery at once so vivid and so complex that it imposes upon any honest enquirer some reëxamination of what he means by imperialism, some recognition that this particular political emotion is not necessarily vicious, and not necessarily inhumane. Clearly, and Curzon is there to prove it, imperialism in the twentieth century is highly inexpedient. For that reason it is doomed, at least in its political form, to disappear. But the honest

enquirer, on reading this enthralling book, will come to appreciate that a political theory, even if outworn, can still be a subject of living scientific interest; and he will feel grateful to Lord Ronaldshay for having displayed this specimen with such care, such vivid detail and such intelligence.

The task of Lord Curzon's biographer was not an easy one. In the first place, he was faced by an almost overwhelming mass of detail. The actual correspondence which Lord Curzon either amassed or emitted was stupendous; then there were his pencil notes, scattered in portfolios, rammed untidily into official envelopes, scored on the margins of letters; hopes, fears, disappointments, bitterness — all were recorded in that large and flowing hand; recorded in pencil, written down, kept. Behind all these personalia existed a great mass of official records and documents, needing to be read and digested, needed to be fitted proportionately into the whole. No wonder that a slight atmosphere of exhaustion hangs about the last of the three volumes: and fittingly so, since it was in an atmosphere of dynamic exhaustion that Lord Curzon passed the last years of his life. Not only has Lord Ronaldshay been hampered by a plethora of papers, but he has been careful not to offend those who are still alive. Lord Curzon would at moments lash himself into fierce vituperative passions against people who, he imagined, had offended him, and these outbursts have rightly been suppressed. Unpublishable also are many of the broad rabelaisian sallies with which he would season his letters, and which formed so pungent a constituent of his conversation and his style. A great deal of Curzon has thus escaped from these volumes, but what remains (and it is essential) is sufficient to give us what is one of the best English standard biographies, and to provide those interested in political problems with a very durable subject of discussion.

What, in fact, was the nature of Curzon's political doctrine? Was his essential failure due to some inner defect in his own character, or merely to some fault in the circumstances of his life? If the latter, then is the tragedy of Lord Curzon to be regarded as a criticism of democratic institutions, as implying that in democracy only the mediocre can prevail? What again was the quality of his intelligence and imagination? How far did the ideals that he stood for proceed from the springs of his conviction? How far were they but the surface stirrings of his emotionalism and conceit? Such are the questions which this book arouses and such

are the questions to which I should propose an answer. It is easy enough to explain away Lord Curzon as an anachronism strayed out of the eighteenth century. The whole story is far more poignant and more complicated than that. It is a strange story of which we today can scarcely grasp the meaning. A hundred years from now students of social history may see in Lord Curzon one of the most arresting figures of our age. They may, for all we know, regard him as the last defender of a disappearing order; on the other hand they may, for all we know, honor him as one of the few statesmen of the twentieth century who had the audacity not only to see, but to say, what was going wrong.

I do not think myself that the failure of Lord Curzon to reach the highest pinnacle of office can by any honest enquirer be attributed to the short-comings of the democratic system. I feel that there were certain flaws in his personal character and intelligence which vitiated his immense abilities, and which were responsible for onsets of blind unreason, and for sudden weakenings of his domineering will. Lord Ronaldshay hints as much in his biography, but does not analyze either the causes or the effects of this strange warping of an essentially noble character and an essentially brilliant brain. And yet it is in this problem that the inner tragedy of Lord Curzon is to be sought.

Let me illustrate the problem at the outset by an incident in my own experience, an incident on which I often look back with interested and puzzled scrutiny. It was during the Lausanne Conference. Lord Curzon, that morning, had been rude, excessively rude, to a tiresome but harmless member of one of the Allied delegations. His victim on this occasion was a little old man, somewhat like Philip II in appearance, who had interrupted the progress of one of Curzon's harangues. He had raised his wizened hand aloft like a school-boy in class and had piped out some foolish interruption. Curzon paused and stared. He stared at Philip II with the eyes of a pained basilisk. The latter, who was not only courageous but convinced, continued to babble his inconsequences. Lord Curzon, in a voice of ice, told him to hold his tongue. "Voulez-vous bien," were the words he used, "vous taire." At which the old gentleman (who incidentally considered himself of great European importance) tottered from the room twittering with rage and mumbling imprecations. Lord Curzon, monumental in the presidential throne, gulped slightly, and then continued his discourse. That evening I was asked to extract an

apology from my chief. This was no easy task. I appealed to his magnanimity, to his regard for old age, to his regard for distinguished statesmen who had rendered great services to the Allies, to the actual expediency of not embittering relations on so small a point. Lord Curzon was obdurate: the little old man had interrupted him: he was not only irritating but foolish: the sooner he left Lausanne the better: an apology might encourage him to stay: besides, he, Curzon, never apologized. I was in despair: I then appealed to his emotion: I said that it made me unhappy to see my chief rendering himself disliked: I begged him, as a return for the real affection that I felt for him (and God knows I still feel it), to render me this small service. A wave of sentiment descended upon him. "You are very kind," he said, "Of course. . . ." he said, "Of course. . . . ." He pulled a sheet of paper towards him, and dashed off a letter, resting the writing pad upon his knee. No letter of apology has ever been conceived with such grace and kindliness. I thanked him. He sat there hunched in his chair with his leg thrust out upon the green-baize foot-rest. "Ah yes," he sighed, "I will tell you something which will surprise you. Every morning when I say my prayers, I ask God that he will grant me not to be disagreeable during the coming day. And do you know? Every evening when I look back upon my day I am forced to confess that I have been disagreeable to five, or sometimes even six, different people!" He said this with a puzzled seriousness which it is impossible to convey. It was only when I laughed, that he allowed his own face to relax from the earnest, and indeed religious, expression which it had assumed.

In this incident you have concentrated the essential enigmas of Lord Curzon's character. His initial cruelty and insensitiveness: his refusal to admit he was in the wrong: his obdurate resistance to all reasonable arguments: his lavish collapse before an emotional argument: his ultimate generosity: and the amazingly naïve commentary by which the incident was closed. For Curzon was hard in the wrong places and soft in the wrong places. He had the mentality of an adolescent. His character became ossified at the age of nineteen.

I do not think Lord Ronaldshay has paid sufficient attention to the early influences by which Lord Curzon's nature was warped. There was that austere and lovely house at Kedleston. The vast rooms and terraces, the cold alabaster columns in the hall, the bell, that echoed through those cold corridors announc-

ing morning prayers. Little Curzon ran, fearful of being late; little Curzon knelt there listening to his father reading the Old Testament, imbibing the conception of a cold and revengeful Jehovah. Then there was Miss Paraman, the governess into whose care those wretched children were entrusted. Deeply did she impress upon those pliant minds her own theories of God and Hell and parsimony and discipline. Her anger was terrible, her punishments ingenious in their cruelty. She wore, Lord Curzon would relate, a large greasy skirt, the bottom of which was trimmed with six broad bands of braid. One of her punishments was to force the children to unpick those bands of braid, and to stitch them on again. Little Curzon, weeping in the big cold house, stitching at Miss Paraman's unpleasant skirt. Then there came Mr. Dunbar, the assistant master at the Rev. Cowley Powle's private school at Wixenford. Mr. Dunbar was violent and sensitive. He believed with passionate fervor in the value of accuracy. Detail was his God. He also destroyed whatever sense of values little Curzon might himself have evolved. Then his mother, Lady Scarsdale, died when he was just sixteen. Three years later he developed curvature of the spine. From that moment he was isolated from his kind by a curtain of suffering and exhaustion. The character which he possessed at eighteen was thereafter incased, as his body was incased, in a cage of steel. Through the interstices of this rigidity, his human qualities escaped but rarely, and then in the shape of emotionalism. He retained throughout his life the "larme facile" of his puberty: I have never known a man cry so frequently or so easily as Curzon cried.

Such then were the early influences which twisted his character into contorted forms. Miss Paraman had taught him the importance of parsimony, and throughout his life his attitude towards money matters was lacking in charm. Miss Paraman had taught him cruelty, anger, suspicion, resentment: these lessons remained with him till the end. Mr. Dunbar, for his part, had impressed upon his then receptive mind the vital necessity of attending to detail: Lord Curzon's passion for detail was to ruin his career. A grandiose and chilly childhood, softened by scant humanity, troubled by fears of God and Miss Paraman and what happened to people who failed to know about the Treaty of Amiens. And beneath it all, emerging while he was still at Eton, a determined egoism, a consciousness that with so uncertain a body, so uncertain a will, great efforts would be necessary if he

were to realize his vast ambition. He set his teeth and made those efforts: he tackled every circumstance in his life with torrential energy; immense generators, vast dynamos, were employed to thread a needle; and in the last resort energy, efficiency, accomplishment, became ends in themselves, irrespective of the purposes to which they were devoted. Miss Paraman and Mr. Dunbar had left their mark. Lord Curzon at the age of sixteen had fallen into the fallacy of confusing energy with strength of mind.

It is legitimate, I think, thus to assume that Curzon's character was warped in childhood, and that his spinal affection, although sometimes exaggerated by himself and his biographer, did in fact account for much of the psychological obtuseness which marred his high abilities. Scarcely less important, however, was the comparative disaster of his career at Oxford, where he failed to obtain a first class in the schools. "Now," he wrote, "I shall devote the rest of my life to showing the examiners that they have made a mistake." Curzon was always far more affected by his failures than by his successes. From that moment his ambition became embittered by the poison of his academic defeat, it became ruthless, inelastic, unremitting. The God of success, an amiable deity, loomed for him as Jehovah, demanding blood and human sacrifice. He gave it, and in vain, all that it desired.

It is absurd, of course, to contend that Lord Curzon obtained from his God no rewards for such devotion. He was Viceroy at 39: he was Foreign Secretary at a time of vast historical importance: he possessed riches and titles and many great houses and the glitter of the Garter at his knee. He rode on elephants whose trappings were of gold and emeralds, he sat on alabaster thrones while potentates bowed jewelled heads before him, he walked on the wide lawns of English homes, he purchased castles and palaces, and he won the love of two of the most lovely women of our age. Yet all these were for him but a temporary solace in great bitterness. He did not get a first at Oxford; he did not get the better of Lord Kitchener, or of Mr. Lloyd George; and it was Mr. Baldwin, not George Curzon, who was appointed Prime Minister at the death of Mr. Bonar Law. These three disappointments remained for him the essential facts of his existence. His victories were for him but evidence of the injustice of his defeats.

It is not, I think, correct to dismiss Lord Curzon as a materialist who failed through lack of any directing idea. He had his ideas and his ideals. That they were somewhat old-fashioned bears, to

my mind, but scant relation to the problem. His imperialism, for instance, was in no sense a despicable thing. There was much about it, of course, that was vain and flashy. "No Englishman," he wrote at the age of 28, "can land in Hongkong without feeling a thrill of pride for his nationality. Here is that furthermost link in that chain of fortresses which from Spain to China girds half the globe." "The sight," he wrote on the same journey, "of these successive metropolises of England and the British Empire in foreign parts is one of the proudest experiences of travel." This of course is wrong and silly. But the imperialism of Curzon was made of stuff far more serious than mere national showing-off. Americans may smile at the Britisher's belief in his own mission, and indeed this facile theory is apt to cover many selfish sins. But to those who have seen British imperialism in action it is not wholly ridiculous to feel that in the administration of alien peoples the Anglo-Saxon genius finds its fullest expression. To Curzon this theory was an article of faith. He believed that God had bestowed on England a divine mission to administer what he called "backward races." This mission which had been "for some peculiar and inscrutable reason entrusted to her by Providence" entailed upon Great Britain "that supreme idea without which Imperialism is only a sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal, namely the sense of sacrifice and the idea of duty." "If," he said while Viceroy, "I felt that we were not working here for the good of India in obedience to a higher law and a nobler aim, then I would see the link that holds England and India together severed without a sigh."

Lord Curzon, of course, was not of those who believe that self-government is in every case better than good government. "Efficiency of administration," he wrote, "is in my view a synonym for the contentment of the governed. It is the only means of affecting the people in their homes and of adding only an atom perhaps, but still an atom, to the happiness of the masses." It never occurred to him that, except for a "handful of agitators" the people of India might really prefer their own warm muddles to the chilly efficiency of English rule. He sincerely dreaded the extent of human suffering which would be caused in India by any sudden relaxation of our dominion. He insisted, however, that that rule, though alien, should be just. "I do not know," he wrote to the Secretary of State for India in connection with some cases of ill-treatment of natives, "I do not know what you

think of these cases. They eat into my very soul." In writing that Curzon was absolutely sincere, and the whole burden of his doctrine and his ideal is contained in the magnificent farewell speech which he made on leaving India. "A hundred times," he said on that occasion, "have I said to myself, 'Oh that to every Englishman in this country, as he ends his work, might be truthfully applied the phrase, *Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity*.' No man has, I believe, ever served India faithfully of whom that could not be said. All other triumphs are tinsel and sham. Perhaps there are few of us who make anything but a poor approximation to that ideal. But let it be our ideal all the same — to fight for the right, to abhor the imperfect, the unjust or the mean, to swerve neither to the right hand not to the left, to care nothing for flattery or applause or odium or abuse, never to let your enthusiasm be soured or your courage grow dim, but to remember that the Almighty has placed your hand on the greatest of His ploughs, in whose furrow the nations of the future are germinating and taking shape, to drive the blade a little forward in your time, and to feel that somewhere among these millions you have left a little justice or happiness or prosperity, a sense of manliness or moral dignity, a spring of patriotism, a dawn of intellectual enlightenment or a stirring of duty where it did not exist before — that is enough, that is the Englishman's justification in India. It is good enough for his watchword when he is here, for his epitaph when he is gone. I have worked for no other aim. Let India be my judge." There will be sceptics, of course, who will dismiss this fine finale as mere rhetoric: they would be wrong: these words represented the very essence of Lord Curzon's faith: there have been faiths more peccant and more harmful; there have been few faiths which have done such practical good.

But again we are brought back to the original conundrum. How came it that a man who had been given such talents and opportunities, who was inspired by such high ambition, such dogged energy, such burning faith, should have missed the main object of his ambitions, should have been worsted in the struggle by lesser minds, should have failed, ultimately, to make good? The explanation, as I have already indicated, may well lie in that strange rigidity which came over his character at the age of nineteen. Other men have been egoistic, but Lord Curzon's egoism was of so inelastic a character as to render him dangerously impervious to what was really going on. He was apt to allow his

judgment to be affected by purely personal considerations. His anti-Turkish bias, for instance, dates from the inconvenience to which he had been subjected by the Turkish customs officials in 1889. His dislike of France, and the low opinion he held of French statesmen, could be traced back to his early contempt for the French officials he had met in Cochin China and to the irritation caused him by the incident at Muscat. His scant sympathy for the cause of Greece is to be attributed not merely to his dislike of M. Venizelos, but also the fact that he had been severely heckled on the Cretan question when Under Secretary of State. This personal aspect frequently vitiated his sense of proportion. "If only," he wrote in 1899, "I could transfer a little of the misplaced anxiety about the Transvaal to Persia and the Persian Gulf. . . ." That, in 1899, was an excessively foolish thing to say.

A further, and most unfortunate element in Lord Curzon's egoism, was the extreme combativeness, often on petty matters, which it provoked. It was, as Lord Ronaldshay remarks, "with the utmost difficulty that he subordinated his views to those of other people." He was continually being diverted from the object he was pursuing by some personal slight or suspicion; often by the mere desire to triumph over his adversaries upon some wholly secondary point. His comparative insuccess as Foreign Minister is implicit in a passage of a letter written in 1900: "I never," he wrote, "spend five minutes in enquiring whether we are unpopular. The answer is written in red ink on the map of the globe. Neither would I ever adopt Lord Salisbury's plan of throwing bones to keep the various dogs quiet. . . . They devour your bone and then turn round and snarl for more. No; I would count everywhere on the individual hostility of all the Great Powers, but would endeavour so to arrange things that they were not *united* against me. And the first condition in such a policy is, in my opinion, the exact inverse of your present policy: for I would be as strong in small things as in big." Here, in a phrase, lies the secret of Lord Curzon's failure to realize the great hopes and opportunities of his tenure of the Foreign Office. "As strong in small things as in big," — Curzon was so busy being "strong" about the little things that he had no time left to deal with the really important problems which called for solution.

This native egoism was, for the conduct of negotiations, rendered even more unpalatable to his colleagues or opponents by Curzon's unfortunate passion for marshalling facts. This was the

fault of Mr. Dunbar at Wixenford who had insisted somewhat unduly on accuracy of detail. Lord Curzon became so intoxicated by his own ability to present a case that his every remark became an oration, and that he adopted the manner, as Labouchère had observed even before he went to India, "of a Divinity addressing blackbeetles." "The pleasure," writes Lord Ronaldshay, "which he derived from speech and writing made him a great master of language; but it tended to broaden rather than deepen his mind. He absorbed knowledge rather than evolved it." Hence arose an unfortunate prolixity, and much irritation, boredom and resentment on the part of those to whom these diatribes were addressed. M. Poincaré, for one, did not appreciate Lord Curzon's rhetoric in the least.

Curzon, for his part, was amazed at his own efficiency. He was proud of what he called "my middle-class method," or "my remorseless scrutiny into everything." "The goal," writes Lord Ronaldshay, "at which he aimed can be described compendiously as achievement, — the bringing of things to a conclusion, the multiplication and accumulation of bundles of acts of accomplishment, across whose respective dockets might be written with a flourish of satisfaction *res gestae.*" The amount of unnecessary business with which Curzon obstructed his daily life was almost incredible. His conviction that only he himself could do a job to his own satisfaction was a very unfortunate element in his character and one which when he came to office did him untold harm. He was so overwhelmed by unimportant matters which he refused to entrust to other hands that he had no time to think of anything important. His official life was a hurricane of trivialities. I have seen him, during a serious European crisis, writing invitations to a dinner party with his own hand for fear lest his wife or secretary might make some mistake. And I have heard from his daughter the story of the lawn at Hackwood which is so extraordinary that it merits to be retold. In the first place Hackwood was not his own home, but a house which he had rented for a term of years. In the second place the lawn at Hackwood is about half a mile square. Lord Curzon observed that the lawn was disfigured by the presence of several dock-leaves or plantains. He ordered the gardener to remove these unsightly objects. This was before luncheon. By three o'clock the lawn was black with gardeners removing docks. Lord Curzon came to watch. He said that the gardeners were doing it all wrong, that they were leaving holes

where the docks had been extracted. They answered, with all respect, that if one removes a large dock from a piece of lawn, a slight abrasion is bound, for a day or two, to be left on the surface. "*But not at all,*" said Lord Curzon, "*not at all.* As usual you do not know your job. I see that as usual I shall have to do it myself." The gardeners were then told never to touch the lawn again. And during the next few months Lord Curzon spent his Sunday afternoons extracting docks from the Hackwood lawn, a task he loathed. They would lunch early and hurriedly. Lord Curzon would then approach the lawn, preceded by a footman carrying a leather cushion, and followed by his three daughters carrying baskets into which the docks were thrown upon extraction. Lord Curzon would kneel slowly down upon the cushion and proceed slowly from dock to dock while his daughters and the footman followed behind. At tea time they would return exhausted to the house, leaving the lawn pitted with the excavations in which Lord Curzon had indulged. Nor did it occur to him for one instant that gardeners were perhaps better at docks than he was, or that there might be something less exhausting and less trivial that he and his daughters could have done on Sunday afternoons.

Such blindness, such evasions of reality, diminished his efficiency as Minister for Foreign Affairs. During his first tenure of that high office he was irked by the inevitable dominance of the Prime Minister, during the second period his labors were nullified by the antagonism of M. Poincaré. He choked himself with a mass of detail and in the intricacies of personal polemics, and in one notable instance, that of Persia, he failed completely to realize that the world had altered somewhat since 1899. But he was almost a great Foreign Secretary, and we are too apt to forget that it was Curzon who was the real originator of the Dawes Plan, and that it was he who in the face of immense difficulties restored British credit at the first Conference of Lausanne. His failure was the failure of adaptability. He was ruined by the rigidity of his own temperament. And in the ultimate resort there was a flaw in the steel. His will-power, so dominating, so ruthless up to the last moment, would suddenly collapse. The essential Curzon was not a strong man. From this there came apparent inconsistencies and betrayals: what Lord Ronaldshay with great kindness calls "his new-found pliancy;" and thus one cannot wholly excuse his sudden abandonment of loudly proclaimed principles as in such

questions as the House of Lords Reform, the Woman Suffrage problem, and the Montagu-Chelmsford report. Had he been less inconsistent, he might have died Prime Minister of England. But he hesitated and made excuses to himself: and people realized that he did not in fact possess that strength of character which alone would have justified his egoism and his obstinacy.

Let it not be thought, however, that Curzon was a little man. He had faults of pettiness and vulgarity, he was often unkind. His intellect and his imagination were marred by curious limitations. But he possessed a soaring sense of duty, a deep intrinsic humanity, and above all a passionate love of truth. "Let me," he wrote, "side with those who abhor the diplomatic lie." And it was truth and duty which inspired what Lord Ronaldshay rightly calls "the breathless activity of his days."

Then there was his charm. Even in the most querulous of his moments, even on what he called his "angry days," the fascination of the man, his "cheery and boisterous energy," held one entranced. He was such a boy. So simple, so petty, so human. He was so amused and hospitable; so interested in every manifestation of reality or life. Lord Ronaldshay speaks of his lack of consideration to his subordinates. I think this is exaggerated. He had little sense of time and would keep one waiting about. But then there was champagne to follow. There was always that champagne feeling when one worked with Curzon, and it was worth it. While behind it all was the immense pathos of his later life. One's heart went out to this sick and querulous man, a man at one moment radiant at some unexpected compliment or triumph, at another cast into the depths of gloom by some unkindly criticism or misfortune. Lord Ronaldshay tells of how, when the days of disappointment and disillusion were already upon him, he discovered in a drawer at Kedleston a collection of his school reports, in which his masters had unanimously predicted for him a great future. Had these forecasts proved correct? Lord Curzon summed up his impressions of his own career in a note of great pathos evoked by these faded school reports. "I never seem," he wrote, "to get any credit for anything nowadays. No one accuses me of any definite errors or blunders of statesmanship. But there seems to be a general tendency to run me down, or completely to ignore what I am doing or have done. If one looks at the record of this in any book of reference it is very substantial, as varied, and in a way successful, as that of any

Englishman of my age living. And yet it does not seem to count for much, and I am treated as though I were rather a back number. Well, perhaps I am. I suppose one gets what one deserves and I daresay the fault lies somewhere in me. And yet, how I have worked and toiled and never spared myself, while I see others treating work as a jest and life as a holiday."

For reasons such as these posterity will look back upon Lord Curzon, not as on some arrogant proconsul who gloried in the honors he obtained, but as on a man of superhuman energy and great gifts who, by the irony of fate, had been robbed of the gift of adaptability. Curzon did not fit. But in the end, after that agonizing interview with Lord Stamfordham of May 22, 1923, after a night of bitter weeping, he attained to real moral greatness, and accorded to the man who had won the prize for which he himself had yearned since childhood his unswerving loyalty and his unstinted support. The story of Curzon's life is a drama of disappointed ambition. And his biographer has rendered it with all the skill and dignity that it deserves.

THE CRISIS OF THE "N. E. P." IN SOVIET RUSSIA

By Paul Scheffer

THE cross-roads at which the economic policy of the Soviets stands today — and with it their general policy — was reached by wholly logical stages. When in 1921 Lenin abandoned "pure Communism," reversed his system of taxation, and decreed the "New Economic Policy" or "N. E. P." — that is, decided to support the socialization of the Soviet economic system by permitting individualistic and capitalistic business methods — his program assumed the correctness of a hypothesis that had never been tested. It assumed that two economic systems which in theory are hopelessly divided would in practice prove entirely compatible. Lenin's idea was that while wider and wider economic fields were methodically being brought under the sway of economic socialization, individual business should continue to fulfill such functions as socialization was not yet able to take over. This implied that socialization should extend its field of operations only when it felt itself capable of duplicating the accomplishments of private business. From the very beginning Lenin vigorously insisted on reserving for socialization the celebrated "controlling economic heights" of business, that is, industry and foreign trade. These, primarily, constituted the "socialized sector" of the economic structure. At the same time, in domestic trade Lenin created "starting points" of socialization, through state wholesale organizations; and in agriculture through the Soviet landed estates. He believed that in this way he had at the outset assured the dominance of the Bolshevik idea; and to that extent he was quite correct in advocating his N. E. P.

In 1921 private trading was permitted side by side with state retailing, and, in spite of the knowledge that the processes of distribution were sooner or later to be socialistically organized, private traders sprang up and even flourished under the wing of a bureaucracy which alternately blew hot and cold, fluctuating between grudging acquiescence to interfering regulation. Gradually the impediments were multiplied, and by the spring of 1924 more than 300,000 private firms had been wiped out of existence either by taxes or by discrimination in the credit furnished by the state banks or in the supplies obtainable only from the state fac-

tories. Still it was found that these shackles and limitations were not adequate enough to keep private enterprise within bounds; harassed though it was at every turn, private enterprise continued to thrive, and so in 1927 the Soviets launched a policy of wholesale and direct repression of both private trading and independent farming. By winter time the rigor of governmental action had brought on a peasant's boycott, which the Government finally succeeded in breaking by "extraordinary" measures of forcible seizure, since replaced by the present policy of systematically repressing the "kulaks" — peasants who are relatively well off.

The Kremlin frankly saw in the success attendant on private trading and independent farming a vital threat to the "socialistic sector" of the Soviet economic system, both present and future. The Kremlin was afraid of becoming hopelessly dependent upon these two forces if it tolerated them any longer, even in their hitherto limited spheres. It believed, and rightly, that through them not only its economic position, but its political position as well, was threatened; and, considering its peculiar situation, it had some justification for making no fundamental distinction between these two interests.

In 1924 the state trading organization and the coöperatives dependent upon it were expanded into a single gigantic whole. This process was begun at the same time that the harassing treatment of private trading was intensified. In 1927 the collective rural agencies of every kind were increased, at a rate corresponding to the rate at which the unwanted independent rural organizations were annihilated. Oppressive taxation and delivery delays worked toward the same end. Both courses of action meant a bold advance in the policy of socialization.

Are not the most cherished hopes of Leninism being fulfilled, then, much more rapidly than seemed possible a few years ago? Yet does it not also seem as if the Soviet State's sheer struggle for existence were compelling it to do the very thing which it originally proposed to do solely of its own free will and from ideal motives? For the extension of socialization is now being brought about much more rapidly than Lenin foresaw, but in very different circumstances. He believed that as the commercial methods of private business came into competition with the economic methods of socialism, they would die a natural death. The same hope has deluded his successors; the candidate for an early death

turned out to be exceedingly lively. But though Moscow persistently hangs on to its ideals, it nevertheless handles uncomfortably practical realities energetically. No power on earth thinks in such large terms or with such reflection and deliberation as do the gentlemen in the Kremlin. Their position makes this necessary, for the present basis of their power is a dangerous provisional arrangement, a kind of twilight zone for which there are no historical precedents and, in the main, the only rules are those that they have learned through their own experience. At any rate, two things are perfectly clear to the Soviets today. First, the applicability of the N. E. P. is far more conditional, far more dangerous, than they conceived it to be. Secondly, the possibility of fostering socialism and private enterprise side by side in the Russian economic system was grossly overestimated. The vigor with which private trade and so-called "capitalistic" farming have been disrupted indicates what troubles and difficulties the N. E. P. has caused its authors in these last seven years, and shows what effort is required if the N. E. P. is to serve the end originally intended and not the opposite.

The natural result of the repression of private enterprise is that socialization must be speeded up and enlarged to just the extent that the rôle of private initiative is cut. Furthermore, from the beginning it has been suspected, and in 1923–24 the suspicion became almost a certainty among those acquainted with the facts, that any forced increase in the rate of socialization was impossible save at a very considerable sacrifice of the general prosperity. It has always been clear that these sacrifices would certainly be made, no matter how great they might be. Nor, after the critical experiences of the first few years, was there much doubt as to which was to make the sacrifices, the socialized section or the section left free for private initiative. The idea cherished outside Soviet Russia that the N. E. P. might provide an eventual means of departure from the socialistic principles of the revolution and a means of approach to our bourgeois individualistic economy, or that the Soviet State might possibly be regarded in the rôle of a prodigal son by the executives of Western banks — this idea, though still ineradicable from many minds, either represents astounding superficiality of thought or else is simply an *idée fixe* to which the Old World clings just because it is so used to it. The determination with which the Soviet State undertook a radical alteration in the structure of Russian economics through the

introduction and development of a "socialized sector," might even in the first days of the N. E. P. have carried a significant moral to outside observers. Today we know in addition that the danger which the N. E. P. represents for the socialistic state organization forces the latter further along the path toward its communistic ideal.

So far we have said less about the picture which the Soviet economic system presents today than about the measures which brought the picture into being. From the beginning the Soviet Republic laid the principal stress upon "industrialization." In the last fiscal year alone (1927–28), no less than 1,800 million rubles has been spent on industry; as early as 1925–26 the sum of 800 millions was devoted to it. Obviously the whole energy of the country was required for this gigantic effort. Prices of crops were held at the 1914 level, though the prices of industrial products meantime increased many fold. The needs of "industrialization" have absorbed more and more of the relatively slight purchasing power of the Soviet State abroad, until today they require 80 percent of it. Result: a distressing lack of ordinary goods, especially those needed by the peasants. For ten years the peasant has been skimped both by domestic industry and foreign trade. In 1927–28 Soviet industry took for its own purposes, especially for expansion, 19 percent of the 23 percent increase of production, and left only 3 or 4 percent for the open market.

The advance in socialistic industrialization seems very imposing when viewed statistically, and from the Soviet standpoint it is the central factor in judging the whole economic situation, especially domestic policy. But its indisputably great success has also a number of negative aspects which we must not disregard in forming our opinions. First, let us consider the effects on agriculture. Before the war Russia was the leading flax-producing country of the world. Today Italy is far ahead. Russia used to be unquestionably the leading barley producer. Today that, too, is no longer true. Her cotton production is still far below pre-war figures. More serious still is the fact that within the last year the Soviet Union has ceased to be considered as a wheat-exporting country. In the coming year it will even be necessary to manage the domestic supply "with great care." This year, for the first time, even the official statistics show a falling off of 1.9 percent in grain production. Here, I think, as in other fields of rural pro-

duction, the otherwise reliable Soviet statistics are merely trailing after disagreeable realities. The present disquieting condition of rural economics was prepared long ago by the increasingly repressive measures against the independents.

The business of the state coöperative has increased very significantly in scope since it set to work in earnest in 1924. In itself this is certainly an extraordinary achievement. But just what significance has it when we consider the business turn-over as a whole? The statistics reveal how sharply the share of private trade — retail and especially wholesale — has fallen off. Today we may estimate that the wholesale private trade comprises perhaps 15 percent of the entire turn-over, retail trade perhaps 20 or 30 percent — but with a strong trend downward. But in view of the increasing difficulties it constantly becomes more doubtful how far socialized trade will really be able to *replace* private management. During the harvest crisis of last year, the state set as its goal the collection of about ten million tons of produce for metropolitan food supply. The assumption was that private trade, in spite of persecutions, would cover the balance of the need. That was an error. The "de-individualizing" of private trade had already been more thorough than official calculations assumed. The realization that positive socialization was not advancing to a degree corresponding with the "de-individualizing" of industry had a disquieting effect not only on agricultural trade but also on all the relationships of private with socialized trade.

As a matter of fact, there is a crisis in Moscow today both in turn-over and in retail sales. People stand in line not only to buy many of the essentials of life, but even to get electric light bulbs! It is much the same throughout the whole Soviet realm. The situation has its origin either in under-production or in under-organization of retailing — or in both. This cannot be denied. It is difficult to imagine what would happen if the great variety of commodities which business might manipulate rose suddenly in price. For several years a lack of every sort of goods suitable for consumption has been felt, and it becomes more perceptible day by day. This shows how cautious one must be in assuming that the increase in the amount of commodities and distribution of all kinds shown statistically in the "socialistic sector" in itself constitutes proof that production as a whole is rising. We are thus compelled, at least provisionally, to assume that the repressive methods used by socialization against private initi-

ative are having the same effects in trade as in agriculture.

Why and how does socialistic industrialization play so large and at the same time so dangerous a rôle in the Soviet economic policy? The idea of industrializing the Soviet Union without any adequate help from foreign capital (which financed and owned 80 percent of Tsarist industry) at first glance seems nothing less than heroic. We must admire the ambitious scale on which it was planned and the tenacity with which the Soviet Government — and especially the Party which today exercises dictatorship — still adheres to it, despite the critical situation. But we must not forget that an important and constant consideration is the necessity of providing support for the political-economic existence of the proletarian State. Without industrialization, without "proletarianization" of the land, the Soviet State some day or other will collapse in the sea of 139,000,000 peasants. It needs an island on which it can feel itself secure. It needs a gigantic labor supply. It has had success with its industrialization. But like everything else this, too, bears the mark of the forced methods which brought it about. The matter cannot be discussed thoroughly here. Suffice it to say that there exist today within Russian industry certain definitely retrograde tendencies — due to lack of raw materials, to increasing financial difficulties (although in a strictly socialist country money does not play precisely the same rôle as among us),[1] and to psychological and technical hindrances to bourgeois direction of the large-scale industrial and commercial affairs of the nation.

It is even admitted by the Soviets that, in addition to the unfavorable state of the whole economic structure, there is a lack of resources for the further industrial development of the country, especially building material and pig-iron. We must therefore conclude that even in this field, judging by technical and economic needs, there has been too much haste in dispensing with private initiative and the services of capital. Industrial production itself, then, has failed in the great task which it has undertaken. Not only does industry provide far too few goods for trade; it does not even provide enough for its own needs. The whole industrial position leads us to put the same query that we did in the case of commerce: Is not the increase of production in the "socialized

[1] In 1927–28 the State industries had 30 percent less money than in 1925, despite a marked increase in production, a marked increase in the number of businesses, and a marked decrease in the purchasing power of the ruble.

sector" merely a partial substitute for the destroyed achievements of private production? This is certainly true in some of the light industries, as for instance in leather manufacture, where during the last year thousands of tanneries have closed down.

But all these separate observations may be reduced to a single, all-embracing question, which day by day causes more and more worry to the responsible authorities in Moscow: Has not the expansion of the "socialized sector" inside the general economic structure (without concurrently satisfying the Russian economy) weakened the governmental organism more than it has strengthened it? If this question is answered in the affirmative, then another question arises. Will not the reaction of the unsatisfactory general situation upon the "socialized sector" as it is today, and on its further extension, constitute an immediate danger for the final success of socialization? These questions will inevitably occur to anyone who has given impartial attention to the course of events since 1924.

Perhaps it will be well to summarize the ideas that I have attempted to set forth in highly concentrated form. 1. The incompatibility between the socialistic and private forms of economics is greater than was anticipated when the N. E. P. was introduced. 2. Any adjustment of such friction as arises must be at the expense of private business. 3. The compulsion to socialization has thus overshadowed the will to socialization in practical politics. 4. Socialization has been unable adequately to replace private initiative as the latter has shrunk or disappeared. 5. The result is that the general economic condition becomes worse instead of improving. 6. Through the collapse of private business, socialization has continuously increased its importance in the Soviet economic system. 7. Nevertheless its rival's collapse has brought socialization to a crisis.

The American reader may perhaps suppose this to be abstract academic reasoning, culled from some economic textbook. But it is not just an ingeniously constructed theory. What I have described is a phenomenon involving the very real fate of very real Russians on Russian soil, 150,000,000 living beings — every living person in Russia, as far as Yakutsk, near the earth's cold pole — for the Soviet administration extends its drastic will with extraordinary unity over the whole of its immense empire. The terminology that one must employ in describing its activity, which is guided by ideas quite other than those which we have come to

know in our Occidental life, sounds strange, abstruse. But were this globe of ours completely occupied by socialistic states, then if some revolution suddenly injected among them a state devoted to private business, this phenomenon would not appear any more strange in their eyes. It is the fatal — and highly un-Socratic — method of many students of contemporary Russia either to recognize only such things as are already familiar or else to force into the scheme of the familiar a variety of things that do not belong there at all.

The fact that one must go to so much effort to comprehend what is going on in any phase of present-day life in Russia shows at least how deeply the socialism of the Bolsheviks has already penetrated into reality. It has of course entailed all sorts of tremendous sacrifices. These have not lessened, nor will they lessen. Indeed, as we have seen, socialism has been its own sacrifice. Today if it is to survive it *must* do what originally it wanted to do of its own free will. "*Beim ersten seid Ihr frei, beim zweiten seid Ihr Knechte.*" The primal demands of self-preservation compel it, force it, to become a wholesaler, as well as to make a "rural proletarian" out of the peasant as fast as possible.

It would be a tremendous task to expand the foregoing observations and to show how it is primarily the logic of its own existence that is driving the socialistic State to achieve social goals by economic means and yet to try to win a political position by economic sacrifices. The same crisis that we have here tried to describe (while scrupulously omitting mention of all the other influences that affect the purely economic N. E. P.) exist also in the cultural, political, and even the diplomatic N. E. P. In each case one can see how Soviet socialism has been compelled by the inexorable force of circumstances to accentuate its position, or, to use a current word, to "radicalize." Only the rigidly theoretical training of the Bolsheviks makes it possible for them to keep their bearings amid the turmoil.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY

By Victor Chernov

NO student of the internal structure of the Soviet power can overlook the way in which every part of the Soviet Government machine is paralleled in the machine of the Communist Party. The supreme organ of the Soviet Union is the General Congress of Soviets, which elects the Central Executive Committee, which in turn elects from among its members the Praesidium, *de facto* the highest executive organ of the Union. The Communist Party pyramid is similarly constructed. The General Congress of the Party corresponds to the General Congress of Soviets; the Central Committee of the Party corresponds to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets; and the Politbureau, which leads and dictates to the Party, corresponds to the Praesidium. Every grade of the Soviet structure has a similar parallelism in the Party structure. Is this mere coincidence? Let us examine the matter a little more closely.

Outside of Russia, the Council of People's Commissars has been long considered as the real government of the Soviet state. Actually it occupies a very subordinate position. "The meetings of the Council of People's Commissars," declared Ossinsky at the eleventh Congress of the Party, "are attended not by the Commissars themselves, but by their deputies, irresponsible people who are not supposed to know much about politics. What is the result? The Politbureau of the Party is the decisive factor. The Council of People's Commissars has always been disregarded, even in dealing with matters of secondary importance. If orders have been given that a question should be decided in such and such a way, the Commissars have nothing to say."

In numerous cases the decisions of separate Commissars and of the whole Council of People's Commissars have been repealed. It is true that usually the Central Executive Committee or its Praesidium, theoretically the highest assemblies of the State, have gone through the form of vetoing them. But it is an open secret that in these cases they have been used as mere instruments for conveying the will of the Central Committee of the Party. This was plainly stated in the report of the Central Committee to the ninth Congress of the Party; Krestinsky was not guilty of

any indiscretion when he declared: "When a decision of the Council of People's Commissars must be repealed or suspended, the Central Committee of the Party does it through the Praesidium." It will be remembered that Chicherin and Krassin signed a draft treaty with Italy. It happened, however, that Lenin, recovering for a while from his illness, attended the meeting of the Politbureau at which the question was discussed. He declared himself against the agreements; and its fate was sealed. "Although we realized," Zinoviev told later, "that it was awkward not to honor the signature of our authoritative representatives, nevertheless we passed a resolution to this effect, with which Lenin concurred." The Council of People's Commissars, meeting at a later date, was confronted with a *fait accompli*.

That the Politbureau — the guiding spirit of the Central Committee — is, in a sense, the highest organ of the Soviet realm, appears from the conflict which arose between the Central Executive Committee of the Union and the Central Committee of the Party over the question of the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection. The word "conflict" is, perhaps, a little out of place here. The Central Executive Committee prepared and submitted to the Council of People's Commissars its own project for this institution, but was immediately rebuked by the Central Committee, which was studying the same question. "This," says Krestinsky, "is not an interference with the work of the Soviets over a trivial matter, but a supervision of their activities by the Central Committee, which indicates to separate departments and institutions their respective rights and jurisdiction. This function is among the Committee's immediate duties."

It is plain, then, that the Central Committee of the Party enjoys the right of supervision over Soviet institutions and also the right of interpreting the Soviet constitution in the matter of delimiting the respective jurisdictions of the various Soviet organs. Of course, it may be argued that this right is not derived from the constitution itself and that it is a breach or violation of the constitution. This opinion, however, is hardly valid. Article 1 of the Fundamental Laws provides that "the present constitution has for its purpose . . . to guarantee the dictatorship of the proletariat." In order to understand this fundamental proposition let us find out what the legislator meant by the term "dictatorship." The works of Lenin will give us an answer. "The scientific idea of dictatorship means nothing else than a power

absolutely unlimited, restricted by no laws or regulations, and based on violence."[1] And again: "The translation to socialism will inevitably be accompanied by the dictatorship of the proletariat; but the dictatorship of the proletariat through the organization of all proletarians is impossible, because not only in Russia, one of the most backward capitalistic countries, but in all other capitalistic countries as well, the proletariat is still so divided, so debased, and occasionally so corrupted, that the dictatorship cannot be effected through the organization of the proletariat as a whole. It can be brought about only by the small vanguard imbued with the revolutionary energy of its class. . . . It so happens, therefore, that the Party counts among its members the vanguard of the proletariat and that this vanguard brings into effect the dictatorship of the proletariat."[2]

The Soviet constitution, therefore, is not an act of self-limitation on the part of the dictatorship, by the enactment of a body of laws binding on it, but on the contrary a guarantee of an unrestricted dictatorship — to be specific, of the dictatorship of the Party. This is why the Communist Party, its Central Committee or the Politbureau are none of them referred to in the constitution; they are above the constitution; they are the power which has given the constitution, which interprets it and, if necessary, alters and repeals it. The constitution is a body of laws dictated by the Party to the outside world, but not binding on itself. Accordingly, the Soviet constitution does not mention those who are the real holders of dictatorial powers but merely describes the auxiliary machinery through which they operate, the "complex system of pitch-wheels," to use the expression of Lenin. Here lies the key to the understanding of the whole system of the Soviet Government.

Comparison may help us to elucidate the points which are still obscure. It is known that Italian Fascism in many instances has adopted the methods of the Bolsheviks in building up its system of statecraft. The Fascist dictatorship, however, has recently taken on new forms different from the Bolshevik pattern. On September 20, 1928, the Grand Council of the Fascist Party accepted a project by which it is converted into one of the highest institutions of the State. Henceforth no changes in the constitution can be made without consulting the Grand Council; it is

[1] Lenin: "Sobranie Sochineni" ("Works"), 1925, Vol. XVII, p. 361.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, Part I, pp. 8–9.

now an important consultative organ whose opinion has to be sought on "all political, economic, and social questions of national importance." It may appear, at first sight, that the Fascists have been more logical and straightforward than the Bolsheviks, who did not dare to proclaim the Politbureau a part of the state machine of the Soviet Union. But this would be an erroneous conclusion. By fitting the Grand Council into the constitutional frame-work of Italy, the Fascists have *ipso facto* limited its powers. It is now one of the several governmental institutions with a definite jurisdiction, and therefore powerless outside it. This is in contradiction with Lenin's view of dictatorship. Then, by making the Grand Council a part of the State machinery, the Fascists have been compelled to regulate its membership. The Grand Council cannot now, as was the case before, be reëlected by a Congress of the Fascist Party at any time without restriction as to the number and qualifications of members. Finally, the Premier appoints the secretary of the Party and the members of the Party's Board of Directors, and he convokes the Grand Council for the discussion of questions falling within its jurisdiction. In other words, the element of party dictatorship is considerably weakened here in favor of the dictatorship of the Prime Minister, a purely personal dictatorship. This rather complex system of relationships and mutual limitations is unknown to the Soviet constitution. It leaves to the Communist Party and its leading organs complete freedom of organization and action, but clothes their decisions with the powers of supreme sources of law.

It is easy to find examples of the binding character of Party decisions. The most important turning point in the life of Soviet Russia — her transition to the New Economic Policy — was marked by the issue of a document of primary importance, the *Rules of the Council of People's Commissars on the Enforcement of the New Economic Policy*, dated August 9, 1921. This document, which is signed by Lenin in his capacity as President of the Council of People's Commissars, and countersigned by officials of that body, from the opening paragraphs leaves no doubts as to its real origin: "The tenth Congress of the Party and the All-Russian Conference of the Party have laid down the fundamental principles of the new economic policy." The policy of the Government, therefore, is dictated not by the Soviet "parliament," which is the General Congress of Soviets, but by the Congress and Con-

ference of the Communist Party. And the Government feels itself so much a part of the Party that in its official pronouncement it issues orders not merely to the Soviet employees, but also to the members of the Communist Party. "Party and Soviet workers," says the *Rules*, "must take the most decisive measures . . . for absolute and effective compliance with the directions issued by the Communist Party."

A reader unfamiliar with the subject may perhaps object that all this was due merely to the "personal union" between the Soviet Government and the Party in the person of Lenin — President of the Council of People's Commissars and at the same time head of the Politbureau and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The reply is that the document was an official one which bears the imprint of the whole Council of People's Commissars. We have further evidence to the same effect in a number of legislative and other official Soviet documents.

The most colorful among them is, perhaps, the one dealing with the fate of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party and of the Commissariat of the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection. The decisive factor here again was the personality of Lenin himself. Seeking the unification of the leadership of the Party, Lenin got the idea of replacing the Central Committee by two organs: the Politbureau — the brain of the Party — and the Organization Bureau — its muscle. Under these conditions the membership of the Central Committee could be increased without danger because its plenary sessions would assume the character of small conferences; in order to emphasize this character of the plenary sessions he added to the membership of the Central Committee the whole Central Control Commission, whose duties were to check over the membership of the Party, to remove undesirable elements, to examine books, and to administrate Communist justice through special Party courts. Having thus created a kind of "second chamber" within the Party, Lenin proceeded to establish a similar organ in the Soviet administration. He found here the remains of the former State Audit Department, which had been re-named the Workmen's and Peasants' Control and later the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection. "The Commissariat of Workmen's and Peasants' Control does not enjoy today even a shadow of authority," wrote Lenin, "everybody knows that it is in a hopeless state and that nothing can be expected from this Com-

missariat under the present conditions."[3] And he started a long and intensive campaign for the complete reorganization of this institution which, it was hoped, might be turned into a special organ for clearing the whole state machinery from every vestige of bureaucracy. In his opinion, this task was all-important. His plan was to amalgamate into one institution the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party with the reorganized Commissariat of the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection. The complete rebuilding of the machinery of the Soviets on the principle of maximum efficiency and economy, its transformation into an ideal instrument for carrying out the industrialization and the electrification of the country, the merciless elimination of all parts useless or inadequate — "such are the high aims," writes Lenin, "which I hope will be achieved by our Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection, such is the reason for my scheme to amalgamate one of the most authoritative Party organs with a mere People's Commissariat."

Lenin naturally realized that the proposed fusion of a State department with a Party organ was pure nonsense from the point of view of recognized standards of law. His answer to the question how far such a fusion was admissible was truly remarkable, perhaps even more so than the plan which his statement tried to justify. His approach to the problem was very simple. "Why not, indeed, combine the two organs into one if this meets the requirements of the moment? Did anyone object against the fact that a fusion of this kind has existed in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs from the very beginning and has met with great success? Does not the Politbureau discuss from the point of view of the Communist Party a great many small and big problems of international relations, the moves of foreign powers and our countermoves, to defeat their — let us say — tricks, not to use a stronger expression? Is not this elastic combination of Soviet and Party elements a source of strength to our foreign policy? I believe that a method which has taken a strong footing in our foreign policy and has gained such a degree of recognition that its application is no longer challenged in this field, will be at least as suitable — and I believe that it will be much more so — if applied to the whole of our State machinery."

This is a good point at which to emphasize that the usual excuse of Bolshevik diplomacy — that the policy of the Government

[3] *Ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, Part II, p. 128.

must not be confused with the policy of the Communist Party — is obviously false. Lenin's evidence certainly carries weight. And he informs us that it is in the realm of foreign policy that the "elastic combination of Soviet and Party elements . . . has gained such a degree of recognition" that it is now a matter of mere routine. His testimony may be of some profit to "innocents abroad" who still accept as true every explanation of Chicherin in this connection.

But another point is still more important: the assertion of Lenin that the "elastic combination of Soviet and Party elements" must be enforced from top to bottom of the Soviet State machinery. This explains the desire for a closer parallelism between the structure of the Soviet Government of the Communist Party and the search for more convenient and flexible channels through which the energy of the Communist Party might be infused into the Soviet machinery. The link between the two organizations ceases to be a purely *de facto* one; it is no longer a question of "personal union." It takes shape in the amalgamated institutions of the Soviet-Party type, in the complex *official* combination of the two organizations.

After what had been said the reader will not be surprised to hear that in January, 1926, the Chairman of the Supreme Council on National Economy, M. Derzhinsky, issued an order directing the presiding committee of a conference on the rebuilding of industrial capital "to organize its work in accordance with the decisions of the fifteenth congress of the Party." Nor will one be surprised by the fact that the order does not even mention what party: there are no other books, but only The Book; there are no other parties, but one and only one Party, because when a party becomes the essential brain and soul of the State machinery, there is no longer room for another, just as there is no room for two governments or two States within the same territory.

Similarly, one will not be surprised to hear that the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party directed twenty members of the latter to carry on an investigation in order to find out how far the "decisions of the Party were adhered to by the Soviet organs" and to "take the measures they may think necessary;" and furthermore that the Central Executive Committee of the Union empowered "those comrades to remove undesirable state employees and to prosecute

them in the courts, as well as to issue orders binding on Soviet organs."[4]

Nor is there anything to surprise us in such facts as that on October 1, 1927, over the signature of M. Yanson, Secretary of the Central Control Commission, appeared the decision of the joint session of two Party organizations (Central Committee and Central Control Commission) and one Soviet organ (Council of People's Commissars) ordering the reduction by 20 percent of the expenses of management of all the coöperative societies of the Union; that the plenary session of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party "has approved the proposed plan of work of the Commissariat of the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection for the year 1926–1927;" that in February, 1927, the plenary session of the Central Committee empowered the Central Control Commission of the Party and the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection, a State institution, to "prosecute in the courts" persons who refuse to comply with the prescribed reduction in prices; that in April of the same year Shiryakov, Secretary of the Central Control Commission, issued in the name of his committee, as well as in the name of the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection, a circular order which directed "the heads of all Government departments" to observe certain rules in sending officials abroad, and threatened them in case of non-compliance "with merciless punishment in accordance with the principles of Party and Soviet justice."

Not without good reason, indeed, has the Central Control Commission been nick-named the "inter-party Cheka." Since its fusion with the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection it occupies an almost dictatorial position among other State institutions. On September 11, 1928, was published the resolution of its third plenary session, which shows that it issues orders not only to the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection, and the Central Bureau of Trade-Unions, but even to so important an institution as the Supreme Council of National Economy. A year earlier, on August 9, 1927, the joint plenary session of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission directed the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection, jointly with the Control Commission, "to prosecute and punish all persons and institutions, whether Soviet or belonging to the Communist Party, who are using measures of repression against people criticizing the evils of bureaucratism,

[4] *Pravda*, April 30, 1925.

irrespective of the form this criticism might have taken," and also to prosecute them in court "taking special care that they should receive maximum sentences and that the action against them should not be dropped." The Soviet lawyers themselves, for instance M. Boryan, commenting on these decisions, admit that "from the point of view of bourgeois jurisprudence they present a hopeless mixture of State and Party elements," that they undermine the very foundation of the independence of the courts, and that "from the point of view of bourgeois jurisprudence the decision of the plenary session of a Party has no legal force and cannot be considered as having binding power until it has been embodied in a law issued through the usual channels. . . . Bourgeois lawyers will be unable to understand how a Party congress may decide on the methods to be followed by the Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection, and even more, issue orders on questions of national importance; they will imagine that the congress of the Party has usurped the prerogatives of the State."

Of course, the complex system of combined Party and State institutions might have been built up by a variety of methods. No definite policy in this respect was followed by the Soviet leaders at the beginning, and the legal situation was extremely confused. The guiding principle was the principle of expediency. Even Lenin had to admit that, "The relationship between the Party and the Soviets is highly abnormal; we all agree on this point." But it would be a mistake to interpret this admission as indicating the recognition of the necessity of drawing a line between the sphere of *jus publicum* — the Soviet institutions — and *jus privatum*, — the Communist Party. It shows a mere desire to introduce a certain uniformity in the relationship between Party and State institutions. The loose and intricate system of hierarchy and subordination between the various bodies necessarily created a tendency to apply directly to the last authority, that is, the Politbureau.

Lenin, even after he realized the "highly abnormal" relationship between the Party and the Soviets, did little to eliminate its causes. He continued to defend the principle of the immediate participation of Party organs in legislation and State administration. "As long as we, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, are responsible for the administration of the country, we shall never give up our right of 'shaking up' " — that is, appointing, dismissing, and transferring State employees. And then

"naturally, all important questions shall go to the Politbureau."[5] What is wrong in the situation, in the opinion of Lenin, is that every unimportant little problem is carried to the Politbureau. But still it is not easy to find a way out of this difficulty because "we have only one ruling party, and you cannot forbid members of the Party to make complaints. This is why the Council of People's Commissars has to forward almost everything to the Politbureau." What is to be done? Lenin could suggest nothing but such half-measures as "to relieve the Politbureau and the Central Committee from unimportant matters and to put the work of responsible leaders on a higher plane . . . so that the People's Commissars should be responsible for their work, and would not be obliged to go to the Council of People's Commissars first and to the Politbureau after," etc. etc. All mere pious hopes.

Stalin, who succeeded Lenin, altered merely the shape of the link between the Party and the Soviet organs. Leaving alone the amalgamated institutions, where he had gained a strong footing even in the days of Lenin, he devoted his energies to the development of Communist "cells" and to the increase of their influence upon the work of the whole State machinery.

The Communist "cells" have passed through three distinct periods. At first, they were not recognized as having administrative functions. "You are concerned with the political education of the masses, and not with economic questions and problems of organization," was the usual rebuke they received from the heads of departments.[6] The second period began with "the energetic interference of the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party to change the attitude towards the 'cells.' " At the end of 1926 the People's Commissar for Finance, Bryukhanov, called a conference to which the members of the Commissariat for Finance, heads of Government departments, and members of the bureau of the "cell" were invited. The "cell" is now entering into the third phase of its development. It has become a State institution, in fact a state within the State. The bureau of the "cell" receives reports from the heads of Government departments and issues directives to them; it examines plans for the reorganization of the machinery of government, discusses schedules of salaries, rations the consumption of raw materials, controls expenditure,

[5] Lenin, "Sobranie Sochineni," Vol. XVIII, Part I, pp. 64–65, and Part II, p. 48.
[6] Pervushin, in *Pravda*, January 6, 1927.

makes provisions for the improvement of industrial methods, etc. In fact, the authority of the "cell" in Government institutions is such that since January, 1927, the Central Committee has made it partly responsible for the work of that institution: in addition to the head of the institution (a member of the Communist Party) "the whole 'cell' shall be responsible to the Party for disorders, inefficiency, and abuses, and in particularly important cases may be punished by the Party."

The Communist "cells" are the feelers spread by the Communist Party through all the institutions of Russian public life, not only in Soviet organs, but also in Trade-Unions, coöperative organizations, and so on; they are an official agency without the participation of which no important change can take place; they are officially responsible for the working of the administration. Members of the Communist Party are responsible in two different ways: as members of the institution with which they are connected, and as members of the "cell." They are all within the jurisdiction of the Politbureau. They simplify the task of the Politbureau in the exercise of its dictatorship by relieving it of the burden of relatively unimportant questions and by allowing the Politbureau to concentrate on matters of general policy. What Lenin attempted to achieve by amalgamating separate organs of the Soviet administration and of the Communist Party has now been achieved along the whole line of the Soviet State machinery, from top to bottom.

Yes, from the very top. The highest legislative assembly of the Soviet Republic is the Central Executive Committee, above which towers its Praesidium. At its peak is a single person, Kalinin, whom the Soviet press likes to describe as the "All-Russian village elder," using a nick-name dear to the heart of the peasants. Kalinin, in accordance with a statement made by Lenin, "personifies the supreme power of the Soviet Republic." His position is roughly similar to that of the President of the United States. And then it appears that being a member of the Central Executive Committee, of which he is also chairman, Kalinin is within the jurisdiction of a special Communist Party "cell" of the Central Executive Committee! In *Pravda* of February 9, 1927, we find for instance the following remark: "The bureau of the 'cell' has recently requested the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Comrade Kalinin, to submit to a meeting of the Party a report on the work of the Central Executive

Committee." We learn from the same article that "heads of departments always comply with the demands of the 'cell';" that "there is no instance of a refusal by a head of department to present a report to the 'cell';" that the "secretariat of the Central Executive Committee invites the secretary of the 'cell' to take part in the deliberations of that body when questions of improving the management of an institution are discussed;" and, finally, that "autonomous republics and territories are represented in our 'cell.' " So even the autonomous parts of the Union are subject to the iron discipline of the Communist Party.

The supreme power of the State is a mere prisoner of the "cell." The circle is now closed. All the agencies of the Soviet administration, like the web of a gigantic spider or the circles of Dante's inferno, center round the Politbureau.

It is perfectly clear that the Soviet rule must be defined as an oligarchy. This begins to be understood even outside Russia. But few are aware abroad that Lenin, who never refused to meet a difficult situation and did not mince his words, once himself pronounced the odious word as a challenge to the opposition. With epical serenity he made the following statement: "The dictatorship is effected by the proletariat organized into Soviets and guided by the Communist Party. . . . The Party is led by a Central Committee of nineteen members elected by the congress, while the current work in Moscow is transacted by still smaller committees, namely the Organization Bureau and the Political Bureau which are elected at a plenary session of the Central Committee and have five members each. We have, therefore, a real oligarchy. In no institution of our republic can any important question of general policy or organization be decided without receiving previously the directives of the Central Committee of the Party."[7] And when attempts were made at the ninth congress of the Party to use the remark of Lenin in a sense favorable to the opposition, the following interesting apology came from his orthodox follower, Yakovlev: "The criticism we have just heard may be summarized in the statement that the country is governed by an oligarchy, a small clique, which has usurped power in the Party and now runs the whole show. Against such methods of criticism every member of the Party ought to and I believe will protest. Let us be logical. If we raise the question of an oligarchy within the Party, then we shall have to raise another question,

[7] "Sobranie Sochineni", Vol. XVII, pp. 138–139.

that of the Party oligarchy which has seized power in the country. For the oligarchy of the Party which has so long led the Revolution you of the opposition intend to substitute another oligarchy, just one grade below. If this is the question you raise, we certainly prefer the oligarchy of genius to the oligarchy of mediocrity. But if you raise a question of principle, then you must be logical and admit that our country is now governed by the Party which you are pleased to call an oligarchy."

The whole system of the Soviet State institutions is imbued with the idea of the oligarchy of the Communist Party, and this has received official recognition. This gives the Communist Party the position of a real ruling party in a sense unknown to the western world. The Party is officially represented in every Government institution, but its sphere of competence is not defined; like ancient castes, it extends to the whole field of statecraft, with the Soviet machinery serving as a mere tool for distributing the political energy which emanates from it. This is a system of caste autocracy by a party, or oligarchical absolutism.

THE POLITBUREAU

THE SUPREME POWER IN SOVIET RUSSIA

POLITICAL power in Soviet Russia is not divided and is delegated only in respect to minor matters; it rests firmly concentrated in the hands of one small group, the steering committee, or "Politbureau," of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The nine members of the Politbureau, together with their eight alternates, are the spear-head of the Communist Party's force of a million and a half members. On the one hand they dominate and direct the Government of the U. S. S. R. (the usual abbreviation for Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), and on the other hand the Third, or Communist, International. They are the main-spring of all action in the realm of the Soviets and of all Communist action abroad.

This fact is to be emphasized because of a tendency to speak of the Soviet Government as though it were an independent agency, like the Government of the United States. There is hardly any similarity between them. In the one case we have a Government of which the President, his Cabinet, and probably a majority of the elected members of Congress belong to a particular Party, but feel bound hardly at all even to the formal Party platform. In Russia today we see a Government recruited entirely from the sole existing legal Party, the supreme organ of which is a self-perpetuating and autocratic group that meets secretly and can banish or imprison every person in the country who incurs its displeasure.

Similarly there often is doubt regarding the relations of the Soviet Government with the Third International, the sponsors of world-wide revolutionary propaganda. Certain spokesmen of the Soviet Government cultivate the theory that they are not responsible for, or in any way connected with, the Third International — a troublesome body, they pretend, which they would be glad to see installed elsewhere than in the Soviet domain. It is true that they may not be responsible for the actions of the Third International, because they cannot control it; but their own masters, the Politbureau, do control it. In particular it cannot escape attention that Rykov, who fills the position analogous to that of Premier in the Soviet Government, and who is also a member of the Politbureau, was elected in September of the

present year to the Executive Committee of the Third International. If it is indeed true that the Soviet Government has no connection with the Third International, then Rykov must, in his triple function, find himself in even a more difficult situation than did the late Franz Joseph, who said "The Emperor of Austria must never know what the King of Hungary is thinking or doing."

The distinction which the Soviet Government asks foreign opinion to make between its official statements and acts and those of the Communist Party and of the Third International seems quite unreal if we examine the mere physical structure of the three bodies. Of the 71 members of the Party's Central Committee (of which, as has been explained, the Politbureau is a part), over half hold high positions in the Soviet Government (including 8 of the 11 members of the Council of Commissars); and 8 are members of the Executive Committee of the Third International. The following table lists the various functions of the nine members and eight alternate members of the Politbureau. It supplies a simple demonstration of the way in which the Party steering committee interlocks, on the one hand with the Soviet Government, and on the other hand with the Third International.

POLITBUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE U. S. S. R.

Members

BUKHARIN
Member of Executive Committee of Third International
Editor of *Pravda*, Organ of the Communist Party
Delegate of Communist Party to VI Congress of Third International

KALININ
Senior President, Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.
President of Central Executive Committee of Russian Soviet Republic
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

KUYBYSHEV
President, Supreme Council of National Economy of U. S. S. R.
Member of Council of Labor and Defense of U. S. S. R.
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

MOLOTOV
Member of Executive Committee of Third International
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Delegate of Communist Party to VI Congress of Third International

RUDZUTAK

Vice-President of Council of Commissars of U. S. S. R.
Commissar for Communications of U. S. S. R.
Vice-President, Council of Labor and Defense of U. S. S. R.
Member of Praesidium of Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

RYKOV

Member of Executive Committee of Third International
President of Council of Commissars of U. S. S. R.
President of Council of Commissars of the Russian Soviet Republic
President, Council of Labor and Defense of U. S. S. R.
Delegate of Communist Party to VI Congress of Third International

STALIN

Member of Executive Committee of Third International
Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Delegate of Communist Party to VI Congress of Third International

TOMSKY

President of Central Council of Trades Unions of U. S. S. R.
Member of Praesidium of Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.
Member of Council of Labor and Defense of U. S. S. R.
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

VOROSHILOV

Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of U. S. S. R.
Member of Council of Labor and Defense of U. S. S. R.
Member of Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

Alternates

ANDREYEV

Member of Praesidium of Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.
Member of Praesidium of Central Council of Trades Unions
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

KAGANOVITCH

Member of Praesidium of Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.

KIROV

Member of Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

KOSIOR, S.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Delegate of the Communist Party to the V Congress of the Third International

MIKOYAN

Commissar for Foreign and Domestic Commerce of U. S. S. R.
Member of Council of Labor and Defense of U. S. S. R.
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

PETROVSKY
2nd President of Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.
President of Central Executive Committee of the Ukranian Soviet Republic
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

TCHUBAR
Member of Praesidium of Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.
President of Council of Commissars of the Ukranian Soviet Republic

UGLANOV
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Commissar for Labor of U. S. S. R.
Member of Praesidium of Central Executive Committee of U. S. S. R.
Delegate of Communist Party to V Congress of Third International

Other members of the Central Committee are such important government personages as Antipov, Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs; Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Lepse, President of the Union of Metallurgists and member of the Praesidium of the Central Council of Trades Unions and of the Praesidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy; Lobov, Assistant President of the Supreme Council of National Economy; Menzhinsky, President of the O. G. P. U., or secret police; Schwartz, President of the Union of Miners and member of the Central Council of Trades Unions; Skripnik, who besides being a member of the Executive Committee of the Third International is a member of the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U. S. S. R.; and Smirnov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Vice-President of the Council of Commissars of the Russian Soviet Republic, and member of the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U. S. S. R.

The varied and influential functions of these Central Committee members, grouped about and subject to the all-powerful Politbureau, merely corroborate our understanding of the interdependence of Government, Party and Third International — "these three, and the greatest of these is the Party."

THE NEW COMMUNIST BIBLE

A COMPREHENSIVE restatement of revolutionary creed issued from the Third or Communist International at the conclusion of its six-weeks Congress in Moscow last summer. This Congress, sixth in number since the Third International was organized by Lenin in 1919, was a meeting of particular significance. Over five hundred delegates were present, one hundred of them representing countries outside of Europe. The most important result was the formulation of a "Program of the Communist International," which was unanimously adopted at the closing session on September 1. This Program, a document of over twenty thousand words, is a complete exposition of Communist theory, practical aims and methods.[1] It was supplemented by a revolutionary appeal in the form of a Manifesto.[2] Finally, an illuminating commentary on the Program was given by Bukharin, the President of the Third International and its principal theoretician, in a report to the Moscow Communist Center.[3] The documents taken together constitute the new bible of world revolution.

The quotations below aim to reflect the spirit of the Program and cover its principal features, particularly those of practical tactics. Unless specifically attributed to the Manifesto or to Bukharin, all of them are from the Program. The following sentences from the Manifesto will serve to indicate the spirit of all the documents, besides revealing certain characteristics of the brand of Communism that is being preached from Moscow at the present time.

The Sixth Congress of the Communist International has adopted an International Program, equally binding on all of its sections. For the first time in the annals of the revolutionary labor movement the labor class receives into its hands a document whose provisions are *law* for millions of organized proletarians in all parts of the world, among all races and nations of the universe. . . . It is a guide in the struggle against their oppressors for millions of toilers — white, yellow, or black — under the tropics and in the remotest corners of the earth — in factories and on plantations — in mines and on railroads — in forests and desert steppes — wherever the class struggle unfolds. . . . It is a Program of Unity for the laboring class in its struggle against the bourgeoisie. It is the Program of the inevitable *World Dictatorship of the Proletariat.*

[1] The Program is printed in full in *Izvestia*, September 5, 1928.
[2] *Izvestia*, September 2, 1928.
[3] *Izvestia*, September 12, 1928.

Says Bukharin:

Basic to the whole construction of the Program is its world character. . . . The Communist International has spread its tentacles over all countries. . . . For different countries the Program may indicate different stages of the revolutionary process. . . . Different immediate aims may be established for colonies and for more advanced countries. . . . But they all march toward the same goal.

In a general way Bukharin conceives the international proletarian revolution as

a manifold and quite complicated process, being the general resultant of proletarian uprisings, of colonial revolts, of national wars of liberation. . . . We revolutionists fully understand that international imperialism cannot be demolished without involving a common revolutionary struggle of all races and of all continents. . . . Our greatest strength, the certainty of our final victory, lies in the very prospect of unleashing on the imperialists the colossal human avalanche of the oppressed and subjected colonial masses.

Throughout the documents this new feature of tying up the revolt of backward and colonial peoples with the proletarian revolution in Europe and America is prominently displayed.

The other most interesting point is the "practical" character of the Program. While other brands of socialism may profess that

the proletarian revolution does not exist and could not take place for a long time . . . our Program considers the present epoch as one of proletarian revolutions, an epoch of actual struggle for governmental power, of struggle for proletarian dictatorship.

This conception, which returns to the earlier theories of "permanent revolution," naturally colors the Program with a tone of high revolutionary fervor, and, one may say, revolutionary sincerity.

The Communists consider it unnecessary to disguise their views and purposes. They openly declare that their aims can be accomplished only through an overthrow by force of the whole of the existing social order. . . . The gain of government power by the proletariat is by no means a peaceful "conquest" of the existing bourgeois government through parliamentary majorities. . . . The hold of the bourgeoisie can be broken only by ruthless violence. . . . The conquest of power by the proletariat consists in an actual annihilation of the existing capitalistic state machine — the army, the police, the bureaucracy, the courts, parliaments, etc. — and in putting in their place new organs of proletarian power, intended in the first place to serve as tools to suppress the exploiters.

The Program consists of a short preamble followed by six chapters. The first of these, called "The World System of

Capitalism: Its Development and Inevitable Collapse," is devoted to theoretical considerations of a general character.

> The Communist International in its theoretical and practical work fully and without reserve holds to revolutionary Marxianism. . . . The history of capitalism fully confirms the teachings of Marx regarding the laws governing the development of capitalistic society, which show that the contradictions of such development must inevitably lead the whole capitalistic system to destruction.

Here we have a reiteration of Marxianism in its extreme orthodox form. The Third International is pronounced to be the heir of Marx and Engels, of the First International, who regarded the conception of class antagonism and class struggle as basic. This struggle is to grow in breadth and intensity and bring the two irreconcilable poles of society, the bourgeoisie and the toiling masses, to a revolutionary clash, in which the industrial proletariat is bound to seize government power, establish its political dictatorship and then proceed to reconstruct society on a collectivistic basis. Talk of "Social Peace," "Industrial Democracy," "Coöperation with the Bourgeoisie," is branded as "treachery;" exponents of such ideas, the Social Democrats of milder persuasion, are stigmatized as "traitors" to the laboring class, "foes of labor unity," obedient "tools of imperialism."

A new feature in the Program is the presentation of the twentieth century phase of capitalism under the specific title of "Imperialism." It is defined as

> a new form of capitalism, distinguished by new relations between the different parts of the world capitalist system . . . a period of capitalistic development featured by leaps and conflicts . . . when free competition is replaced by monopoly, when all the formerly "available" colonial lands have been "partitioned," and when the struggle for spheres of influence and for the redistribution of colonial domains inevitably assumes the form of armed struggle . . . *Industrial capital* evolving into *financial capital* . . . *Industrial competition* being replaced by the *monopoly of financial capital*. . . . Export of capital becoming the specific and predominant form of link tying together the different parts of the world capitalistic system . . . *Government power* evolving into a dictatorship of the *financial capitalistic oligarchy*, the expression of its concentrated might . . . a multi-national imperialistic super-state with functions branching out in all directions.

Imperialism is supposed to have

> developed to the utmost the productive force of world capitalism and thus to have completed the material premises for the socialistic transformation of society. . . . Imperialism — the epoch of dying capitalism . . . the eve

of a world socialistic revolution. . . . Imperialism deepens and reveals all the contradictions of capitalistic society, strains to the limit class oppression, brings to acute edge competition among capitalistic states, and provokes inevitably imperialistic wars on a world scale, wars which shake the whole system of prevailing relations and lead with iron necessity to a world proletarian revolution.

The inevitability of world-wide armed conflict among the so-called imperialistic countries themselves is continually emphasized. Together with colonial revolt it seems to be looked upon as the principal factor which is bound to uproot the present order and unchain revolution. Such is the prophecy of "Leninism," termed "Marxianism of the Epoch of Imperialism and of Proletarian Revolutions."

No effort, however, is spared to "unmask" what is believed to be the real meaning of bourgeois attempts to reduce armaments and prevent war. These merely cloak the real military aims of the imperialists.

The history of humanity knows of no steps more hypocritical, false and repugnant than the present "pacifistic ideology" of imperialism, whose real profession is war of the most barbaric, counter-revolutionary and destructive type. . . . The fiercer the competition in armament the more energetically resounds the competition of pacifistic "rhetoric" in peace-making "Pacts," Conferences, Projects and Drafts.

The second chapter of the Program is called "The General Crisis of Capitalism and the First Phase of the World Revolution." The theories of Leninism are here applied to analyze the actual conditions growing out of the Great War, which is stated to have opened the first phase of world upheaval.

The war shook the whole system of world capitalism and initiated a period of general crisis. The dislocations and miseries which it entailed have sharpened class struggle, and this has grown into open revolutionary outbursts and into civil war.

A lengthy list of revolutionary events is given, starting from 1918. Together with the events in Europe,

the deep ferment in India and the great Chinese Revolution form links in one world-wide revolutionary chain. Great masses of humanity have been drawn into the revolutionary maelstrom. . . . The history of the world has entered into a new phase, that of a protracted general crisis of the capitalistic system.

The first "round" of revolutionary upheaval (1918–21) is said to have ended, except in Russia, with the defeat of the proletariat. Taking advantage of their victory, the bourgeoisie is said to

have succeeded in achieving a partial stabilization of capitalism through an increased exploitation of the masses. Against this admitted success of the bourgeoisie the Program displays

the piercing of the imperialistic front in Russia. . . . The October (Bolshevik) Revolution . . . for the first time in history has set up and consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat in a country of immense size, has enacted into life a new "Soviet" system of government, and has opened the epoch of the international revolution of the proletariat.

The meaning of Communist victory in Russia is thus described:

The very existence of the Soviet Union, with its world influence on the toiling and oppressed masses, is in itself the most conspicuous expression of the deep crisis of the capitalistic system. Within the boundaries of the formerly homogeneous world there are battling at present two antagonistic systems, the system of capitalism and that of socialism. Class struggle is unfolding itself on a gigantic world scale; world labor is now in actual possession of its own State, the only real homeland of the international proletariat.

The stabilization of capitalism referred to above is pronounced to be partial, temporary. Forces are at hand in what is termed the "capitalistic sector," laboring toward a new and inevitable outbreak of revolution. Internal economic processes are dependent on "the growing concentration of capital and an increasing exploitation of the masses," of which some of the results are the following:

Antagonisms arising out of competition for raw material. . . . Conflicts between metropolitan and colonial and semi-colonial countries. . . . Centripetal tendencies in the British Empire. . . . Latin America aroused by the spreading imperialism of the United States. . . . The transfer of the economic center to the New World. . . . The conflict between Great Britain and America. . . . Germany once more on the imperialistic path. . . . The tangle in the Pacific. . . .

Once more the motive of a war to come is sounded:

The International Revolution is unfolding. . . . Against it the imperialists are gathering their forces. . . . The order of the day with them is: expeditions against colonies; a new World War; an onslaught against the U. S. S. R. . . . These in turn will inevitably unleash all the forces of the International Revolution, to be followed by the unavoidable collapse of capitalism.

Chapter Three — "The Final Aim of the Communist International: World Communism" — describes the future communist society.

Chapter Four — "The Transitionary Period from Capitalism to Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" — is in many respects the most interesting part of the document. It ex-

plains the mechanism of world revolution and gives a detailed list of immediate practical aims.

Between the capitalistic order and the Communist order there lies a period of revolutionary transformation of one order into the other. Politically, in this transitionary period, government cannot be anything else but a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . The transitionary period on the whole is characterized by a merciless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, by organizing socialistic reconstruction, by "remaking" people *en masse* in the spirit of socialism.

This transitionary epoch is conceived of as a prolonged period of revolutions, wars, agrarian and colonial revolts, etc. By seizing government power the proletariat will destroy the bourgeoisie and establish communism in one country or another. "The victory of socialism is possible first in only a few countries, or even only in one individual country." For a time these communistic states will be coëxistent with the old capitalistic states. The world will then be divided into a capitalistic and a Communistic sector. But this will be only temporary. Country after country will become socialistic as the proletariat gains power.

When these newly formed proletarian republics join the already existing republic on a federal basis, then finally this federation will become a Union of Socialistic Soviet Republics of the World.

The "new" type of proletarian government suggested is the Soviet State. Contrary to bourgeois democracy,

the Soviet proletarian democracy openly acknowledges its class character and avows as its purpose the suppression of exploiters in the interest of the overwhelming majority of the people. . . . It deprives its class enemies of the exercise of political rights. . . . Eventually it discriminates politically in favor of the proletariat so as to secure for it the leading rôle. . . . The Soviet State carries out a complete disarmament of the bourgeoisie and concentrates the holding of arms in the hands of the proletariat. . . . The Soviet State is a state of an armed proletariat.

The victorious proletariat uses government power as a lever of economic upheaval in the revolutionary transformation of capitalistic property relations into relations appropriate for socialistic production. . . . The starting point of this greatest of economic revolutions consists of the expropriation of property from the land owners and capitalists, that is, the transformation of monopolistic ownership of the bourgeoisie into government ownership by the proletarian state.

A detailed list of enterprises subject to "confiscation and proletarian nationalization" is given. It comprises:

all large industrial enterprises, — factories, mines, power stations; railroads; means of automobile, water and air transport; telegraph, telephone, radio;

banks, including gold reserve, securities and deposits; warehouses, grain elevators, wholesale and large retail stores, stocks of merchandise, etc.

Confiscated property is to be transferred to the Soviets with the purpose of organizing the management of the government on a communal basis. In particular there is to be: (1) "Labor administration of industries." (2) "A centralized government banking system." (3) "A monopoly of foreign trade." (4) "Cancellation of the national debt to foreign and domestic capitalists."

"Confiscation and proletarian nationalization" is to apply also to all large land holdings "in the cities and in the country, including lands owned by the Churches." The confiscated land is to be transferred to the Soviets, together with all

public lands, forests, mine properties, and water rights. . . . Subsequently all and every kind of land is to be nationalized. . . . Large estates are to be administered by the organs of proletarian dictatorship in the form of Soviet farms. . . . Part of the confiscated land is to be given for usage to the poor, and part to the middle elements of the peasantry. The portion of land which is to be given to the peasants is to be determined by considerations of economic expediency as well as by the necessity of "neutralizing" the peasantry and of winning them to the cause of the proletariat. . . . All purchasing and selling of land is to be prohibited.

Real estate in cities (buildings and large dwellings) is to be confiscated and transferred for management to the local Soviet. . . . Bourgeois quarters are to be peopled with laborers.

Other features are:

Nationalization of the press; government monopoly of news and of the publishing business; nationalization of the larger moving picture enterprises and of theatres; and the utilization of these nationalized means of "spiritual production" for the enlightenment of the toiling classes on a proletarian basis.

The Program makes general suggestions regarding how to utilize state-operated enterprises for the benefit of the masses. Detailed measures for protecting labor are enumerated, including the introduction of a seven-hour day. Directions are given for handling different classes — the ruthless repression of the higher middle-class and landlords, of the loyal officer corps, of the higher bureaucracy. A discriminating attitude is to be adopted toward technical experts and the city lower middle-class, some of whom, together with the peasantry, are gradually to be won over to the cause of the proletariat. Warning is given against peasant landownership and small retail trade, and in this respect the suggestions seem to reflect the experience of the Communists in Russia.

The difference in the political and economic development of different countries naturally leads to a "difference in the path and in the tempo of the advent of the proletariat to power . . . as also in the possible forms of socialistic construction."

The Program reduces the world to three basic classes:

(1) *Countries of high capitalistic development* (the United States, Germany, England, etc.), with a highly centralized industrial productivity and a long-established democratic political system. In such countries the principal political requirement of the Program is the direct transition to proletarian dictatorship. Characteristic in the economic field are: expropriation of all basic means of production; establishment of a large number of Soviet farms; transfer of relatively small amounts of land to the peasantry; a small volume of trade left unregulated; a fast tempo of socialistic development in general; collectivization of farm economics in particular.

(2) *Countries with a medium level of capitalistic development* (Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, the Balkan States, etc.), featured by large remnants of semi-feudal relations in agriculture, but with a certain minimum of material premises, indispensable for socialistic reconstruction, and with the bourgeois democratic political transformation not fully consummated. . . . In such cases a dictatorship of the proletariat may take effect not at once . . . but in the process of transition from a democratic dictatorship of the peasantry to a socialistic dictatorship by the proletariat. . . . In general the main, sometimes the decisive, rôle is to devolve upon an agrarian revolution.

(3) *Colonial and semi-colonial countries* (China, India, etc.) and *dependent countries* (Argentine, Brazil, etc.); countries with a degree of industrial development inadequate, in the main, for self-dependent socialistic reconstruction; countries where "mediaeval" relations or "oriental" methods prevail in the economic and political structure; countries where the most important industrial, commercial and banking enterprises, as well as means of transportation, large land holdings and plantations, are mostly held by foreign banking groups. . . . The prescription in this case is on the one hand a struggle against pre-capitalistic forms of exploitation and a systematically enacted agrarian revolution, and on the other hand a struggle against foreign imperialism on behalf of national self-dependence. . . . Success in socialistic construction is possible on condition . . . that direct assistance is rendered by countries where the proletarian dictatorship has already been established.

A new theory running through this closing sentence is more fully elucidated in the remarks dealing with revolutions in still more backward countries (as in Africa), where life is entirely primitive, where there is no native bourgeoisie and where foreign imperialism plays the rôle of a military occupant.

In these countries a revolt aimed at "national self-dependence" is conceived of as possibly opening the way directly

towards the development of socialism, without passing through the stage of capitalism . . . in the event that active and potent assistance is given by countries where the proletarian dictatorship has already been established.

The idea is that the rôle of the pioneer in developing such backward countries, performed in the past by capitalistic states, is to be undertaken by countries where proletarian government has been established, so that the economics of these backward countries will be built up directly on a socialistic basis. This new brand of "socialistic imperialism" figures also in dealing with the practical aims in colonial revolutions. After enumerating the immediate aims, such as

the overthrow of foreign imperialism . . . the joint dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry on a Soviet basis . . . the repudiation of foreign debts . . . the nationalization of industries, banking and trade enterprises owned by imperialists . . . the confiscation of land holdings, the organization of a labor-peasant revolutionary army, etc.,

the Program elucidates the rôle of the emancipated colonies during the transition period in their relation to the highly industrialized countries which under proletarian leadership have already established socialism. The colonies are to constitute a "World Village," acting as consumers of the products manufactured by the "World City," the latter being the federation of the proletarian states.

The problem of organizing socialistic economics on a world scale, which is that of a proper relation between industry and agriculture, is in great measure the question of a proper attitude toward the former imperialistic colonies.

At later stages the Communists are supposed to help these colonies to develop on a socialistic basis, and thus "the expansion of socialism, as a new system of production, acquires its world swing."

In Chapter Five, entitled "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the U. S. S. R. and the International Socialistic Revolution," the rôle of the Communist Government in Russia as the active center of world revolution is once more emphasized. The capitalistic nations are portrayed as always vacillating between the advantages to be derived from trade and economic relations with Russia and the fear of the U. S. S. R. as a revolutionary center. On the whole, it is concluded,

the prevailing tendency now is toward a counter-revolutionary war aimed at the annihilation of Communism in Russia.

Against this war the Communists in all countries are expected to "react" by most courageous and decisive mass action.

The last section, Chapter Six — "The Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International in the Struggle for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" — is divided into two parts. The first contains an analysis of the various forms assumed by the labor movement, a survey of the different branches of socialistic creed, and a review of revolutionary doctrines prevalent in China, India and among the colored peoples. In large part it is a bitter denunciation of the so-called "social democracy" and of its international organization, the Second International, in Brussels.

The second part of the chapter deals with revolutionary strategy and tactics. Ways and means are recommended to effect revolutionary leadership; directions are given as to how to act in periods of "peace" and during epochs of revolutionary unrest. The nucleus of revolutionary leadership is the Party.

> The successful struggle of the Communistic International . . . assumes the existence in each country of a united, centralized and disciplined Communist Party, weathered in battles and closely tied with the masses. . . . The Party is a revolutionary body cemented by iron discipline. . . . It symbolizes the unity of proletarian principles, of proletarian will and revolutionary action.
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> For the purpose of coördination it is indispensable for the proletariat to have an international class discipline. . . . This consists of subjecting the local and particular interests of the movement to its final aims, with all Communists unconditionally carrying out the directions of . . . the Communist International. . . . Contrary to the Second International, each constituent party of which is obedient to the discipline of its "own" homeland, the sections of the Communist International recognize only one discipline, that of the international proletariat.

The Party is to establish an active influence in the first place over the labor masses, including women and youths. The Communists are to penetrate "trade unions, coöperatives, educational and sporting bodies," and to establish active leadership. Next in order to receive attention come the toiling masses of the peasantry, the artisans, the lower middle class of the cities, etc. A "hegemony" of the proletariat is to be established over all workers, a potential revolutionary army directed and commanded by a centralized staff.

Tactical lines to be followed by Communists during periods of peace, when "revolutionary unrest is absent," follow closely the "strategy" outlined above. The Communists are supposed to keep in close touch with the masses, in order to formulate de-

mands and suggest forms of action. Conflicts are to be sharpened and economic demands turned into political issues.

The Program then outlines tactics to be followed during periods of "revolutionary unrest." At such periods

the problem which the party faces is to lead the masses into direct attack on the bourgeois state.

Slogans growing more and more revolutionary are to be formulated, accompanied by organized mass action.

Forms of mass action are: strikes combined with demonstrations; strikes combined with armed demonstrations; finally a general strike, with an armed uprising against the bourgeois government. . . . This highest form of struggle must comply with the rules of military art; it requires a military plan, offensive military operations, unreserved heroism and loyalty on the part of the proletariat. Its action must be preceded by organizing the masses into combat units and by energetic revolutionary work within the army and the navy.

In a general way, the revolutionary work in

so-called civilized countries . . . consists of organizing revolution under the banners of proletarian dictatorship.

In Latin America, among the negroes, among the yellow races and in countries where anti-Semitism flourishes, the Communists are to support every struggle directed against "oppression or racial discrimination."

In imperialist countries the Communist Party should openly avow and preach the right of colonies to separation . . . and their right to armed rebellion. . . . Active support should be given by all and every means. . . . An identical line of action is obligatory with regard to all oppressed nations.

In colonial and semi-colonial countries, the Communist Party should openly preach and put into effect . . . agrarian revolution, arousing the masses to overthrow the landlords. . . . They should organize propaganda within the army and navy on behalf of the oppressed nations . . . and mobilize the masses for an organized boycott in protest against any movement of arms and contingents.

Particular attention is to be paid to propaganda campaigns against the danger of imperialistic wars . . . and to the ruthless unmasking of social chauvinism and pacifistic phraseology. . . . There must be relentless organized work in this direction, and this work should combine both legal and subversive methods. . . . The principal slogans are to be: Turn an imperialistic war into civil war. Defeat one's own government. Defend by all means the U. S. S. R.

The general rôle of the Communist International is summed up in the closing words of the preamble to the Program: *The Organizer of the International Revolution of the Proletariat.*

ICELANDIC INDEPENDENCE

By Vilhjalmur Stefansson

STRUGGLES for independence generally originate in emotion. In the case of Iceland the emotion that feeds the present movement for independence is in turn based to a greater extent than usual on literature and history. Economic reasons come in too, of course, and there are many other contributing causes, but these have been correspondingly less important in Iceland than among most nations engaged in struggles to regain or win separate statehood. A sketch of Icelandic history and literature is necessary, therefore, for an understanding of the country's present relationship to Denmark and the rest of the world.

For those who think that racial temperaments are inherited, whether biologically or sociologically, it is important first of all to study the blood of the Icelanders; I therefore shall emphasize that part of their colonial history which shows the sources from which the population was derived.

It is a common error to suppose that Iceland was discovered by the Norsemen (Vikings) and that the discovery took place about 860 A. D. In reality it is clear that the original discoverers, or at least the earliest we know of, came from Ireland. The source of this information is in a writing of the Irish monk Dicuil about 825 A. D. He refers to a discovery and colonization a hundred years before, or around 725, of "Islands in the ocean north of Britain," and continues with a description which has usually been thought to fit the Faroe Islands. He then says that it has now been thirty years since certain priests had been on the island of Thule, or Iceland, which may mean that the Faroes were discovered around 725 and Iceland only shortly before 800. It may be, however, that he means to date only the Icelandic colonization around 795, and that the discovery was earlier.

Around and shortly after Dicuil's time the Vikings overran Ireland, as well as England and Scotland, conquering large parts and setting up various governments and overlordships. Whether the Norsemen heard of Iceland from the Irish is debated. Anyway, they sailed there shortly after 850. They may have carried Irish pilots and it is probable that they were at least following direc-

tions given them by the Irish. One of their early wintering parties gave to the country its present inappropriate name. The sagas tell that this happened when, the spring after the wintering, a mountain was climbed and floating ice was seen in a bay. The dictum of this saga has generally been accepted, but some scholars believe it to be nothing more than an instance of "popular" or mistaken etymology, and that the name comes from "isa," or haddock.

The first real Norse colonization of Iceland is considered to have been in 872. There has been much dispute as to how many Irish these Norsemen found ahead of them. Some have maintained that there were merely a few anchorites, with perhaps some peasant retainers, and that all of these were on the south coast. Others have claimed that there were Irish colonies throughout the country, even around the north coast.

Though there is great vagueness about this Irish question so far as it antedates 872, there is a remarkable clarity about the whole colonial story thereafter. It has been said, and probably correctly, that we do not have as clear and complete accounts of the settlement of the thirteen original states of the Union as we have for all the pioneer settlements around Iceland. The names of more than 400 chieftains are given in the records, and we know certainly where each settled, with considerable detail of the boundary between estates, the number of retainers, the comparative dignity and power of the chieftains, and, as said, information in general that is scarcely surpassed even by our records for the settlement of Massachusetts Bay Colony.

There is little doubt that between 872 and 930 the number of colonists in Iceland grew to the vicinity of 50,000. But there is much dispute as to whence they came, and even more argument as to their blood. The extreme positions are, on the one hand, that 90 percent of the colonists were from Norway and 10 percent from England, Scotland and Ireland, but chiefly from Ireland, and on the other hand that 40 percent of the Icelandic blood is Irish, with a little Scotch, less English, and the rest, of course, Norwegian. There seems no indication that there were originally colonists, in any number, from Denmark, Sweden or any countries except those named.

Those who argue for a high percentage of Norwegian blood in Iceland cite the indisputable fact that most of the chieftains had Norwegian names and are known to have been partly or wholly of Norwegian descent. The counter contention is that these

chieftains had many of them come to Iceland by way of Ireland, and some had resided there for several years, while a few had even been there for one or several generations. The wives of many of these chieftains are known to have been Irish, and there were Irish servants. Still more Irish are known to have joined themselves voluntarily to the Norse chieftains, bringing in their train retainers who almost certainly were Irish.

Following the colonization, trading voyages to the South came to have a place in the Icelandic social scheme comparable to the university training of today, or the "grand tour" of a century back. The son of a wealthy leader had his own ship, or perhaps more than one. He employed sailors and men-at-arms, and spent three years or more trading from one land to another, in some cases going as far south as the north coast of Africa and east through the Dardanelles. In winter they were usually honored guests at the court of some king or earl. These voyages often were in part "Viking," or piracy. On the final return they not infrequently sailed up the Irish coast around harvest time, went ashore and captured an entire farm, taking master and servants along with live stock and property. They even tore down buildings and carried them along, for timber was always scarce in Iceland. These and other captures were the basis of the slavery which flourished in Iceland for a time. But the number of captives was so much in excess of what was needed or could be used in Iceland that it is estimated that the average time of servitude was five years, the older slaves becoming freedmen as newer captives stepped into their places. These slaves and freedmen were chiefly Irish, and therefore of the same physical appearance as their masters, so that they disappeared readily in the population. Aside from trade, there was a social advantage in being for a while in service at the courts of foreign kings. There are records of Icelanders in the bodyguard of the rulers of the Empire of the East at Constantinople, and at one time or another they served as life guards or mercenaries for almost every king from the Mediterranean north.

The tongue of the Vikings, because of their power and prowess, was fashionable in northern Europe at this time, and widely understood. Poetry was a gift and a passion with the Icelanders, and many of them were court poets, not only in the Scandinavian countries but in Britain, Ireland and elsewhere. But they seem to have had a longing for their home land and usually returned

there eventually, bringing their foreign wives and perhaps dependents with them.

When Icelandic sailing expeditions slowed down, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, partial compensation was found in the trading voyages which were made to Iceland from other countries. It was the custom for the trader to arrive in summer or autumn. He would put up his tents, display and sell his goods, and then be invited by some local chieftain to spend the winter, leaving the following spring laden with Icelandic wares. The records show, however, that many of these traders never sailed south again but married into the families of their hosts. The ninth to the thirteenth centuries were an aristocratic time, and we have records of nothing except the doings of chieftains, but it is probable that the sailors and underlings of the trading ships married in Iceland and settled down there much as their commanders did.

Thus do the Celtophiles arrive at the conclusion that while Iceland is 99 percent Norse in language it is no more than 50 percent Norse in blood. No one disputes that the Irish made up at least 10 percent, and those authorities who claim 20 percent to 35 percent Irish (and Scotch and English) blood are numerous.

The view that the Icelanders are almost wholly Norwegian has been deduced fallaciously from the complete triumph of the Norwegian language. You might as well deduce one hundred percent English descent of the American nation from the disappearance of all languages but English. Moreover, while the Norse triumphed completely in language, it did not do so in the fundamentals of the literature. The Icelanders owe a heavier debt to the Irish than America does to any literature except the English.

Since the political struggle in Iceland, and the resulting political status, depend so much on the literature, it is a pity that its very extensiveness makes it impossible for us to discuss it here in detail. In lieu of discussion we shall assume the correctness of the view expressed by Lord Bryce after his careful study of the country's language and institutions. He gave it then as his opinion that there were three great literatures in the older Europe, Greek, Latin and Icelandic, and that Icelandic literature was as much superior to the Latin as it was inferior to the Greek. Of course the evaluation of a literature lies within the field of taste rather than statistics, and it is therefore easy to disagree with Lord Bryce. The fact remains that Icelandic prose and poetry are studied today in most of the great universities of the world. What is more

pertinent here is that Icelandic literature has exerted an influence upon Iceland much greater than the combined influence of Shakespeare and the King James Bible upon England.

Modern Danish, Norwegian and Swedish differ as much from the common Norse of a thousand years ago as French, Italian and Spanish differ from Latin. But the current Icelandic differs less from that same Norse than modern newspaper English differs from the speech of Shakespeare. The explanation usually put forward is that the three Scandinavian tongues changed so much because of intimate commercial and other relations with foreign countries, but that Icelandic remained stationary because of the geographic isolation of the country in the north Atlantic. But the larger share of the truth is in the literary view, that the sagas and poems stabilized the language.

The Dark Ages descended in full gloom upon the rest of Scandinavia but only the penumbra of their shadow fell on Iceland. Throughout that dull and, in the rest of Europe, unliterary time, the Icelanders almost alone remained literary in their tastes if not in productive genius. For a thousand years, right down to our time, it has been the custom there for the entire family to gather in a large room during the long sub-arctic winter evenings and, while the rest worked wool quietly, carding, spinning and knitting, one man with a good voice read or recited prose or chanted poetry. It was through these evenings of prose and verse, fashionable in Iceland as never in Norway, Sweden or Denmark, that the literature secured the effective stabilizing hold on the language that makes the present vernacular almost identical with the classic records, and makes the Icelanders still so passionately aware of their former independence and their former literary and political importance.

The sagas tell, and scholars have usually agreed, that one of the chief motives which the Vikings had for quitting Norway in the ninth century was the unwillingness of chieftains previously independent to suffer the dictation and taxes of the first king of all Norway, Harald the Fair-Haired. These same chieftains, whose united efforts could not prevail against one of their own number at home, yet had the strength to scatter in many directions, with each band or horde still capable of conquering and in some cases administering large territories. The greatest success, of course, was that of the Normans in France, but there were notable administrative successes, too, in the British Isles. The

forces that made the Norsemen overlords in Scotland and farther south made them an independent nation in Iceland. It was an aristocratic republic. There was a half-defined understanding that things should go by majorities of the whole free population, but, in some cases at least, they really went by majority of swords rather than noses.

Soon after the colonization of 872 there started up in various parts of Iceland minor parliaments somewhat similar to the New England town meeting. Towards 927 there developed a feeling that there should be a central government under a code of law. So a learned chieftain, Ulfljot, went to Norway for three years to study the "Gulathing" laws and government procedure, with a view of establishing in Iceland a similar parliamentary government, but minus a king. The actual founding of the parliament took place in 930. The body resembled the English House of Lords in being a legislature and a supreme court in one. There came times, centuries later, when the law-giving power waned and even died down completely; but in some other ways, especially as a court, the parliament has functioned continuously for a thousand years, except for a break between 1800 and 1843.

The weakness of the Icelandic government was in the lack of a centralized executive. They could pass laws but there was no machinery for enforcing them except public opinion. For a while this sufficed, and then disruptive forces came into play. One of the chief forces operating against the integrity of the republic was the growing power of the church, not only as an organization but in its hold over the minds of the people. From the doctrine of the divine right of kings it was logically deduced that self-government was to a degree impious. Opposing a king was opposing God; unwillingness to have a king was similarly disrespectful to God.

When Europe settled into the general lethargy of the Middle Ages the commerce of Iceland declined. The kings of Norway were ambitious and they agitated in Iceland to get the country to renounce its sovereignty and become a part of Norway, one of the most enticing promises held out being improved shipping facilities.

A third factor operating against the republic was increasing power of a few chiefs. Feuds developed, and there was practically a state of civil war.

For these and other reasons parliament finally agreed in 1262 that Iceland and Norway should become a confederate union. But each was to retain extensive powers of self-government; this the King solemnly guaranteed. But kings have short memories, or at least they don't seem to transmit memories from father to son, and the very things the Norwegian king promised not to do his successors began to do. With a continuity of policy on one side, and no definite policy or organization on the other, the power and influence of the Icelandic government continually declined, until finally the King felt himself strong enough to abolish the parliament entirely.[1]

According to the treaty which the Icelanders made with the Norwegian King, Hakon Hakonarson, in 1262, the Icelanders swore allegiance to the King and his descendants and promised to pay certain annual taxes. In return the King promised numerous privileges. The Icelanders looked upon the treaty as providing for a personal union between Iceland and Norway. In 1380 Norway and Iceland came under Denmark, or at least under a Danish king. From that time Iceland was ruled by the King of Denmark. Iceland was, however, pretty much a sovereign state, functioning through the Althing (or Parliament) until after the introduction of the Reformation in 1550. Then the Danish crown took possession of all church property and a rigid trade monopoly was established. In 1662 the Icelanders swore a new oath to the King of Denmark and Norway as absolute and hereditary sovereign. Through this the legislative power of the Althing really became nil, though it was not formally declared abolished till 1800. The Parliament was reëstablished as a consultative assembly in 1843.

In 1849 when the absolute power of the King was abolished in Denmark, but not in Iceland, the Icelanders began their struggle for independence under the leadership of Jon Sigurdsson. This strife finally culminated in 1874 when the King issued a constitution for Iceland granting legislative power to the Althing and establishing self-government for Iceland in domestic affairs, but with executive power vested in Copenhagen in a Danish Ministry for Iceland.

The constitution was modified in 1903 to the extent of appointing an Icelandic minister in Reykjavik, with other changes

[1] Cf. "Thjodrettarsamband Islands og Danmerkur" ("The Union Act of Iceland and Denmark"). By Einar Arnorsson. Reykjavik, 1923.

which really amounted to home rule. Still the Icelanders were not satisfied. Increased prosperity, the creation of an independent steamship line, and the influence of the World War caused them to make more marked efforts to gain autonomy. This they finally obtained in 1918 through the Danish Icelandic Act of Union, which is subject to a plebiscite in 1940. By its provision, Iceland becomes an independent kingdom, maintaining a personal union with Denmark through the same King. According to the agreement, both countries are sovereign states, neither superior to the other. But Denmark is to act for Iceland in foreign affairs. It is guaranteed that in the Danish foreign ministry there shall be a member well acquainted with Icelandic needs and interests.

In anticipation of the plebiscite, the relations between Iceland and Denmark are now being somewhat affected by an Icelandic echo of the Norwegian claims against Denmark for either ownership or special rights in Greenland. The Norwegians maintained that Greenland was theirs by discovery, Eric the Red having been born in Norway. They strengthened this claim by pointing out that while Denmark undoubtedly has cultivated the west coast and even the southern portion of the east coast, it is chiefly the Norwegians who have made use of the northern two-thirds of the east coast of Greenland — for sealing, fishing, hunting, etc. They claimed in addition whatever moral rights there are in favor of a nation that needs an outlet, the Norwegians being active fishermen, already in the habit of using Greenland, whereas the Danes, not much given to fishing, would not suffer if another country fishes Greenland waters or controls that part of the coast which is, so far as we now can see, mainly useful as a fishery. It was no doubt partly in reply to these claims and contentions of Norway that Denmark recently established a colony at Scoresby Sound in N. Lat. 70°, thus permanently occupying a part of the territory which the Norwegians were claiming on the basis of frequent visits.

Of course the Icelanders, good historians and keen in dialectic, were quick to see that the Norwegian arguments were even stronger in their hands. Eric the Red, they pointed out, was only a baby when he left Norway and certainly lost his Norwegian citizenship through being outlawed with his father. Neither the Danes nor the Norwegians deny that Iceland was an independent country at this time. Therefore Eric became a

citizen of Iceland, when he grew up there in his father's new home, thus cancelling his Norwegian citizenship even if the Norwegians had not themselves already nullified it by the expulsion. It was therefore as an Icelander and not as a Norwegian that Eric the Red sailed on the momentous voyage which led to his discovery of Greenland, to its colonization, and to the inevitable discovery of North America.

Furthermore, say the Icelanders, if the Norwegians have a moral claim because they are fishermen and need fishing grounds, Iceland has a still greater claim, for fishing is a more important item in its national economy than it is in the Norwegian. Moreover, Iceland is much closer to Greenland geographically and can more easily cultivate the fisheries.

Accordingly there is in Iceland a small but aggressive party who demand as one of the prerequisites for continuing the tenuous bond with Denmark that the Danes shall give the Icelanders free access to Greenland's natural resources, especially the fishing. To this the Danes cannot agree without renouncing their enlightened and unique policy of administering Greenland for the benefit of the Eskimos rather than for the benefit of any Europeans, whether Danish or not. Of course, Iceland has world precedent on its side in demanding that the territories of aborigines be thrown open to modern commercial development. But the Danes have the support of humanitarian arguments when they point out that the Eskimos are the real owners of Greenland and that it is a paramount moral duty to conserve the country's resources in their interest.

This Greenland argument is used as a weapon in the contest with Denmark, but it is not really a reason for Icelanders to desire complete separation, because their one hope for privileges in Greenland is to continue their special relationship with the Danes. For now that the Danes have pretty clearly won their dispute with the Norwegians about northeast Greenland, they hardly would fail to win a similar dispute with the Icelanders, even if the latter have somewhat stronger claims than the Norwegians along the Norwegian line of argument.

The modern fashion is to assume that economic reasons lie behind any struggle for autonomy or independence. But it is very hard to see any reality in these issues in the case of Iceland, excepting only the fear that the Danes may monopolize Icelandic fisheries, a matter referred to below.

Some feel that Iceland has a new reason to desire complete independence because of its potential importance in aviation. A realization has grown up during the last ten years that this island in the mid-Atlantic is a logical way-station on flights between Europe and America. It lies on the direct or short route between Seattle and Paris, Chicago and Berlin, New York



ICELAND AND WORLD AIR ROUTES

and Moscow, besides many others. Flying conditions on these routes are on the average better than on the Newfoundland-Ireland route that has been so much used already. We know this theoretically for the whole route, and it was reported as a fact by Hassel and Cramer the past summer when they flew two-thirds of it, from Rockford (Chicago) to Greenland. Besides, the over-water jumps are much shorter, a thing of no consequence

perhaps to dirigibles but crucial for air-planes that count on maintaining regular traffic, such as a mail service.

In a flying age, Iceland will therefore be tied close into the network of commercial countries. Many dirigibles will pass over, and some of them will stop for commercial or tourist reasons. The air-planes will have regular way stations there, as they will in Labrador and Greenland and in the Faroes, halfway between Iceland and Scotland. All these are on the direct route from Chicago to Paris; they are so little out of the way on the New York-Paris route that many planes will doubtless fly that way for increased safety as well as for the comfort of being able to allow passengers to stretch their legs occasionally and to get meals and relaxation on the ground.

The above considerations, and doubtless others, were behind a debate which took place on February 25, 1928, in the Parliament of Iceland, sitting at Reykjavik. The news of this debate brought consternation to Denmark, caused lively and even excited discussion in all Scandinavian countries, and attracted general interest throughout the world. The most conservative and reliable papers in Europe agreed in reporting that "all Icelandic parties favor the abrogation of the treaty of confederation" (*Berlinske Tidende*, Copenhagen, February 25). The London *Times* on the same date reported: "The Government was opposed to a continuation of the connection. Conservative and Socialist leaders expressed similar views. Such unanimity is unprecedented." In Iceland itself the debate was similarly understood. The press there said that the party in power had announced a policy looking toward complete separation from Denmark after 1940 and that both the other parties, Conservative and Socialist, had agreed with the Government through speeches by their leaders. The sentiment was declared unanimous.

But the next month the Icelandic Minister in Copenhagen, Sveinn Bjornsson, announced through the Danish press that the text of the parliamentary debates had arrived in Copenhagen. This text, he maintained, showed that the news reports had been incorrect. Only the Socialists had declared for the complete separation of Iceland from Denmark. The Government and the chief party in opposition, the Conservatives, had made no separatist statement but had merely declared against two important provisions in the Act of Union and had announced they would oppose their retention when time came for the

plebiscite. To this the Socialists had agreed, adding that the aim should be complete separation.

The three parties, said Mr. Bjornsson, agreed on two things. First, Iceland would not retain after 1940 the arrangement by which Denmark acts for her in foreign affairs. The motives here seem national dignity and the failure of the Danes (alleged) to understand the needs of Iceland and their inability to act for Iceland advantageously. Second, the various potential interpretations of the clause with regard to "Equality of Citizenship" can cause so much dissension that the Icelanders would like to see it cancelled. Their chief motive for this is fear: Denmark with a population thirty-five times larger than that of Iceland could by vote take possession of its natural resources.

One direction in which the Icelanders already entertain fears regarding this sort of Danish action is the question of fisheries. They say it is only empty words to provide in a law that Icelanders shall have the same fishing privileges in Danish waters that the Danes have in Icelandic waters, for Denmark is negligible as a fishing country while Iceland is one of the richest in the world. Some Icelanders consider this clause dangerous because the Danes, being a wealthier people, might use their voting power to legalize Danish fishing stations in Iceland that would compete with the natives.

It is incorrect, then, to say, as the press of the world had it, that the three Icelandic political parties have declared for repudiating the personal union with Denmark in 1940. Only one party has so declared. But readers of Icelandic newspapers and travelers in that country are impressed with the steady growth of separatist feeling from year to year. This tendency, likely to crystallize into a movement, appears to have some economic motives for it, but more against. The main causes of the separatist tendency are clearly what a hostile critic would call vanity and what a friendly critic would call pride — pride in the former independence of the country and in the notable contribution it made in old days to literature, geographic discovery and the development of the forms of popular government. It can easily seem to the Icelanders justifiable that a land of such tradition shall demand that not the suspicion of a shadow shall be cast on its full independence even by such a gossamer thing as a personal union with any country.

ARBITRATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

By Antonio S. de Bustamante

THE year 1928 deserves to be remembered in the history of international law by reason of the efforts made during that period by all the civilized nations of the world in favor of arbitration. In February and March the Sixth International Conference of American States met in the capital of Cuba, and, amongst many other important agreements, one was reached, after lengthy and most interesting discussion, concerning international arbitration. By virtue of that agreement, plenipotentiaries of the independent governments of this part of the world will be assembling at Washington about the time this appears in print, with specific instructions to draw up a treaty establishing and regulating arbitration. Meanwhile at Geneva a special committee appointed by the League of Nations has also been studying this subject, and in three successive meetings it has prepared various plans which will shortly be submitted for the consideration of the League. America and Europe are vying with each other for the successful solution of a problem which may perhaps be uniformly solved by a World Treaty.

Arbitration is a very ancient institution in the history of the world and it has suffered many vicissitudes. The Greeks practiced it among themselves; Rome suppressed it as the inevitable sequel to her universal dominion; the Middle Ages witnessed its revival, although it was perhaps in most cases a proof of the superior power of the Popes; the modern state on the continent of Europe again eliminated it during the first centuries in recognition of the right of the stronger and of the ideal of universal monarchy. Philosophers and idealists, however, cherished the memory of it and dreamed of re-establishing it; jurists headed by Grotius urged it with confident hope; popular sentiment grew increasingly in its favor, and at the end of the nineteenth century, as now in the twentieth, caused it to make considerable strides forward, sometimes timidly, sometimes boldly, bringing it finally into the forefront of those problems which are most properly the concern of world opinion. The American continent must be accorded honorable mention for the highly important and creditable part it has played in reaching this triumphant stage in the development of the ways and means

of peace. During the second term of the first Congress of the United States, after the signing of the Constitution, on February 9, 1790, President Washington displayed his farsighted genius by recommending to the Senate that all questions between the United States and other nations should be promptly and amicably settled. At the moment there was a serious problem, that of the Canadian frontier, which was causing friction between the United States and Great Britain. The Senate in accordance with the suggestion of the State Department agreed on March 12, 1790, that a commission representing both countries should arbitrate the frontier question. Thus was reached the Treaty of November 19, 1794, between Great Britain and the United States — a great example to the world and a great victory for arbitration.

The nineteenth century opened in South America under equally favorable auspices. Argentina and Brazil, with a view to the peace the centenary of which they have recently been celebrating, had recourse to arbitration in their Treaty of 1828. The following year, in the second paragraph of Article 19 of a treaty signed at Guayaquil, Colombia and Peru for the first time in the history of the world stipulated that general arbitration should be compulsory on all questions that might arise between them. The document closes with a statement in which Peru designates the republic of Chile as arbiter.

It would require a whole volume to mention all the cases which prove my statement as to the priority and enthusiasm of the New World in matters relating to arbitration. Limiting ourselves to a few brief references, it will suffice to recall that the *Alabama* case between the United States and England, submitted to arbitration by the Treaty of May 8, 1871, and settled at Geneva on September 14, 1872, is mentioned and applauded by all in favor of such treaties as the most solid basis of the contemporary world movement on behalf of such settlements. We have progressed so far in this part of the world that the republic of Brazil did not hesitate to introduce into its federal constitution of February 24, 1891, a clause which provides that the national Congress can authorize the government to declare war only "when arbitration has failed or cannot be effected" — thus making it a principle of public law.

Consequently, it is not surprising that when this question was discussed at the second Hague Peace Conference, in 1907, Brazil and San Domingo advocated compulsory arbitration under all

circumstances and without reservations, and that when the matter came to a vote in Committee, although compulsory arbitration obtained only ten favorable votes, with eight unfavorable and three abstentions, all of America there represented, North and South, decided unanimously and enthusiastically in its favor.

The attitude of the New World was made evident at the first Pan-American Conference held at Washington in 1899. There a compulsory treaty of arbitration was approved of for all cases, whatever their nature, object or origin, without any limitation other than that contained in Article 4, as follows:

> The only question excepted from the provisions of the previous article are those which, in the opinion of any party to the controversy, would seem to threaten its independence. In that case arbitration shall be optional for such nation but it shall be compulsory for the opposing nation.

At the second Pan-American Conference, held in Mexico in 1901, the question came up again and a great many of the participating republics — Argentina, Bolivia, San Domingo, Guatemala, Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay — signed another treaty whose first article read:

> The high contracting parties agree to submit to arbitration all controversies which exist or may exist between them and are not suspectible of solution by diplomatic means, provided always that in the opinion of any of the nations concerned these controversies do not affect its independence or national honor.

In pursuit of this task, and without prejudice to the fact that all the nations of America are bound by treaty amongst themselves and with other Powers by means of many arbitration agreements of various kinds, the sixth Pan-American Conference at Havana unanimously reached the following agreement on February 18, 1928:

> The Sixth International Conference of American States resolves:
>
> *Whereas:* The American Republics desire to express that they condemn war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations; and
>
> *Whereas:* The American Republics have the most fervent desire to contribute in every possible manner to the development of international means for the pacific settlement of conflicts between States;
>
> 1. That the American Republics adopt obligatory arbitration as the means which they will employ for the pacific solution of their international differences of a juridical character.
>
> 2. That the American Republics will meet in Washington within the period of one year in a conference of conciliation and arbitration to give conventional form to the realization of this principle, with the minimum exceptions which they may consider indispensable to safeguard the independence and

sovereignty of the States, as well as matters of a domestic concern, and to the exclusion also of matters involving the interest or referring to the action of a State not a party to the convention.

3. That the Governments of the American Republics will send for this end plenipotentiary jurisconsults with instructions regarding the maximum and the minimum which they would accept in the extension of obligatory arbitral jurisdiction.

4. That the convention or conventions of conciliation and arbitration which may be concluded should leave open a protocol for progressive arbitration which would permit the development of this beneficent institution up to its maximum.

5. That the convention which may be agreed upon, after signature, should be submitted immediately to the respective Governments for their ratification in the shortest possible time.

The governments participating in the arbitration conference at Washington have doubtless been preparing instructions for their plenipotentiaries, adapting them to contemporary facts and bringing them in line with the proposals set forth in the above resolution. It is to be hoped that they have borne in mind the concept and the possible applications of arbitration, as well as the different phases of its evolution. International order, which is as necessary to humanity as domestic order, is distinguished from the latter by the fact that it has no adequate organs of government. It has no legislators, no executives and no judges. Each single component part creates, interprets and applies the law which seems best fitted to regulate its relations with others, and its conduct is sometimes prompted by justice, but also by interest, ambition, or force.

Lacking a common superior, the nations, when unable or unwilling to go to war, or when the issue did not seem to be worth such a price, have agreed that a third party, either another State or some individual arbiter, should pronounce the final word and decide who was right. Historically this is the first and most frequent form of arbitration: a dispute arising between two parties, prolonged for a longer or shorter period, and finally submitted by common consent to the decision of a third person. Arbitration as a fact preceded arbitration as an institution, and, before an agreement made it permanent, there came the application of the principle to specific questions under discussion.

Later on, when international relations became more complicated and special treaties were drawn up relating to certain administrative or commercial matters in which there was no serious political element that might interfere with a fair decision by third parties,

there was introduced into these treaties, in view of possible difficulties, a *compromise clause*, that is, an agreement in advance of any difficulty that a third party should settle it if the interested parties could not agree directly. As examples I may mention the Universal Postal Union, and, since the end of the last century, many commercial treaties.

This was an important step forward because compulsory arbitration was provided for future questions that might arise and ceased in this respect to be optional, while it was further a recognition that at least a certain part of a nation's external activities might freely be submitted to judicial decision. Despite all deficiencies in execution, some of which are very obvious, there was one great advantage: Public opinion in every country became accustomed to see the State not as the supreme form of international sovereign will, but as a member of a larger group from which justice and security could be expected.

We have now reached the third step in the historical evolution which I am trying to sketch. From the Arbitration Clause in treaties relating to special matters, special treaties of arbitration had rapidly been reached: they related to all matters which were not expressly or implicitly excepted. In this category belong what might be called the bilateral treaties of Mr. Root and of others in Europe and America. To make such instruments multi-lateral was one of the objects of the two Peace Conferences at the Hague and the International Conferences of American States, in harmony with the unofficial efforts of a great many national and international associations.

Much had been gained, but there remained at least four threats to the peace of the world which it was necessary to avoid. The first was found in the exceptions to the principle of arbitration, which were either so extensive as to reduce considerably the scope of the general principle, or so vague and arbitrary that the principle might be defeated by the contracting parties. The second consisted in leaving to the interested parties the decision as to when it was a matter of rule and when of exceptions, instead of also making this question the subject of an arbiter's decision. The third and most serious menace to universal peace consisted in not knowing what must be the next step when exceptional cases arose, thereby leaving the way open to war. The fourth factor was the absence of constituted arbiters ready to function like the judiciary, which meant that on each successive occasion the nations had to

reach a fresh compromise in appointing them. Let us see how the march of events has been supplying an adequate solution for each of these four great difficulties.

The first exceptions in the treaties of general arbitration were necessarily very broad and very vague. The nations not only had their collective and individual fears, but also the natural desire not to compromise their political interests and to preserve the absolute exercise of their sovereignty. At the meetings at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 only questions of a legal character were regarded as susceptible of optional arbitration, particularly those concerned with the interpretation and application of international agreements, and in 1907 arbitration was accepted as in a certain sense obligatory in matters relating to the recovery of contractual debts. However, when the scheme for general compulsory arbitration for legal questions was presented, the committee accepted it only on condition that it did not affect the vital interests, the independence and honor of the countries concerned, nor the interests of third parties. The practical effect of this formula regarding honor, independence and vital interests, was to make compulsory arbitration optional, regardless of the nature of the case; but it soon became very popular to include it in all treaties signed during the first part of the present century.

At the conclusion of the World War, when the pact of the League of Nations was inserted in the Treaty of Versailles, Article 13 was worded as follows:

> The members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them *which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration* and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.

At such a time, in a treaty between the victorious and the defeated perhaps nothing more could have been asked; but the principle of arbitration was left entirely to the interest, the good will or the good faith of the nations concerned. The agreement establishes an alternative for problems that cannot be arbitrated — *inquiry by the Council* — but this in turn (Article 15) is subject to the possibility that "if the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement."

Nevertheless, this formula has not prevented certain recent

arbitration treaties from continuing to mention the same exceptions, drawn from the habitual practice of the above mentioned commission of the second Hague Conference. Examples are the treaty between Switzerland and Japan of December 26, 1924; that between the United States and Sweden of June 24, 1924; and that between the United States and Liberia of February 10, 1926.

Different reservations have been discussed and introduced into recent arbitration agreements. For example, that which excludes questions relating to constitutional procedure mentioned in the treaties between Argentina and Venezuela of July 22, 1911, the ratification of which was postponed until August 24, 1924; between Italy and Honduras of December 8, 1913; Argentina and France of July 3, 1914; China and Holland of June 1,1915; France and Uruguay of April 18, 1918; Great Britain and Uruguay of the same date; Germany and Switzerland of December 3, 1921; Hungary and Switzerland of June 18, 1924; Italy and Switzerland of September 20, 1924; Poland and Sweden of November 3, 1925; and Spain with Switzerland and Denmark of April 20, 1926, and March 14, 1928 respectively.

Certain treaties, as those signed by Germany and Switzerland on December 3, 1921, and Czechoslovakia and Poland on April 2, 1925, excluded from arbitration disputes affecting territorial integrity, except in cases of frontier problems. Other agreements, such as Article 1 of the Treaty between Poland and Switzerland of March 7, 1925, by means of a formula which may perhaps contain a solution of this great difficulty for tribunals and states in the future, omit from their stipulations questions which are left by international law to the exclusive decision of each nation.

A very recent conciliation and arbitration agreement, made between the United States and France on February 6, 1928, in addition to excepting disputes relating to domestic jurisdiction and to the interests of third parties, also excludes any dispute the subject matter of which depends upon or involves the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the Monroe Doctrine, or involves the observance of the obligations of France in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In order to avoid certain inconveniences another formula has recently been devised which, instead of laying down a general rule and then noting one or more exceptions, states exactly the scope and object of the institution of arbitration. The happiest formula

is that which proposes arbitration for all cases in which a right is reciprocally discussed, or in which that right is invoked. In this connection may be mentioned Article 2 in the Treaty between Poland and Sweden of November 3, 1925; Article 1 in the Treaty between Germany and Poland of December 13, 1927; and those of February 5 and March 3, 1927, made respectively with Switzerland and Denmark by Belgium. Also in the same sense must be mentioned Article 36 of the Statutes of the Permanent Tribunal of the World Court. Twenty-nine nations have adhered to these Statutes, amongst them Germany and France in Europe, and Brazil, Costa Rica, San Domingo, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama and Uruguay in America.

The great danger of the exceptions above mentioned consists in determining who is to interpret them. In the beginning, as we have seen, resistance to international justice and an exaggerated sense of domestic sovereignty succeeded in converting every state into its own judge as to what arbitration stipulations should be fulfilled, which in most cases meant that they were useless as an instrument of peace and universal justice. In the end there was a reaction against this, and many of the international treaties recently quoted contain in more or less the same terms the formula appearing in the last paragraph of Article 2 of the Treaty between Guatemala and Italy of April 20, 1915:

> The question of determining whether a dispute does or does not constitute a difference expressly provided for in Articles 1, 2 and 3 shall also be submitted to arbitration.

This is equivalent to saying that the arbiters are the final judges of what comes within their jurisdiction.

However, opponents of war who looked to arbitration for a panacea for all its evils and dangers could not rest satisfied. A means existed for deciding impartially what disputes were susceptible of arbitration. But there remained all those disputes, frequently very grave, in which recourse could not be had to justice. In view of the uncertainty and the danger of mediation, conciliation commissions were formed in conjunction with the developments arising out of the first and second Hague Conferences. The famous Bryan Treaties gave a great impulse to this movement. Arbitration for legal cases, combined with conciliation for others, now appears in a great many treaties — amongst others, that between Germany and Switzerland of December 3, 1921; Hungary and Switzerland of June 18, 1924; Italy and Switzerland

of September 20, 1924; Poland and Czechoslovakia of April 23, 1925; Denmark and France of July 15, 1926; and Denmark and Spain of March 14, 1928.

The Commission of Arbitration and Security of the League of Nations, which met in Geneva this past summer, is trying to take a further step in the direction of a common agreement that differences submitted to conciliation shall be declared necessarily susceptible of arbitration as soon as it has been proved that the conciliatory formulæ have broken down. In this manner nothing in international life would be outside the scope of peaceful settlement, and the generous and laudable declaration of the Kellogg Treaty signed in Paris on August 27 last would become a practical reality. These are its terms, to which all nations have been invited to adhere and which contain no reservations:

> Article 2. The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

Another and probably the supreme difficulty still exists for certain states. Conciliation and arbitration are agreed upon; but it still will be necessary to appoint commissions and arbiters when disagreements arise — that is to say, just at the time when people's minds are least disposed to agree about anything.

It used to be customary for arbitration agreements to designate as judge the head of a friendly state or some other higher functionary. But very soon the idea of a permanent tribunal recommended itself and was supported by the nations of Europe and America at the second Hague Conference. It crystallized after the Versailles Treaty in a procedure for the election of judges which is as ingenious as it is practical.

Some sort of tribunal, constituted in advance, and to which application can be made by one nation against another, is an absolute necessity. For seven years the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague has been functioning with increasing success and on an increasing scale. The reservations proposed by the Senate of the United States do not refer to its necessity, or its convenience, or its judicial functions, but to other matters of organization and scope; as to these, with a little good will on all sides, an agreement will sooner or later be reached.

So far as conciliation is concerned, all the treaties establishing it provide for a permanent commission, which is definitely agreed upon and which may function *motu proprio*, anticipating the appeal

of the disputants. When these bilateral agreements are drawn up for a continental or universal treaty, the commission will be of the same character, although it will be necessary in such cases to use common sense and justice in smoothing out certain practical difficulties. There is no reason why several nations — or all nations — should be unable to do collectively what two of them can do.

The last trench of the enemies of arbitration is the contention that it involves the codification of international law, legally speaking, and disarmament, practically speaking. That is an error. It is quite true that we have as yet no written code of international law, but it is none the less true that Europe and America are steadily codifying it, by the work of the League of Nations and by the Pan-American Conferences. And it is further true that universal custom, the principles generally admitted, and the decisions of international tribunals, are daily clarifying the code and helping to establish it. The law and the tribunal are inseparable, and the acceptance of one of these involves the clarifying and defining of the other.

As for disarmament, it is bound to come, seeing that force wastes and destroys itself in two contrary ways, by use and disuse. When humanity is convinced that it has practical and effective guarantees against all aggression, and that it can defend itself against any injustice from the strong or the thoughtless, from the imprudent or the mistaken, by appealing as do private individuals to an impartial authority, disarmament will come of itself, as the necessary sequel to a public opinion that is peaceful and quiet. There will only remain a domestic police force and perhaps an international force for the rarer cases in which judicial decisions are not voluntarily obeyed.

As I have said, the whole of America is about to meet in Washington to study this problem. Much may be done there for our own advantage and also as a stimulus to the right development of civilization. The responsibility of the delegates and of their governments is enormous; it can only be measured by the glory with which the Conference will cover itself if it reaches agreements which the world applauds and accepts.

THE GRAND COUNCIL OF FASCISM

By Gaetano Salvemini

THE Grand Council of Fascism was set up in 1923, shortly after the "March on Rome," as a private advisory council of the Prime Minister. The Fascist deputy, Signor Volpe, not long ago described it as "the General Staff of Fascism." By the terms of the bill which will undoubtedly have been passed by the time these words appear in print, the Grand Council becomes "the supreme body, which controls all the activities of the régime." The members composing this "supreme body" fall into three categories:

1. *Life members.* The Dictator; the "Quadrumvirate" who led the March on Rome; ex-ministers who have held office in the Fascist Cabinet for at least five years; and those who have acted as secretaries-general of the Fascist Party since the March on Rome.

2. *Ex-officio members.* The President of the Senate; the Speaker of the Corporative Chamber; the Cabinet Ministers; the Prime Minister's Under-Secretary; the Under-Secretaries of the Foreign Office, the Home Office and the Ministry of Labor; the members of the central executive of the Fascist Party; the two Presidents of the National Organizations for Industry and Agriculture and the President of the Trade Unions; and five other high officials.

3. *Extraordinary members*, designated among "men who have deserved well of the National Cause and the Fascist Revolution, or are experts on the questions under discussion in the Grand Council."

The first two categories total thirty-five persons; the numbers in the third are not fixed. In category two only the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the Corporative Chamber are designated by their respective assemblies; the others owe office to the Dictator. Members of category three are likewise all designated by the Dictator.

One of the important functions of the Grand Council is that of "designating" the deputies for the Corporative Chamber. A few words must be said about this interesting process.

When the Corporative Chamber is to be nominated, the National Councils of the six National Confederations of Employers, the six National Federations of Employees and the one National

Confederation of the Professional Classes, meet in Rome, and each Council "presents" names for its allotted share of 800 candidates. Two hundred more names will be "presented" by such cultural, educational or charitable bodies as are designated by the Government on the recommendation of a committee composed of five senators and five deputies.

The Fascist *Corriere della Sera* (September 29, 1928) estimates that about ten thousand persons will have a share in this "presentation" of candidates. I tabulate below the members of each National Council, as given by the *Corriere*, and the candidates whom each Council is empowered to "present" according to the law of May 17, 1928.

Organization		*Number of Members in its General Council*	*Number of Candidates Presented by General Council*
INDUSTRY	Employers	500	80
	Employees	6,000	80
BANKING	Employers	50	24
	Employees	100	24
COMMERCE	Employers	113	48
	Employees	1,000	48
AGRICULTURE	Employers	200	96
	Employees	550	96
MARITIME AND AERIAL TRANSPORT	Employers	50	40
	Employees	100	40
INLAND ROAD AND WATER TRANSPORT	Employers	21	32
	Employees	700	32
PROFESSIONAL CLASSES		250	160

The agricultural classes, both employers and employees, have in their hands at least three-fourths of the economic activities of the country, but they are allowed to put forward hardly one-fourth of the total. The Confederation of Industrialists, with a

membership of 60,000, puts forward eighty names; so does the Federation of Workers, which has a membership of 1,206,586. The 450 employers in maritime transport put forward 40 names, as do 49,000 employees in the same trade. The 22,000 employers in land transport put forward 32 names, as do their 247,000 employees.[1] This is the system described by Mussolini to the *Paris-Midi*, February 8, 1928, in the following terms: "Capital and labor shall have equal rights and duties as brothers in the Fascist family."

After the list of a thousand names has been "presented," the Fascist Grand Council "designates" the final list of 400 deputies, not only by selection from the "presented" lists, but even by the addition of persons not included in it. This unlimited discretion makes the "presentation" of the preliminary lists a mere farce. The Minister of Justice wrote in the Memorandum with which he introduced the bill into Parliament: "The designation made by the Grand Council may be regarded as the actual election of deputies; subject only to ratification by the electorate." When the Fascist Grand Council has "designated" the 400 candidates, the list goes for "ratification" to the electorate. The whole country will form a single electoral unit. The ballot will bear the formula: "Do you approve the list of deputies designated by the National Grand Council of Fascism?" The electors are to give the answer "Yes" or "No." If the majority answers "Yes," the 400 candidates are elected *en bloc*.

Fascist theorists are at much pains to explain that this "ratification" has nothing to do with the "elections" of the old era. Fascism claims to have abolished the vote-catching system forever. In a speech made on January 22, 1928, the General Secretary of the Fascist Party stated:

> The method of appointing the leaders from above is a fundamentally Fascist one. It has produced good results by suppressing all remains of democratic mentality. We are an army of believers, not a mass of associates.

Signor Rocco, Minister of Justice, in the Memorandum with which the bill was introduced into Parliament, wrote:

> The electoral system has been reduced to a mere expression of assent or dissent in regard to a Government policy — an expression not beyond the power of people of little education or culture, and consisting only in saying "yes" or "no." Its similarity to a plebiscite must not, however, obscure the real nature of the institution. The expression of opinion demanded of the electors is not in-

[1] The membership of each group was given by Signor Bottai, Undersecretary at the Ministry of Labor, in his speech on March 15, 1928.

tended as a tribute to the principle of the sovereignty of the people. It is not as a tribute to a fancied sovereignty on the part of the electors that they are asked their opinion on the policy indicated by the Grand Council, but as a test of their disposition, in order to maintain better and better the contact between the State and the masses.

And Signor Maraviglia on behalf of the parliamentary sub-Committee who examined the bill insisted:

It is not a question of an election, since individual voters are not asked to choose members of Parliament, but only to approve or reject *en bloc* the list drawn up by the Grand Council, to represent a definite trend of policy. All the voter is asked to do is to ratify this list and by it the policy of the Grand Council. Such a right of ratification cannot be regarded as an even indirect recognition of sovereignty manifested by ballot. It has been deemed expedient as clearing away all misunderstandings as to the true nature of the Fascist State. This is not an oligarchy, but a State built on a wide popular foundation.[2]

The Law makes provision for the hypothetical case of the list failing to gain a majority. Then fresh elections will be held in which it will be possible for different lists to be put forward. As only Fascist organizations having more than 5,000 electors will be allowed to put forward lists, in this second election, too, only Fascists will be candidates.

Signor Rocco explained the advantages of the new system in an interview with the *Paris-Midi*, February 10, 1928:

The country will be able to express its opinion about the candidates proposed and the policy they represent. If by an extraordinary chance a difference were to appear between the answer given by the nation and the preliminary selection made by the authorities representing the nation, this would be simply the sign of some misunderstanding or uneasiness which it would be well to dissipate. But we shall always be sheltered from chaotic elections and surprise outbursts of public opinion.

But it is evident that there never will be "misunderstandings" to dissipate. Signor Forges-Davanzati, in the *Tribuna* of February 21, 1928, rightly remarks:

There is no interest in the alternative system of elections; these provisions have been introduced as a merely formal hypothesis.

The "merely formal hypothesis" has, however, its uses as an article of export. It is intended to make foreign countries believe that, in the words of the *Tevere*, February 21, 1928, "Fascism

[2] *Tribuna*, March 13, 1928.

respects all the rights of the opposing currents of thought," since it permits a genuine election if the official list is rejected.

Even Signor Rocco's allusion to the "opinion of the country" is an article of export for the readers of the French paper whose correspondent he was addressing. At home the Fascist leaders boast that they do not care a fig for the opinion of the country. Mussolini in a speech at the National Congress of the Fascist Party on June 22, 1925, said:

> There are certain gentlemen who define themselves as officiating priests of a mysterious divinity called public opinion. We do not care a damn for this public opinion. Fortunately we are still an army.[3]

The principle on which the Fascist electoral system is based was outlined by Mussolini in an interview with the Buenos Aires *La Prensa*, December 7, 1926:

> Our aim is to create a Corporative Chamber without an opposition. We have no desire nor need for any political opposition.

And on May 26, 1927, he announced to the Chamber:

> The humbug of universal democratic suffrage had been solemnly buried in the Corporative State.

But even this "Corporative Chamber without an opposition" is stripped of all powers. By the law of December 24, 1925, no motion can be laid before the Chamber or the Senate without the previous sanction of the Prime Minister, who can thus suppress any discussion which might lead to a vote of no confidence. The law of January 31, 1926, authorizes the Government to modify any existing law and to make new laws by Royal Decree in virtually every field of public administration, "whenever reasons of urgent and absolute necessity require it." The sole limitation to this legislative omnipotence is the obligation placed on the Government to secure the confirmation of its legislative decrees by Parliament within two years of their date; if such confirmation is not secured, the decree "ceases to be operative from the day of the expiry of the two years." In the Senate on December 14, 1925, the Minister of Justice explained what would happen in this case:

> If in Parliament there are various currents and opinions as to the approval and ratification of a decree, and it proves impossible to secure agreement within

[3] *Stampa*, June 23, 1925.

two years, it will certainly be possible to prolong its operation by a special law. If in extreme cases it proves impossible to secure agreement and the case is one of urgency, a fresh legislative decree will be promulgated.

Side by side with the "Corporative Chamber without an opposition" and without powers there remains the Senate. It consists one-fifth of generals, one-fifth of high officials, one-fifth of big landowners, one-fifth of big industrialists and bankers, and one-fifth of university professors and Fascist intellectuals. It therefore contains the groups which control Italy through the Fascist Party. As the Senators are appointed by the King, *i.e.* by the Prime Minister, there is no danger that a popular election would give unpleasant surprises. Moreover, the number of Senators is not fixed. The Prime Minister, by introducing the requisite number of new-baked Senators, can down all opposition, assuming that in such an assembly an opposition could arise. In short, the Senate as it exists today in Italy might be thought to be the ideal Chamber for a Fascist régime, making any other Chamber unnecessary. But it has not been judged expedient to abolish every form of elective representation in Italy whilst all other civilized countries are still under the spell of that ridiculous infatuation. The Fascists compromise by retaining a pretended elective Chamber alongside of the Senate, on condition that neither Chamber nor Senate have any power.

I have tried to indicate briefly the rôle of the Fascist Grand Council in "designating" the deputies for the "Chamber without an opposition." It has other functions as well:

It must give its opinion on all bills dealing with constitutional issues: *the succession to the Throne, the powers of the King and the royal prerogatives;* the composition and functions of the Grand Council, of the Senate and of the Chamber; the appointment and prerogatives of the Head of the Government; the right of the executive power to promulgate laws; corporative legislation; relations between the State and the Catholic Church; international treaties involving territorial changes. The Grand Council draws up the list of names to be submitted to the Crown for the appointment of Head of the Government should a vacancy arise. The Grand Council likewise draws up the list of persons suitable for holding high offices in the Government.

The italicized words empower Mussolini to ask the opinion of the Grand Council on a bill substituting some other prince for the Heir Apparent. He may even propose that the King and his heirs make way for the "Emperor," Benito I. If the Grand Council gives a favorable opinion on such a bill, the latter is not likely to

be rejected by the "Chamber without an opposition," or by the Senate in which no effective opposition is possible.

This is nothing less than the abrogation of the Salic Law which has always governed the succession in the House of Savoy. The measure is the more striking since, besides the Heir Apparent, there stand ready today in the House of Savoy ten possible heirs to the throne. The fact that Mussolini and his friends have raised such a delicate constitutional issue would indicate that they must not only be meditating some change in the order of succession, but must also feel strong enough to carry it through. Since the time of Childeric III, the last Merovingian king, who was deposed by his major-domo, Pippin the Short, A. D. 751, no king in history has been in a more ignominious position than His Majesty King Victor Emanuel III — "feliciter regnans."

The law of December 24, 1925, enacted that the Prime Minister should be appointed and dismissed by the King; the King should maintain him in power until "the system of economic, moral and political forces," which brought him to power, should come to an end. As the Prime Minister was independent of a Parliamentary vote of confidence or censure, it rested with the King to dismiss him when he deemed that "the system of forces" had come to an end. This seemed an increase in the King's authority. But in a speech to the Chamber as early as May 26, 1927, Mussolini declared:

> I have become convinced that I must carry on the task of governing the Italian Nation for ten or fifteen years yet. It is a necessity. My successor is not born yet.

Thus, for the next ten or fifteen years the royal prerogative would have to remain in abeyance.

The Parliamentary reform setting up the "Chamber without an opposition" struck a grievous blow at the powers of the King. Signor Albertini in his memorable speech in the Senate on May 12, 1928, pointed this out:

> Some of the most sensitive prerogatives of the Crown are undermined by a machinery which puts in the hands of the leaders of the dominant party the choice of deputies subject only to a kind of national plebiscite. This system cramps the power of the crown with fetters which profoundly change the spirit if not the letter of those articles of the Constitution which define the powers of the crown — for instance, Art. 85, which lays down that the King nominates and dismisses his ministers. Under the new system the Sovereign will never be called upon to intervene, since it is unthinkable that deputies of one single party,

who owe their nomination to their party leaders, should turn against the Government which is the Government of their own party.

At which point Signor Giunta, Under-Secretary at the Presidency, called out: "You may be quite sure of that."

Now that the Fascist Grand Council has become the supreme governing body in the Constitution, the King has been stripped of all authority. Even should the King be convinced that "the system of economic, moral and political forces," which brought Mussolini to power, has come to an end, and even if he felt himself in a position to invite Mussolini to resign, he has no freedom in the choice of a successor, but must choose him from the list drawn up by the Grand Council, which, being nominated by Mussolini, will present him a list consisting of a single name: Mussolini.

In an interview with the *Paris-Midi*, February 10, 1928, the Minister of Justice, Signor Rocco, drew an analogy between the Fascist Party and the Catholic Church:

The mechanism of Fascism bears a certain resemblance, both in form and substance, to that of the Church; not that Fascism has copied this from the Church, but that they have in common the spirit of unity and order. Like the Church, the Fascist State is one and omnipotent, it has its undisputed leader and its powerful hierarchy. It works through its organizations of defense, education and propaganda. The Grand Council of Fascism is a sort of conclave. Our political organization corresponds to the Order of the Jesuits and our organization of education and propaganda to the other religious orders. The essential thing is unity.

The comparison is apt. The analogy may be further developed. Mussolini and the Grand Council of Fascism are to the Corporative State what the Pope and the College of Cardinals are to the Catholic Church. The Pope nominates the Cardinals, and the College of Cardinals elects the new Pope; just as Mussolini nominates the members of the Grand Council, and these in turn elect his successor. The King has the same function with regard to the Grand Council as the Holy Ghost in the College of Cardinals. There is, however, one difference between the Conclave of Fascism and the Conclave of Catholicism. When a new Catholic Pope is to be elected, it is the Holy Ghost which inspires the Cardinals; when a new Fascist Pope is to be elected, it is the Fascist Cardinals who inspire the Holy Ghost. There is another difference. In the Catholic Church, the Holy Ghost cannot be

dismissed from office. In the Corporative State, the Holy Ghost may at any moment be dismissed.

Count Thaon de Revel, plenipotentiary of the Fascist Party in North America, in an interview with the New York *World*, September 15, 1927, stated:

> You must have a dictatorship during every revolutionary period. But within two years (*i. e.* in 1929) the Corporative State should be established. Then the Dictatorship will cease and you will have a democracy. The Corporative State of Fascism is essentially democratic.

But, as always happens, Mussolini went one better than his admirers. Fascism, he proclaimed in his interview with the *Paris-Midi*, is the "united true democracy."

A democracy? Mussolini and his friends merely give a respectable political terminology to the old instruments of violence and tyranny. They borrow from democracy its technique of organization, but while this technique presupposes the existence of competing parties, the Fascists abolish all other parties and remain alone in the ring, fighting with nobody. In a democracy, the elector chooses his representative from among different candidates; under Fascist rule, the Dictator, who first of all elected himself, next elects the electors; then elects the elected; and finally summons the non-electors to approve the elected. Whilst at one moment claiming to be the negation of democracy, and at another to be a superior democracy, Fascism is merely a falsification of democracy.

THE THREE LATIN SISTERS

By Salvador de Madariaga

FRANCE, Italy and Spain are the three nations shed by the Roman Empire when the old tree, over-ripe, let go its plums. The three peoples were ruled for centuries by the same or similar laws and in approximately the same language. But there the resemblance stops. The fact that French, Italian and Spanish belong to the same philological family has been granted an undue importance in the field of national psychology. A philological kinship can only be read as a sign of psychological and racial parentage when the languages in question are autochthonous, i.e. the creation of the peoples concerned. Such is (probably) the case, for instance, with the Scandinavian and with most of the Indian languages. But in the case of French, Italian and Spanish, philological kinship is the result of a mere accident of history: the conquest of two of the nations by the people who at the time constituted the third. To this purely fortuitous fact no excessive importance should be granted. To be sure, the linguistic conquest of France and Spain by the Latin-speaking legions and officials of Rome implied a certain admixture of Roman blood and the acquisition of a number of mental and social habits. But we know the first to have been relatively unimportant and doomed in any case to absorption by the native race and soil; while the second operated against the grain of native tendencies. The fact to be emphasized here is the rapid divergence of the three languages as soon as the unifying effect of Rome ceased to act on them. For, while the common philological stem was an accident of history, the divergence of the branches sprang from natural forces inherent in the three peoples and due to deep differences in their characters.

But then why all this fuss about Latinity and sisterhood? First, because there is a conscious or subconscious endeavor to impersonate in the "South" a pseudo-Hellenic civilization opposed to the "North," to raise the Mediterranean man as the match to the Blond Beast. But there is something more. Nature, it is true, does not provide much ground for all this Latinity and sisterhood, but when nature fails there is art still to be tried. And the Latin family is of course more art than nature. Curiously enough, the spring motive of all this art is closely connected with

America, indeed so closely that it is doubtful whether we would have heard about Latin sisters at all had not Christopher Columbus discovered a new continent on his way to Japan. For the fact is that the Latinity and the sisterhood of France, Italy and Spain did not become prominent until the Spanish colonies broke loose from the metropolis and a host of young nations appeared in the New World. The attraction of the Latin family was not so much in old Spain as in her young daughters.

Then we began to hear about "Latin America," a phrase unknown in earlier days. For, even during the nineteenth century, the nations south of the Rio Grande were known as "Spanish America" — all of them, including Brazil, since the word "Spain" was always understood by intelligent Portuguese as comprising Portugal. Later on, verbal sticklers invented "Ibero-America." But "Latin America" is an invention of "Latinity" and "sisterhood," the underlying intention of which is to set up a family at the head of which France would be surrounded by the young American republics, graceful choristers of her glory, while old Spain would sit half-asleep in her sunny corner.

Italy herself, though not particularly fond of a fiction which placed her at least second if not third fiddle to France, had no other means of entering the lists than the fanciful gate erected with the pillars of Latinity and sisterhood. So, remembering that America had been discovered by one Italian and christened by another, and relying on a strong contingent of immigrants in the southern nations, she claimed a chair at the family table.

So, behold the three Latin sisters sailing forth towards the American shores like the three caravels led by Columbus: *La Pinta*, *La Niña* and *La Santa Maria*. Do you not feel the suggestiveness of these three picturesque names? *La Pinta* — *The Motley* — is France. *La Niña* — *The Girl* — is Italy. *La Santa Maria* — *The Holy Mary* — is Spain. Now do not take me at my word in that matter-of-fact manner of men who know too much and understand too little. I do not claim that the names of the three caravels fit the three nations as a glove a hand. But they tickle the imagination and stimulate certain lines of comparison.

The Motley is France. For is not France the nation of the intellect? And what more motley than the faculty which mirrors everything without actually penetrating and living through what it reflects and bathes in light? The variety, the clearness, the movement, the smiling grace, the charm, the liberty bordering

on licentiousness, the elegance and the easy-going tolerance of French life and civilization, are as it were incarnated in that light-hearted feminine name: *La Pinta.*

The Girl is Italy. For Italy, though an old people, is a young nation, indeed a very young one, a *niña*, which suggests lesser years than *girl.* Her enthusiasm, her pride, her vitality, her passion, her self-assurance, her beauty, her head full of dreams, her romantic faith in her hero, Mussolini, her disregard of wise counsel, her touchiness and her jealousy of France, all the features that make of Italy the petted *enfant terrible* of Europe, are called to life in the name of the second caravel: *La Niña.*

And *Holy Mary* is Spain. For is not the name an apt suggestion of her other-worldly preoccupations when she gave herself, her armies, captains, navies, admirals, ministers and monks to the worship and service of her exacting Lord? And moreover, did not Spain bring forth a New World quite pure from the sin of knowledge, for neither she nor her madcap navigator had the faintest idea of what the Spirit was going to manifest through their endeavors when the three caravels sailed forth from Puerto de Palos in 1492? Then, the New World once there, Spain gave herself to it — gave her lifeblood to it, and even her reputation, only to see it go the way of destiny. *Santa Maria.*

Fancy? No doubt. But through the play of fancy, we have corrected whatever there might be too rigidly negative and critical in our scepticism over the Latinity and the sisterhood of our three nations. For after all, though different in name and spirit, built perhaps of different wood and on different designs, the three caravels did sail together towards the American shores and the three "Latin" nations have sailed together along the seas of European history, kept within each other's sight by the language kinship. Spain, as the seat of Latin ecclesiastical learning first, and then as the bridge between semi-barbarous Europe and cultured East, acts as the first civilizing agent, particularly in science and philosophy. Italy and France react on her later, influencing her arts and letters. Then, politically, Spain overflows in France (south, east and north) and gradually occupies the major part of Italy. In the fifteenth century, Italy leads in Europe. The sixteenth belongs to Spain. From the middle of the seventeenth, France is frankly on the ascendance. Not till the eighteenth is England's voice heard outside her own shores. Germany does not rise to leadership till the nineteenth.

But though three centuries of close partnership in the leadership and development of European culture have no doubt established permanent ties and common or similar trends of thought between them, the three nations remain vigorously individualized in the inmost roots of their character, and therefore in their creative genius, their general and political evolution. The difference is easiest to perceive in the case of France and Spain. For while in France life manifests itself in conscious talent and persevering method, in Spain it springs from subconscious genius and discontinuous impulse. The stress, in France, is on civilization; in Spain, it is on nature. And so France is the land of art and knowledge, while Spain is that of inspiration and understanding. Italy would seem to lie midway between the two extreme types. Intellectual and conscious, like France, she has nevertheless something of the passionate and integral nature of Spain. Italy is a more complex character than either Spain or France, as a mere glance at the arts and life of the three nations will show.

If a deliberate exaggeration were allowed (a heavy thickening of certain lines in order to bring out the contrast), we might describe Spain as passion without purpose, genius without talent, intuition without method; France as purpose without passion, talent without genius, method without intuition; Italy as passion with purpose, genius with talent, intuition with method. Hence, again, in the world of experience, which is the world of good and evil, we feel the French detached through their objective lack of passion, and the Spaniards through their subjective lack of purpose; while the Italian is deeply committed owing to his intimate blending of purpose and passion. Good and evil thus take in Italy a more perfect, deliberate and personal form than in France or Spain. St. Francis and Machiavelli were both Italians.

This greater complexity of the Italian nature, and particularly the wealth of personal purpose which animates it, may well explain the superabundance of form which is one of the characteristics of Italian life and genius. The curls of the Neapolitan, the rich, sonorous endings of the Tuscan language, the decorative wealth, the wave, the curve, the gesticulation, are but manifestations of a deep tendency which makes of Italy the mother of the arts. Form is in France sobered by intellectual control and limited by a keen sense of measure to the strict needs of a moderately vigorous inspiration; in Spain, form is at the mercy of inspiration, now loose and flaccid, now over-ornamented, now admirably taut

under the winds of the spirit; but in Italy, passion and purpose keep the spirit in constant turmoil and form abounds, bounds and rebounds, flowing and overflowing in all manifestations of life.

Perhaps, then, the most representative Italian might be Benvenuto Cellini, the man whose hands fidgeted for matter to be turned into form. The artist rejoices in small shapes which he can handle. And this spiritual cause, rather than other external reasons, may be the factor which determines the slowness with which Italy reaches full nationhood. To be sure, Spain and France began both as congeries of petty states. But each in her typical way achieves nationhood early in the history of Europe: France, through the gradual effort of her jurists, her intelligent kings and statesmen; Spain by heating the whole Spanish people to melting heat in the crucible of religious unity. But Italy was too rich in passion and purpose, too gifted as an artist, not to enjoy her small republics, her Venices and Florences, beautiful cups of collective life which the eye could see and take in.

Nor can the present-day life of the three nations be understood without reference to the difference in the rhythm of their respective national evolutions, itself in tune with the respective national characters. Spain, in many ways the oldest of the three, cooled down from the furnace heat of her fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and by the end of the seventeenth was but cinders and ashes. Phoenix-like, she rose again, but the world she found was no longer that of her splendor. The old faith had gone. Spain, despite Machiavelli, despite Montaigne and Rabelais, had in her imperial days maintained the doctrine that the prince had duties as the minister of God on earth. Spanish thought had never admitted the absolute right of the king to act in peace and war according to his unaided lights. Her history, from the days when her leadership and even the dynasty which had exerted it had gone, became a long and laborious process of adaptation to a rationalistic world. Her difficulties are not unlike those of oriental countries, of which in many ways — perhaps the deepest — she is one. Her present political system — or should we say, lack thereof — is but an episode in this process. It may even be added that Spain's present ruler is the most oriental she has ever enjoyed. Born within sight of the Islamic world, he governs like a good sultan, according to his lights, not all of which are bereft of Divine vibrations. And Spain lets do. She has known worse and survived. She has the

long-suffering patience of those whose eyes have seen and whose memories have stored too much to be surprised or offended or afraid. Both in home and in foreign affairs, Spain has reached the age of mellow experience when one's only ambition is — in the words of the great Spanish poet — to remain *ni envidiado ni envidioso*. The vigor inherent in her people and the wealth of her soil explain her present economic progress. The revival of her literary and scientific life and the strengthening of her always admirable artistic power are but manifestations of the same cause. Many a European observes these signs, and only the other day a Swiss traveller, judging Spain according to his own standards, wondered (at the sight of the splendid hotel accommodation to be found now-a-days in the Peninsula) whether she was not "awakening." As a corollary, her international position rises *pari passu* with her progress in hotel management. But Spain cannot find again her old level until the world has made greater strides towards its unity. World unity was her ideal in the days of her narrow and bigoted faith; world unity remains her ideal in the days of wider if shallower beliefs. Hence, perhaps, the curious matter-of-course attachment of her intellectual leaders to the (ideal) League of Nations.

France brought to Europe a political conception of power as opposed to the religious conception held by Spain. France moreover saw with keener intellectual acumen than her Catholic neighbor that world-unity was premature and that the world had to go through nationalistic disintegration before it could integrate itself as a federation of national units. The French monarchy represented therefore in Europe the principle of sovereignty, incarnated first in the monarch, then in the State, finally in the nation. Francis I fought for nationalism, i.e. the nation as sovereign, against the Christian unity which was the constant dream of Charles V. The triumph of this doctrine was, paradoxically enough, the *République Une et Indivisible* of the Great Revolution. The intelligence and the method of French statesmen have maintained France alive despite the dangers of the doctrine of unrestricted national sovereignty when applied by a ruthless and powerful nation. And not only alive, but prosperous and growing. For the French Empire in Africa and Asia is an astounding achievement. It differs, however, from the Spanish Empire in that France does not give her lifeblood but her intellect. A sparing nation, the French are above all sparing in human lives.

"French" Africa is French by its government and laws, Spanish or Italian by blood. And this sense of measure and economy which is one of the chief features of the French character (in direct contradistinction, by the way, with Spain and Italy, both extravagant nations), limits the vitality of the French race itself. France's intellectual capacity is beginning to prove bigger than the physical means at its disposal. Her attitude towards the League of Nations is less that of an inspiring muse than that of a prudent housewife, anxious lest the bank in which she has deposited her hard-earned savings is not sound enough.

Italy meanwhile is in the early years of her nationhood. *La Niña.* The Girl-Nation. Now, a little charity and not much history suffice in the circumstances to understand that Fascism, far from being an unpardonable crime, is a natural phase for a nation in her teens. The first phenomenon which occurs in the early years of a nation is the appearance of absolutism. That is the case with Spain, France and England in the sixteenth century; with Germany in 1870; with Italy today. Moreover, Italy, rightly or wrongly, considers herself as an imperial nation with an historical duty towards herself — that of building the Empire which in the scheme of things belongs to her. Every other nation who has built her own or is building it should ask herself the question: why should not Italy do the same? And, to be honest, the negative answer is easier to give than to justify. No imperial nation — past or present — can reproach Italy her imperial ambitions unless she herself is ready to give up altogether her own imperial philosophy — and to hand over the juicy fruits thereof to the World Community. As for Mussolini, he stands at the confluence of two currents — the absolutist tendency of a youthful nation, and a constant tendency of Italian history, i.e. the tendency to produce *condottieri.* The very nineteenth century, which seemed so ill-adapted to this most interesting genus, has brought forth at least two first-rate specimens: Napoleon and Garibaldi. Mussolini belongs to the group, as a human being, though as a political type he may recall the race of Beaconsfield and Bismarck. He is moreover a truly representative Italian in the admirable manner wherewith he answers to our Italian formula: passion and purpose. And as for form, he is overflowing with it. And after all, what is a *condottiere* but a masterpiece of passion, purpose and form?

THE WINNING OF CZECHOSLOVAK INDEPENDENCE

By Robert J. Kerner

THE MAKING OF A STATE: MEMORIES AND OBSERVATIONS, 1914–1918. By Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak Republic. An English version by Henry Wickham Steed. New York: Stokes, 1927.

MY WAR MEMORIES. By Eduard Benes, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928.

DURING the first year of the World War two university professors, T. G. Masaryk aad Eduard Beneš, escaped from Prague to start a revolution for the Czechoslovaks against Austria-Hungary. Four years later they returned, the one as President of the newly created Czechoslovak Republic, the other as its Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ten years after the World War finds them still in office, the only statesmen of the parliamentary governments in Europe who survived the entire decade of post-war turmoil. A record unique in the annals of history!

It is no wonder that their memoirs should be awaited with eagerness and hailed as important historical documents. There have been war memoirs and war memoirs. Some have been written to conceal, others merely to justify. Some reveal just enough to mislead, others just enough to awaken curiosity by their omissions. Rarely, however, do they bare the soul, and seek objectively and frankly to explain what they did, so that others may learn from their mistakes as well as from their triumphs. It is to the latter group that the memoirs of these two remarkable men belong. And they have been written with an eye to the future. For a nation to regain its independence is one thing. To preserve it is still another task.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was born in 1850 in Moravia, now a part of Czechoslovakia. He came of poor Slovak parentage, his father having been a coachman on one of the estates of the Austrian Emperor. His father wanted him to be a blacksmith, but the village school master insisted that he should become a teacher. He tutored his way through the University of Vienna and later Leipzig, and was called in 1882 to the newly created Czech University of Prague as professor of Social Philosophy. He drew to Prague two generations of enthusiastic scholars from all parts of

Austria-Hungary and the Balkans and became the leader of the Progressive Party (sometimes called Realist) and thus a member of the Austrian Parliament. Masaryk believed he had a mission. For this he prepared himself by long philosophical, historical, and sociological studies. "I never wanted to be a professor," he writes, "I wanted to be a diplomatist and a politician." He studied the history of his nation and found its philosophy in the religious ideals and motives of the Hussites and the Bohemian Brethren. He became a Czech Puritan, an opponent of Russian Panslavism, and at first advocated a peaceful, evolutionary nationalism which would be just and sober, if Austria permitted a development toward federalism. He rejected Marx and sought social reform by evolution rather than revolution.

After his return to the Austrian Parliament in 1907, events soon forced him to realize that Austria-Hungary would not and could not solve the problems which confronted it. In the crisis which followed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 he was forced to indict the Foreign Office for having used forged documents against the Serbo-Croat Coalition in the Croatian Diet. He worked feverishly and daringly to bring about a reconciliation of the Balkan Slavs with Austria-Hungary before the World War, but failed. During all this while he had nurtured a program for solving the problems of his nation, and he had often declared: "If it will work with Austria, very well; the Czech nation is willing to make peace. If it will not, the Czechoslovaks will await a favorable opportunity to pay back to Vienna that which they have suffered for centuries at her hands."

He had worked hard and loyally to change things by methods of peace and reconciliation. When the World War broke loose, he knew what to do. One day he received a visit from his former student, by this time also a university professor, Eduard Beneš. Beneš had reached the point where he could no longer remain a "passive spectator." In fact, he confided his belief in the necessity of a revolution. To this Masaryk replied: "Good. I am at it already." At this point began that association of teacher and pupil which led to a successful revolution and the foundation of one of the most progressive democracies in Europe.

Eduard Beneš was thirty-four years younger than Masaryk. His father was a peasant farmer who brought up a family of seven children. Eduard was the live-wire of the family. He was quick, alert, and endowed with tireless energy. He, also, worked his way

through the university. Under the spell of Masaryk he transferred his affections from Romance languages and Germanic philology to philosophy and the social sciences. He spent several years in France and Western Europe as a student and hack-writer for Czech reviews. Here he "learned to look on the world in a different light." Like Masaryk, he saw hope for his nation from the history and experiences of the West. His nation, he argued, must depend upon realism — it must know how to do things, it must learn to observe, to analyze, to contemplate, sanely. It must free itself from romanticism. Down to the World War his writings had been premised with the idea that the forces which had held Austria-Hungary together from within were still strong enough to hold it together against any destructive forces, whether from within or from without. He had believed in the possibility of a democratic, federalized Austria-Hungary, but when the World War began, Eduard Beneš was among the first to see that such a conflagration could create much more formidable forces against that Empire from without than the German Alliance or any binding forces from within.

This was the opportunity which Masaryk and Beneš utilized. In a few months the secret revolutionary organization, the "Maffia," was created, while Masaryk, who had secured a passport good for three years just before war was declared, left for abroad for the first time to orient himself and the group in Prague. The memoirs, which supplement each other, bear ample evidence of the calm, level-headed, rational way in which the two social scientists went about their work. They were not engaged upon an easy task, nor did they enter upon it with light hearts or the recklessness so often characteristic of such actions. They had for years consciously and with purpose studied the forces which since the Renaissance and Reformation had molded Europe. They realized that the World War was something more than a conflict between Germans and Slavs, between Prussian militarism and nationalism, between German and British merchants and empire builders, and many other rivalries, important as they were. To them it was something more universal, something more fundamental. It was a great struggle between two parts of Europe which historically had developed to different stages. It was a struggle between two ideas. Western Europe, in spite of many contradictory manifestations, had evolved into the democratic conception of the freedom of the individual and of the nation,

in which the state existed for the people. It had left behind the feudal and aristocratic conceptions of the Middle Ages. Germany, Austria and Russia had not outgrown them. Prussian militarism, Austrian bureaucracy, and Russian Tsardom had not yet been transformed by the same forces which had so fundamentally transformed Western Europe and America. The future was in the hands of rapidly democratizing forces which in the end would prove far more powerful than the Prussian war-machine.

To Masaryk and Beneš the historical experience of the Czech nation fitted into the scheme of what had happened in Western Europe. Here in the heart of Europe had developed a nation which had shared, even led, in the Reformation, and had lost its independence in the struggles which resulted from it. The Hapsburgs had banished its educated classes and nobility, confiscated their lands and their wealth, converted their people by force, and inflicted on them a serfdom which was not only economic, but political and spiritual as well. But this enserfed peasantry had raised itself by its own endeavor to a nation which had become educated and democratized and which in its competition with the Germans had played them to a standstill. Both Masaryk and Beneš always insisted, and insist today, that the Czechoslovaks must fit their problems and their policy into the general framework of European development. They attribute their success to their ability to do this. It was only after a careful scanning of the skies that these two pioneers of new conditions in Central and Eastern Europe concluded that their philosophy of European and Czech history was substantially correct and that the time for action was ripe.

It was necessary not only to create the underground revolutionary organization, the "Maffia," but to secure the consent and, so far as possible, the coöperation of the other political leaders of the nation who would not be able to leave Bohemia and upon whom all the pressure of the Hapsburg machine would be exerted to disavow what was being done abroad. The "Maffia" would act as an agency of liason between the revolutionary leaders abroad and the passive leaders within until the time would come for action. While these preparations were being made both the Austro-Hungarian Government and the nation gave unmistakable evidence of what was to happen. The former proceeded to imprison the political leaders and to enter upon a persecution which could only increase the bitterness of the nation. The nation

began to resist passively within, and its sons on the front lines deserted *en masse* to the enemy. As the young men defiled along the streets of Czech cities they were often enjoined by their sweethearts and mothers, standing on the curb, not to fight against their Slavic brothers in a war about which the nation had not been consulted. The nation in its heart and in its actions, where it could show them, was far more radical than its leaders, and became increasingly so as time went on under the stupid policy of its German and Magyar overlords. From this Masaryk and Benes knew that the situation was developing along lines which they had foreseen. Meanwhile, Masaryk was notified by the "Maffia" that it was too dangerous for him to return from his second trip of observation abroad. He remained in Switzerland. Beneš, who had been twice to visit Masaryk for instructions, now saw that his arrest was only a matter of time after Kramár, Klofač and other leaders had been imprisoned. On September 1, 1915, armed with a forged passport and assisted by a comrade, he crawled through the underbrush of the forests under the very noses of the Austrian sentries on the Bavarian frontiers. "Was it," he asks, "a leap into the dark or into a new life?"

His forged passport got him into Switzerland, where he immediately began his activity alongside of his former teacher. The task which faced them was tremendous. The Czech Question was but little known beyond the borders of Austria. Since the Seventeenth century it had been a "provincial" question. The Germans and Magyars had seen to it that it was not a question of international politics. It now became the duty of these men to educate the statesmen and public opinion of the Entente as to the possible significance of the liberation of the Czechoslovaks. It meant nothing more nor less than the destruction of a world power, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was a huge task, but they accomplished it. The methods they used and the way they went about their job is a long and complicated story. But suffice it to say that it forms one of the most important developments of the entire World War. On this the memoirs speak clearly and give most valuable historical testimony.

On their side worked certain positive factors. They had a nation which was intelligent enough to comprehend the meaning of the struggle — to engage in it actively where that was possible and to be passive where premature action would have been disastrous. Through the "Maffia" the exiles were able to keep its

leaders at home informed on what to do and when to do it and to give them news of what was taking place in the Entente countries. In turn the "Maffia" was able to secure information extremely valuable for their exiled leaders, who put it to the uses of the Entente. They were able by virtue of this information to diagnose accurately what was going on in the Central Powers. Masaryk and Benes, on their side, were favored by their long study of what was taking place in general, were able to criticize intelligently the policies and programs of the Entente and were in a position ultimately to make their views prevail.

Against them was ranged the dense ignorance which existed as to Austria-Hungary, knowledge of which was limited to only a few scholars, publicists, and statesmen in Entente countries. In addition, there were strong Austrophil elements, aristocratic, Catholic, and financial, which labored in every way to minimize Austria-Hungary's blame in the war and hoped to bring about a favorable peace at the first opportunity. It was a relatively easy matter to convince Entente statesmen that provinces might be lopped off from the Hapsburg Monarchy, but it was altogether another thing to talk of freeing a nation in the heart of Europe and breaking up an Empire which some hoped might be detached by a separate peace. Of Tsarist Russia, Masaryk and Beneš were frankly skeptical — both as to its ability to last out in the conflict and as to its own plans with regard to its Slavic kinsmen.

Having created a Czechoslovak National Council, these two men, joined by Dr. Štefánik, the Slovak astronomer, and by others, organized first the colonies in the Entente countries and subordinated them to their organization. They proceeded next to the task of forming armies out of Czechoslovaks resident in these countries or taken prisoners, as in Russia, Serbia and Italy. As they succeeded in this task they requested and received the attributes of governmental power in respect to the troops and consular and diplomatic rights over citizens of their nationality both in and outside of the armies. The character of their soldiers, who often deserted *en masse* from the Austro-Hungarian armies, their intelligence and their quality as fighters, soon began to tell. It was hardly necessary to speak of these things after these men were once put under fire. The exploits of the Czechoslovaks in Russia and their anabasis through Siberia made a powerful argument for their leaders.

Step by step, the personality and organizing ability of Masaryk

and of his assistants, Benes and Štefánik, began to tell. Intelligent and powerful friends were found in France, England, and America, and a propaganda was developed which day by day undermined the counter-propaganda of the Central Powers. Masaryk was made a professor in the University of London. Beneš lectured in Paris. Štefánik was a genius at making friends and interesting statesmen. On February 4, 1916, Masaryk was received by Premier Briand and was given an opportunity to explain to him his diagnosis of the general situation — the Pan-German plans of Berlin, the vassalage of Austria-Hungary, and the aims of the Czechoslovaks, which, by the break-up of the Hapsburg Monarchy, would turn Germany back upon her own territorial limits. He outlined a reorganization of Central Europe based on the liberation of the small nations and indicated why this plan was more in harmony with the general development and interests of France and the Entente than any other. Briand, in an official communiqué, immediately expressed the sympathy of France for the Czechoslovak movement. It was the first official recognition which it had received.

Masaryk had from the first foreseen the value of creating armies out of the Czechoslovaks who as Austrian citizens had been interned or as prisoners had been kept in the concentration camps in Entente countries. France had begun to feel the tremendous losses of life which her armies suffered in the first and second years of the war and had turned to Russia for assistance. The latter had promised 400,000 troops, but only 16,000 had been sent. This created such difficulties that the idea arose of sending to France the Czechoslovak prisoners in Russia, who were seen to be more adaptable to the purpose. It was in this way that Štefánik was sent as a French officer with an official mission to Russia, and this is the origin of the development which bulked so large in the events of 1917 and for two years after, and led step by step to the signing of a convention late in 1917 for the regulation of the Czechoslovak army in which the Czechoslovak National Council for the first time received the attributes of a government.

Meanwhile the Central Powers were everywhere victorious and engaged in their first peace offensive. This resulted in the reply of the Entente to President Wilson (on December 30, 1916), which named as one of the war aims "the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians and Czechoslovaks from foreign oppression." For the achievement of this mention of the Czechoslovaks Beneš

is given a great deal of credit. The Central Powers feared to state their aims concretely, and this the Entente fully utilized, thus outpointing them. The declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare followed and with it the entry of the United States into the war. That and the Russian Revolution, which broke out in March, 1917, became the decisive events of the world struggle. Woodrow Wilson's diplomatic broadcasts, playing largely on the self-determination of nations, together with the Russian Revolution, undermined the moral foundations of the Central Powers. Why should German soldiers and the nations of Austria-Hungary fight against Russians who had freed themselves from the reactionary Russian Government? For the small nations, and especially for the Czechoslovaks, these events were the dawn of liberation.

A dark shadow was suddenly cast over their rising hopes when it became known that secret negotiations were being carried on between the Entente and Austria-Hungary. Germany was considered the arch-culprit who must be isolated and then defeated on the battlefield, for, after all, German arms had brought the Allies once more to the breaking point. If the Entente could get Austria-Hungary out of the conflict, they could achieve their object. Moreover, it seemed as though the new Emperor Charles would welcome such a development. So there followed a series of attempts in 1917 and early in 1918 to reach an agreement through various agents. The crux of the matter was that Austria-Hungary should desert Germany, sign a separate peace, and permit the Entente to carry on war from her territory against her former ally. The result of these negotiations was that Austria-Hungary either would not or could not make a separate peace. She then endeavored, under German pressure, to obtain a general peace, but the terms set by the Germans made them impossible of acceptance by the Entente.

This was what Masaryk and Beneš had been predicting all along, and their correct diagnosis made a deep impression on the Entente leaders. After Clemenceau's resolute action in accusing Czernin of lying, the whole affair was liquidated, and there followed in quick succession the convention between France and the Czechoslovak National Council for the creation of the Czechoslovak army (August 4, 1917, officially promulgated February 7, 1918); the expression of sympathy with the national aims of the Czechoslovaks by the United States (May 29), followed by its recognition of the Czechoslovak army as a belligerent army and

the National Council as a *de facto* Government (August 2); the Treaty with France recognizing this status and promising representation at the Peace Conference (September 10); the establishment of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government (September 14), and its admission to the Armistice Conference (November 4). In the same way, step by step, the leaders in Prague, following the directions from Beneš in Paris, made their declaration of aims, defied the Vienna Government, and finally announced that their cause would be dealt with by their representatives at the Peace Conference. On October 28 they established their rule at Prague by a bloodless revolution. Austria-Hungary vanished amidst ill-meant and tardy plans for federalization. The Empire had failed to solve the problems which confronted it.

Upon all these things the memoirs of Masaryk and Beneš throw a flood of light. For their own nation, now celebrating the tenth anniversary of its independence, they bring many valuable lessons for the future.

THE STRATEGY OF SINGAPORE

By Nicholas Roosevelt

SINGAPORE guards the western gateway of the Pacific. Situated at the extreme southeastern corner of Asia, where the tongue of the Malay peninsula protrudes into the East Indies, it is so favored by geography that ships plying between Suez and Japan as well as between India and Australia must pass within a mile of it. Off Singapore the waters of the Indian Ocean, the China Sea and the Java Sea meet. Like Panama, Gibraltar and Suez, it is one of the great focal points for shipping, where geography forces far-flung lines of communication to converge.

The strategical significance of Singapore was first appreciated by Sir Stamford Raffles, agent for the East India Company, whose brilliant career and services to the British Empire have never received proper recognition. He it was who in 1819 planted the British flag there, only to be scorned and denounced by the Little Englanders of his day. "It gives us," he wrote a friend, "the command of China and Japan, with Siam and Cambodia, to say nothing of the islands [the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines] themselves." Within a half century of his unsung death the city which he founded was one of the great ports of the world. Today as much commerce flows past it as through Panama or Suez. Its importance as the great Eastern outpost of the British Empire is at last being realized, despite the efforts of pacifists and present-day Little Englanders to discredit it. As early as 1882 the first elements of a naval base were laid down, but only in 1921 was it decided to ask Parliament for £10,500,000 to make Singapore the principal naval station in Eastern Asiatic waters.

In order fully to appreciate the importance of Singapore it is necessary to examine the accompanying maps. From these it is clear that Singapore stands on not only the principal trade route from Europe to Eastern Asia, but also the line of communication that ties the Dominions in the Pacific to India and the rest of the Empire. To show the relative distances two circles have been drawn, with a radius of 1,500 and 3,000 miles respectively. Within the smaller circle lie the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, French Indo-China, Siam, and the Bay of Bengal. The outer circle just touches Japan. The sailing distances, in nautical miles, from Singapore to the principal ports are as follows: Nagasaki (the nearest Japanese seaport) 2415; Hongkong 1454; Manila 1370; Port Darwin (northwestern Australia) 1967; Calcutta 1646; Madras 1591; and Colombo, Ceylon, 1585.

Aside from the general geographical position of Singapore in relation to trade routes, the local features are favorable for the creation of a naval base with ample storage facilities. Singapore is an island which fits like an egg into the cup of the Malay Peninsula. On the southern or outer edge, nearest the shipping lanes, is the commercial harbor and the city of 500,000 inhabitants who live by its trade. On the northern or inner portion is the site of the base, with ample anchorage space. It is protected from the sea by the surrounding low hills. The outer approaches through Dutch and English owned islands are readily defensible by mines and nets.

The base itself is to consist primarily of docking and storage facilities, rather than of costly defense fortifications. The reason for this is that the British fleet in Eastern waters is at present forced to depend on distant stations for supplies and repairs. This is particularly true of capital ships that cannot be drydocked at any point short of Malta, thirty-one days steaming distance from Singapore. There is at present in Singapore a commercial drydock capable of handling

SINGAPORE'S CENTRAL POSITION ON FAR EASTERN TRADE ROUTES

ships of less than 10,000 tons. As part of the new naval base development a floating dock was shipped to Singapore and installed during the latter part of 1928, for the purpose of handling larger ships. At the same time the oil storage facilities were completed, and the provision depots planned with sufficient thoroughness to insure adequate supplies for Singapore so long as it does not fall into enemy hands.

The island is connected with the mainland by a granite and concrete cause-

way through which runs an aqueduct and over which is an excellent road for motor lorries and a double track railway. The presumption is that in the event of war it would be possible to supply Singapore overland from some port near the Indian end of the Malaca Straits. This causeway was at one time severely criticized by naval experts because it shuts off one of the two sea approaches to the base. The economic consequences of linking the island with the hinterland would seem, however, to outweigh these naval objections.

Not only in the United States, where the rôle of bases in naval operations has never been generally understood, but even in England, the question "Why Singapore?" has often been raised.



The answer, apart from the geographical factors already explained, is to be found in a further consideration of the functions of naval bases in peace as in war. The popular conception of a naval base as a highly fortified rocky eminence, like Gibraltar, is largely misleading. While a base must be safe from attack, its chief purpose is to give the fleet greater mobility in important strategic centers. This means primarily to provide fuel and supplies of all sorts, and to furnish adequate docking facilities so that in peace the ships' bottoms may be scraped and in war the necessary repairs made. A fouled bottom reduces a battleship's cruising radius, as well as its speed. In tropical waters it is particularly necessary to dock ships frequently in order to remove the rank growth that accumulates on them.

As a matter of fact it may be said that a fleet without a naval base within striking distance is much like an automobile in the Sahara. In war an injured ship has a chance of recovery if it can reach a near base. But if it has to travel many thousands of miles it is in imminent danger of annihilation. The existence of a well developed naval base with drydocks and supplies at Singapore therefore greatly increases the mobility of the British fleet in Pacific and Indian Ocean waters, and so affords to the British possessions in these regions that same degree of protection which other portions of the Empire now enjoy.

The most succinct summary of the wherefores of the Singapore base was made by Mr. Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty, from 1921 to 1924, speaking in Parliament on March 18, 1924:

"Singapore is essentially in a British part of the world. It is actually the point of one of the richest and most progressive parts of the Empire. It is the key to the Indian Ocean, round which lies three-quarters of the land territory of the Empire. The Great Southern Dominions, India, and our East African possessions lie around that ocean. Three quarters of the population of the Empire is around it also. We have not a single base in all that vast region at which a modern ship could be fitted or repaired. . . . There passes through that Ocean every year something like £1,000,000,000 worth of our traffic and a

great deal of other traffic belonging to the rest of the Empire. Something like £160,000,000 worth of our ships and cargo is afloat in that ocean at any minute of the day. Singapore is the one point from which the whole area can be effectively defended and protected. More than that. If Singapore were an enemy base, there is no other point from which any part of that great area could be protected. It is also the only station on the way to Australia and New Zealand by which the fleet can move to their help. You cannot steam a fleet either from the Panama Canal or the Cape across to Australia and New Zealand. The only route by which help can come to the Southern Dominions is by way of Singapore. Once the fleet is at Singapore it already covers the approaches to these Dominions, and is in the best position to provide them with security."

When the Singapore project was first discussed in Parliament it was attacked on three grounds: that it was a violation of the spirit of the Washington agreement; that it was an aggressive act against Japan; and that it would involve unwarranted and ever-increasing expenditures.

To the first complaint even Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who was one of the strongest opponents of the Singapore project, took exception in no uncertain terms. Like Lord Balfour, who directed the British negotiations at the Washington Conference, he pointed out that at that Conference the boundary of the area delimited in the treaty as that in which fortifications were not to be strengthened was fixed at 110 degrees, and that Singapore, lying outside the boundary, was knowingly and expressly excepted from the agreement. This was understood at the time by the public as well as by the American, Japanese and other naval experts. The charge that the base violated the spirit of the Washington Conference may therefore be dismissed as specious.

To the second criticism the defenders of the base pointed out that Singapore is very nearly as far from Japan as England is from the United States. This is too great a distance for a modern fleet to operate successfully in an aggressive action against a strong fleet in its home waters. Furthermore, they pointed out that at the Washington Conference Great Britain had forfeited the right further to fortify Hongkong, and that the withdrawal on Singapore was, in fact, removing their Far Eastern base 1,500 miles farther from Japan. Finally, rather than establishing a new point of attack on the Island Empire, they insisted that Singapore was not directed "against" any nation any more than is Gibraltar or Malta.

To the third charge — that the base would entail increasing expenses — no adequate replies were made in the Parliamentary discussions. But it is interesting to note that the contract awarded in September 1928 for completion of the base called for an expenditure of only £7,750,000 instead of £10,500,000 as originally demanded.

Even today many Englishmen fail to appreciate the implication of the argument so ably put forward by Mr. Amery and others in Parliament — that Singapore is an Imperial, rather than a merely English, base. In fact, the pressure for the construction of Singapore came largely from the Pacific Dominions and colonies. At the various Imperial Conferences the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers, supported by New Foundland and on occasions by Canada, urged the creation of the base so that they might benefit from the

protection of the British defense system. In order to show its earnestness, New Zealand contributed a sum of £1,000,000 and the crown colony of Hongkong £250,000. The Federated Malay States donated the land for the base and additional sums. Australia preferred to put her contribution into ships, but her officials never ceased demanding that the base be completed as rapidly as possible. When the Ramsay MacDonald government decided to halt work on the base in 1924, many people in the Dominions felt that England had betrayed them and, to use the words of the then Australian Prime Minister, that "incalculable harm" was done to the Empire's prestige.

The British Empire has not been alone in supporting this project. In the Dutch East Indies it has been hailed with enthusiasm and relief. Holland possesses in her tropical islands one of the richest treasure stores in the world. Not only is their present agricultural yield enormous, and their production of oil an important item in the world's supply, but they contain vast scantily-populated areas which promise to be as rich as Java when commensurately developed. This empire is unprotected. Holland's few cruisers in the Dutch East Indies, based on a small naval depot at Soerabaya, would be unimportant against even a second-class naval power. The Dutch have long known that as a result of this they hold the islands only on the sufferance of their neighbors. Hence they are keenly anxious to see the balance of power preserved in the Pacific. They realize that with a strong British fleet based on Singapore, Britain's interests, which, like those of Holland, are determined by the necessity of upholding the status quo, would automatically protect the Indies. In fact, with a base at Singapore, Great Britain could never permit the occupation of any of the Dutch islands surrounding Singapore by a power other than Holland. It would not be surprising, therefore, to learn that the already closely interlocked Dutch and British oil interests are factors in the Singapore situation. No agreement has ever been published, but that an understanding of some sort exists is generally believed in the Orient.

The Americans in the Philippines look with just as friendly an eye on the Singapore base as do the Dutch because they, too, care only about the preservation of the status quo in the Pacific. They realize that the provisions of the Washington Conference forbidding the strengthening of the existing island defenses, taken in connection with the distance of the islands from Hawaii, makes difficult their defense by the American navy alone. Hence they place much faith in the close community of interests between the Americans, British and Dutch in this section of the world as the best assurance of achieving the mutually desired peaceful goal.

The weakness of the Singapore base lies in the exigencies of European politics. The size of the fleet which Great Britain can base on Singapore, whether in peace or war, is determined by the demands of the European political situation. An example from history will make this plain. Prior to the German race for naval armament, Great Britain maintained a powerful fleet in Chinese waters, based on Hongkong. As the German fleet began to threaten the English fleet after 1908, it became necessary for the British to withdraw their Asiatic squadron upon the Mediterranean, and ultimately to make their principal concentration in the North Sea. While there is no imminent danger of a new threat from Germany alone, it is more than likely that if England were to become in-

volved in a war in the Far East the enemy would seek to create a situation in Europe which would at least threaten England's lines of communications and so force the immobilization in European waters of an important part of the British navy.

But this does not mean that Great Britain would be defenseless in the East. In a war which threatened the status quo in the Pacific she would not be likely to be fighting single handed. None of the Powers in the Singapore area could view with impunity an attack on the possessions of one of the others in that region. Fortunately the likelihood of such an attack is at present infinitesimal. But it is the policy of the British Empire, if not of Holland or the United States, to run no risks in matters of defense and to prefer to make good-will doubly sure by preparing for all emergencies. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that despite the fact that England's financial contribution to the base was withheld during the premiership of Ramsay MacDonald, the work was carried on, thanks to funds from other portions of the Empire, and that it is now assured of completion within a few years.

THE GUATEMALA-HONDURAS BOUNDARY DISPUTE

By Raye R. Platt

IN March, 1928, the United States Government, acceding to requests from the Governments of Honduras and Guatemala to assist them in a renewed endeavor to settle their long-standing boundary dispute, appointed Roy T. Davis, United States Minister to Costa Rica, to represent the State Department on a mixed commission which was to study the situation on the ground and, if possible, lay out a tentative boundary. The commission held a series of meetings at Cuyamel during March and April from which nothing definite resulted because both the Guatemalan and Honduran delegates had definite instructions as to the minimum claims of their governments and no compromise of even a tentative nature was possible. The State Department, therefore, suggested that the matter should be submitted for arbitration to the Central American tribunal. Guatemala accepted the proposal but Honduras refused to consider it, giving as her reason a number of technical considerations, chief of which was that there was no adequate panel of judges available to sit on such a question, and asserting her willingness to submit the case to the President of the United States or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for arbitration. The State Department in reply insisted that the question could and should be arbitrated by the tribunal which had been created for just such a purpose and that the contention of Honduras that there was no adequate panel of judges was baseless. Honduras repeated her refusal and there the matter stands with little immediate prospect of further action.

The Guatemala-Honduras boundary dispute is one of the most important of the many (involving every one of the Latin-American republics) that arose when Spanish rule was overthrown and it became necessary to determine the jurisdiction of the newly-established republics. In general, other major boundary disputes in Latin-America, whether settled or unsettled at the present time, involve regions of undeveloped and actually little-known resources, with little or no white population and no immediate prospects of extensive colonization. The Guatemala-Honduras dispute, however, deals with a region of considerable population, important transportation lines, and rich agricultural resources that are now undergoing rapid development.

Guatemala and Honduras, as states of the Central American Federation, which took the place of the Captain-Generalcy of Guatemala after the revolution and as independent republics after the dissolution of the Federation, were formed from the provinces or dioceses of Guatemala and Honduras of the Captain-Generalcy. No precise delimitation of these two states was made under the Federation. After its dissolution Guatemala and Honduras signed a treaty on July 19, 1845, which provided that "the states of Honduras and Guatemala recognize as their common boundary that laid down for the diocese of each in the Royal Ordinance of Intendentes of 1786;" but that ordinance did not define the boundaries of these dioceses. Negotiations for the demarcation of the boundary under this treaty failed and another was signed

on March 1, 1895, which provided for a mixed commission to make a study of the whole problem and present data upon which the two governments could base their final studies. The convention was to continue in effect for ten years. Later commissions met in 1908, 1909, and 1910. Cerro Brujo and Cerro Obscuro were established as points on the common boundary and the line of actual possession from Cerro Obscuro to Coyoles determined in detail. A third treaty was signed in 1914. Its terms were approximately the same as those of the 1895 treaty except that it provided that the dispute should be submitted to the President of the United States for arbitration in case the disputants themselves should be unable to arrive at an agreement.

The two governments finding themselves again unable to come to any agreement asked the President of the United States to act as mediator be-



Map of the region in dispute. 1. Approximate boundary of extreme Honduran claim. 2. Boundary of minimum Honduran claim at Washington conferences, 1918–19. 3. Boundary of minimum Guatemalan claim. 4. Approximate boundary of extreme Guatemalan claim. 5. Boundaries of adjoining countries. The ruled areas show the minimum claims of Honduras at the Cuyamel conferences, 1928.

tween them, and, on May 20, 1918, commissions from both countries met in Washington with the Secretary of State. Each presented documents and maps to prove its maximum claims (see map). The Guatemalan commission based its claim to the River Uluá-Gulf of Fonseca line on a royal *cédula* of September 8, 1563, which thus described the eastern boundary of the province of Guatemala. The Honduran commission presented a *cédula* of 1564 which it interpreted as repealing the 1563 *cédula* but which the Guatemala commission interpreted as verifying it. The Honduran commission based its maximum

claim not on any royal decree, since it claimed that the only decree that had ever expressly described the boundaries of either province (that of 1563) had never been put into effect and had been repealed by the 1564 *cédula*, but on a series of documents and maps purporting to prove that Honduras, previous to and at the time of the revolution of 1821, was in possession of not only the territory claimed at the Washington conference but of a much larger area reaching to Yucatán and including what is now British Honduras.

Each commission presented also a minimum claim as a basis for compromise and without waiving its maximum claims. Both accepted Cerro Obscuro and Cerro Brujo as points on the common boundary although there was some slight disagreement as to the actual line between these two points. From Cerro Obscuro to the Gulf of Honduras, Guatemala claimed all of the drainage basin of the Motagua River and insisted that the boundary should follow the ranges of mountains that form the divide between the Motagua and the rivers draining to the east. The Honduran commission insisted that the boundary should follow the line of division between actual Honduran and Guatemalan settlement and jurisdiction as traced from Cerro Obscuro to Coyoles by the mixed commissions acting under the 1895 treaty. The Honduran commission claimed that this line was official since it had been determined by commissions acting under the authority of their respective governments; Guatemala claimed that it had only the status of a recommendation and had been repudiated by the Guatemalan government. From Coyoles the line claimed by Honduras ran to the Managua River, down that river to the Motagua, and down the Motagua to the sea.

After the evidence presented by both countries had been studied it was evident to the State Department that more precise information on the topography and resources of the disputed region and the present interests of the two countries therein was needed before a compromise could be suggested. A survey under the auspices of the State Department was proposed and agreed to by both governments; but by that time (March 1919) it was decided that there would not be time to carry out a topographic survey before the rainy season. Feeling, meanwhile, was running high in both countries and hostilities seemed imminent. It was decided, therefore, to undertake the economic survey and at the request of the State Department this survey was carried out under the supervision of the American Geographical Society of New York during May and June 1919.

In general the report of the Economic Survey was favorable to Guatemalan claims as far as actual jurisdiction at the time of the survey is concerned. Although a number of fairly important towns in what may be called the Copan region were found to be under Honduran jurisdiction, these were cited in the report as exceptions only to the general rule of Guatemalan jurisdiction throughout the disputed zone, except for the banana plantations and railway right-of-way on the lower Motagua held by the Cuyamel Fruit Company under concessions from Honduras. Even there it was found that, for eight miles, the Cuyamel Railway ran over lands granted by Guatemala to others than the Cuyamel Fruit Company while, of the proposed 36-mile extension to this railway, 22 miles would also be on Guatemalan land grants. Of the 4615 square miles studied by the Economic Survey actual conflicts

(that is, concessions granted by both Guatemala and Honduras) totalled not more than 178 square miles and 30 to 46 miles of railway right-of-way.

At the Cuyamel conferences of March and April 1928 the actual disputed area was reduced to about one-third that under consideration at the Washington conferences of 1918 and 1919, Honduras having signified her willingness to accept as her boundary with Guatemala (except for a small section in the neighborhood of the Cerro Brujo-Cerro Obscuro line) the mountain barrier demanded by Guatemala as far as the sources of the Chachagualía River. Thence the boundary proposed by Honduras would run down this river to its mouth in the Motagua and down the Motagua to the sea. This would preserve to Honduras the concessions and railway right-of-way already granted by Honduras to the Cuyamel Fruit Company and the section through which that company now proposes to extend its railway.

Guatemala persisted in her claim to the whole of the Motagua valley. The proposed boundary line as drawn on Guatemalan maps would include the sea coast towns of Cuyamel and Omoa now held by Honduras; but it would seem that Guatemala recognizes the right of Honduras to these towns since in the Guatemalan reports of the Cuyamel conference, the town of Cuyamel is referred to as Honduran.

Previous to the Cuyamel conference one of the strongest arguments of Guatemala against the demand of Honduras for the Motagua River as the boundary was that the Guatemala Railway, the chief transportation line of the country, ran, as far as the town of Quebradas, through territory that would thus be Honduran. Honduras seems now to have recognized this. Guatemala still, however, disputes the rights of Honduras to her present claim, quite aside from the historic Guatemalan claim to the River Uluá-Gulf of Fonseca line, on the ground that, until Guatemala had granted banana concessions in the Motagua valley to the United Fruit Company and thus had begun the enormous development in the banana industry of the region in the last few years, Honduras displayed no interest in the region and even on her own official maps showed the boundary as following the mountains. Guatemala claims that when the Cuyamel Fruit Company first sought concessions in the area of its present development the request was addressed to the Guatemalan Government and it was only after refusal on the part of Guatemala that the company began negotiations with Honduras. Meanwhile Guatemala has stopped with soldiers further construction on the Cuyamel Railway.

The gravity of the whole situation has been greatly lessened by the reduction of Honduran claims to their present limited area. When the question is presented for arbitration much time will again be spent in the presentation and defense of the maximum claims of each country; but the final decision will turn upon modern occupation and development rather than upon historic documents, and will draw a boundary which will be least prejudicial to the welfare of both countries and at the same time satisfy the national honor of each.

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 25 West 43rd Street, New York City.

General International Relations

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By SIR GEOFFREY BUTLER AND SIMON MACCOBY. New York: Longmans, 1928, 602 pp. $9.00.

One of the most careful and authoritative accounts.

STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS. By A. PEARCE HIGGINS. New York: Macmillan, 1928, 322 pp. $5.

A series of essays by a competent writer, dealing with such questions as the Monroe Doctrine, the Locarno Treaties, the international position of the Papacy, etc.

DIE ANERKENNUNG VON STAATEN UND REGIERUNGEN IM VOELKERRECHT. By JOSEF L. KUNZ. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1928, 218 pp. M. 12.

A scholarly analysis of the vexed problem of recognition.

AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WARFARE. By M. W. ROYSE. New York: Vinal, 1928, 356 pp. $4.00.

An impressive study showing the changes wrought in the position of non-combatant populations through the advance in technical aspects of warfare.

THE PEACE PACT OF PARIS. By DAVID HUNTER MILLER. New York: Putnam's, 1928, 283 pp. $3.00.

An account of the origins and purpose of the so-called Kellogg Pact, with a careful and illuminating examination of the American Government's diplomatic correspondence with other signatory states, and a forecast of some of the consequences that may be expected to flow from the Treaty's adoption. The principal documents are included in an appendix.

DER KELLOGG PAKT IM RAHMEN DES KRIEGSVORBEUGUNGSRECHTS. By KARL STRUPP. Leipzig: Noske, 1928, 83 pp. M. 5.

An illuminating lecture by a prominent German authority on international law.

VERS UN GOUVERNEMENT INTERNATIONAL. By ROBERT LANGE. Paris: Commerce des Idées, 1928.

A leading French protagonist of the League examines the system of representation at Geneva and criticizes the organization of the Council.

THE ORIGIN, STRUCTURE AND WORKING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By ELLIS C. HOWARD. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928, 528 pp. 21/.

On the whole the most complete and authoritative exposition of the League.

FROM PARIS TO LOCARNO. By F. ALEXANDER. London: Dent, 1928, 246 pp. 5/.

A sound review of the problem of security as it presented itself at Paris in 1919, and of the various stages in the attempt to solve it.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. By John Donaldson. New York: Longmans, 1928, 704 pp. $3.20.

Though written in the form of a textbook, this work should be useful to all interested in international relations. The author, who has had wide official experience as an expert on commercial problems, attempts to get at some of the fundamental factors which condition international economic relations. He conceives them in the broadest possible sense, and discusses with admirable clarity geographic, social and political as well as legal and territorial factors. Perhaps the most noteworthy part is the examination of the industrial basis of foreign trade and the emphasis upon its effects on international economics. The latter part of the book is taken up with a discussion of international enterprises, world trusts, the exploitation of special areas, the interdependence of nations for raw materials, the problem of public and private control of essential materials and the question of world monopolies. Though it is difficult to give an adequate idea of the wide range of subjects dealt with in this volume, enough has been said to indicate its general importance.

THE REMAKING OF MODERN ARMIES. By B. H. Liddell Hart. Boston: Little, Brown, 1928, 327 pp. $3.50.

The well-known military critic and writer leaves the problem of disarmament aside and, in his usual brilliant style, attempts to get at rock-bottom considerations of modern warfare. Taking as his keynote the mobility of armies, the author starts out by demonstrating that in the last war armies had mass without velocity, with the result that there was a general paralysis in the form of trench warfare. Infantry tactics have obviously become impossible in the days of mechanization and cavalry of the old kind has also passed its usefulness. Military organization must therefore adapt itself to the demands of mechanization and the only solution lies in the development of large numbers of small fast tanks to take the place of cavalry and in the extension of the use of nonlethal gases, which, for effectiveness and humaneness, are preferable to almost all other modes of warfare. This general argument is set forth by the author with great conviction, the thesis being fortified throughout by reference to concrete problems, not only of the English and colonial forces, but also of the French and German armies.

AIRMEN OR NOAHS? By Rear Admiral Murray F. Sueter. London: Pitman, 1928, 441 pp. 25/.

A loosely-argued and rather ineffective reply to Neon's recent book *The Great Delusion*. The writer sees a great future for submarines, tanks and aircraft as weapons of warfare.

International Relations of the United States

SURVEY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1928. Edited by Charles P. Howland. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, 610 pp. $5.00.

The first of a series of annual volumes surveying the foreign relations of the United States, prepared under the direction of Charles P. Howland, Director of Research for the Council on Foreign Relations. Its broad scope may best be indicated by naming some of the chapter headings. The first section "American Foreign Policy" includes "Factors and Forces," "Traditions" and "Domestic Control." The section "The United States as an Economic Power" includes "Commercial Expansion," "The United States as a Creditor Nation," "State Department Supervision of Foreign Loans" and "International Implications of Gold Distribution." The third section is entitled "The United States and the League of Nations." The section "Financial Relations of the United States Government after the World War" includes "Reparations,"

"Debts," "The German Debts under the Treaty of Berlin" and "The Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany." The final section, entitled "Limitation of Armament," includes "Geneva," "Washington," "The Preparatory Commission, 1926," "The Three Power Conference," "1927 Assembly," "Naval Armaments: a Special American Interest," "Anglo-American Naval Controversy" and "Suggestions for an Anglo-American Naval Understanding." Mr. Howland has had collaboration in the preparation of important sections from Arthur Bullard, Herbert B. Elliston and Quincy Wright, besides advisory help and suggestions from an impressive list of international authorities and specialists. The appearance of this volume is a milestone in the comprehensive, detached and contemporaneous study of American foreign relations.

THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE. Edited by Charles Seymour. Volumes III and IV. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928, $10.00.

The final volumes of the important papers of the American statesman, covering the period of America's participation in the war and the work of the Peace Conference.

OUR RELATIONS TO THE NATIONS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. By Charles E. Hughes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1928, 123 pp. $1.75.

A series of lectures by the former Secretary of State, dealing with our relations to Canada and to the various Latin American states. The book may be taken almost as an official presentation of the American policy.

CONQUEST. AMERICA'S PAINLESS IMPERIALISM. By John Carter. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928, 358 pp. $2.50.

A journalistic account of American imperialism and the methods of dollar diplomacy.

LA POLITICA INTERNACIONAL EN AMÉRICA. By Benjamin Fernandez y Medina. Valladolid: University of Valladolid, 1928, 52 pp. Pes. 3.

A concise statement of the general Spanish view of inter-American relations.

THE AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY. By Edson L. Whitney. Washington: American Peace Society, 1928, 360 pp. $4.00.

A centennial history of the activities of the Society.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY. By Admiral Thomas P. Magruder. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1928, 179 pp. $2.50.

A timely exposition of Admiral Magruder's well-known views, with a general survey of the present state of the navy.

ORIENTAL EXCLUSION. By Roderick D. McKenzie. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1928, 200 pp. $2.00.

How the restrictive measures work and their effect upon Orientals on the Pacific coast; a paper prepared for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

RESIDENT ORIENTALS ON THE AMERICAN PACIFIC COAST. By Eliot G. Mears. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1928, 561 pp. $3.00.

A valuable contribution to the subject. The author examines the legal background and the present status of the Oriental population, based upon all available printed material and upon wide personal investigation.

Western Europe

GRAF BENCKENDORFFS DIPLOMATISCHER SCHRIFTWECHSEL. Edited by B. von Siebert. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1928, three volumes, M. 30.

A new edition of the famous Russian correspondence, arranged chronologically and containing some hundreds of new documents.

THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR. By Sidney B. Fay. New York: Macmillan, 1928, two volumes, $9.00.

The publication of this work may be called an event of note, for Professor Fay's book easily supersedes all previous treatments of the subject. It is neither a restatement of the outworn Allied arguments in regard to the origins of the war nor a new presentation of the so-called revisionist view. In other words, the book has no place in the controversial literature of the subject, but belongs to the province of serious scientific history. The mass of material in all languages upon which the author bases his account is truly staggering, but the great deluge of new evidence has pretty well come to a close and it is unlikely that his main conclusions will be called seriously into question. The work is divided into two parts, the one dealing with the period prior to July 1914 and the other with the crisis of that fatal year. In the first volume many obscure points have been investigated and elucidated. Among the most important of these may be mentioned the problem of the Anglo-French military conversations and the question of English obligations to France, as well as the all-important matter of Russia's policy in the Straits question and the general evolution of the Near Eastern problem in the years just preceding the crisis. The volume dealing with the July crisis is less novel than the first, for the subject has been handled by many writers and most of what can be said has been said in one place or another. Still, this part too is impressive for its cogency of argument. All in all, this is and will probably remain for some time *the* book on the subject.

IN QUEST OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE. By Harry Elmer Barnes. Chicago: National Historical Society, 1928, 423 pp.

Much of this volume is devoted to a reprint of the numerous controversial articles published by the author during the past years, but the earlier part is taken up with a survey of the question of the origins of the war in the light of the most recent revelations and particularly with reference to the writer's conversations with some of the surviving statesmen of 1914. Of interest in this section are the statements of Berchtold, Hoyos and Szápary regarding the effect of the German attitude and the assurances given the Russian Government by the Austrian.

STATESMEN OF THE WAR IN RETROSPECT. By William Martin. New York: Minton Balch, 1928, 329 pp. $5.00.

Brilliant pen portraits of the leading statesmen of the war period, written by the foreign editor of the *Journal de Genève*.

RAIDERS OF THE DEEP. By Lowell Thomas. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928, 363 pp. $2.50.

An account of the work of the submarines during the war, containing some new and interesting information.

EUROPE. A HISTORY OF TEN YEARS. By Raymond L. Buell. New York: Macmillan, 1928, $3.00.

A satisfactory brief introduction to the history of Europe since the peace settlement. The author reviews the treaties and general problems arising from them and then surveys the developments in each of the various European countries.

DIPLOMATIC EUROPE SINCE THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES. By Count Carlo Sforza. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, 137 pp. $2.50.

A series of brilliant lectures delivered before the Institute of Politics by the well-known Italian statesman.

LES CONSTITUTIONS DE L'EUROPE NOUVELLE. By B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch. Paris: Delagrave, 1928, 415 pp. Fr. 18.

An admirable handbook written by an authority. There is a good chapter dealing with general tendencies of constitutional development.

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF EUROPE, PRE-WAR AND AFTER. By Morgan P. Price. New York: Macmillan, 1928, 218 pp. $3.50.

The writer analyzes the movement of capital during the last generation and discusses its effects on world economy.

EUROPEAN TARIFF POLICIES SINCE THE WORLD WAR. By E. Delle-Donne. New York: Adelphi, 1928, $3.50.

After outlining the tariff situation as it existed in 1914, the author surveys the various war measures and the acute situation of the post-war period, closing with a discussion of the Economic Conference.

THE THIRD REPUBLIC. By Raymond Recouly. London: Heinemann, 1928, 390 pp. 12/6.

Perhaps the best brief account of the Third Republic down to the year 1914, but rather inclined to be journalistic and sadly deficient in the treatment of economic and social questions.

DAS POLITISCHE FRANKREICH VOR DEM KRIEGE. By Max Clauss. Karlsruhe: Braun, 1928, 162 pp. M. 7.

On the whole a good survey of pre-war France, but rather apt to over-accentuate psychological factors such as nationalism.

CORRADINI E IL NAZIONALISMO. By U. D'Andrea. Rome: Augustea, 1928, 111 pp. L. 12.50.

A much-needed study of the origins of Italian nationalism in the pre-war years; a book which should not be overlooked by students of Fascism.

MY AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Benito Mussolini. New York: Scribner, 1928, 318 pp. $3.50.

Hardly an important historical contribution. There is almost nothing in the way of new information and the picture of the man is the familiar one, only more so.

DIE IDEE MUSSOLINIS UND DER SINN DES FASCHISMUS. By Georg Mehlis. Leipzig: Haberland, 1928, 156 pp. M. 4.50.

An honest attempt to make Fascism understandable to Germans, written with the aim of improving relations between the two countries.

1919. By M. Giampaoli. Rome: Littorio, 1928, 336 pp. L. 15.

Recollections of a Fascist leader, highly interesting and instructive.

GUERRA, DOPOGUERRA, FASCISMO. By G. Volpe. Venice: La Nuova Italia, 1928, 470 pp. L. 30.

A prominent Fascist gives what is one of the sanest sympathetic accounts of the rise of the movement.

UNDERSTANDING SPAIN. By Clayton S. Cooper. New York: Stokes, 1928, 318 pp. $2.50.

Spanish characteristics are investigated by a level-headed and keen observer.

INTELECTUALES Y HOMBRES DE ACCIÓN. By Alvaro de Albornez. Madrid: Hernàndez y Galo Sàez, 1927, 318 pp. Pes. 5.

The conflict between ideals and the hard facts of reality as reflected in the Spanish situation.

THE NETHERLANDS AND THE WORLD WAR. By J. H. Carpenter Alting and W. de Cock Buning. Volume III. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, 149 pp. $2.25.

The last volume of an authoritative work, dealing with the effects of the war upon the Dutch colonies.

REPUBLICAN GERMANY. By Hugh Quigley and R. T. Clark. New York: Dodd Mead, 1928, 332 pp. $5.00.

This is one of the best accounts of the development of the German Republic in the first decade after the war. The writers have the advantage of being outsiders, who can look upon the situation without passion. At the same time they write sympathetically and show throughout an unusual understanding not only of the questions at issue, but of the position and aims of the men responsible for their solution. In attacking the political problem the authors stress the fact that the Allies, who were largely instrumental in bringing about the collapse of the old régime, crushed the new state with a staggering peace treaty. If the Republic has survived, it has not been due to sympathetic treatment at the hands of the country's former enemies. In any case the immediate result of the treaty was the strengthening of the reactionary nationalist movement, which is skillfully analyzed and described in this volume. But the larger part of the book is taken up with a consideration of the economic problems, upon which the situation largely hinged. We are given an excellent treatment of all the ramifications of the reparation question, as well as an illuminating account of the reorganization of Germany industry and the economic recovery of the country. The volume is one with which little fault can be found.

DAS REICH ALS REPUBLIK. By August Winnig. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1928, 361 pp. M. 6.50.

The former governor of East Prussia paints a rather lugubrious picture of the past ten years and bemoans the mistakes that have been made.

THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE MAX OF BADEN. New York: Scribner, 1928, two volumes, $10.00.

The English translation of the last chancellor's memoirs, which throw a flood of light upon the closing days of the Empire.

DIE AUFZEICHNUNGEN DES GENERALMAJORS MAX HOFFMANN. Edited by Karl F. Nowak. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1928, two volumes, M. 15.

This is a contribution of first rate importance for students of the history of the war. The second volume consists primarily of a reprint of the published writings of the general, but the first volume, besides an excellent biographical sketch by the editor, contains Hoffmann's reminiscences of the Russian-Japanese War and above all his diary and notes of the World War. Hoffmann was primarily responsible for the final terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and his notes are full of important information in regard to these crucial negotiations. His attitude is not one which will be likely to meet with approval outside the military circles of Germany, but at any rate it was a strong attitude and was held by a man who knew what he was about. It would be impossible to outline here even the most interesting parts of these memoirs, but they clearly belong with the most important sources for the history of Germany during the war.

WALTHER RATHENAU. SEIN LEBEN UND SEIN WERK. By Count Harry Kessler. Berlin: Klemm, 1928, 379 pp. M. 8.

Rathenau was the type of man who defies the average biographer, and none of the biographies of him that have been written so far have been accepted as in any way satisfactory. Count Kessler, who was intimately associated with the German statesman during the later part of his career, has written a really outstanding book, not only well-informed but thoroughly appreciative without being uncritical. He has not attempted a history of Rathenau's career as a great industrial leader, and this is perhaps the chief weakness of the book. But he has made up for it by a particularly penetrating examination of Rathenau's writings and has made a keen estimate of his personality. Of course the book deals at length with Rathenau as a statesman. Kessler throws considerable

light on the obscure matter of the Genoa negotiations and the much-disputed Rapallo Treaty. Taken by and large the book can be confidently described as the authoritative biography.

GEDANKEN EINES SOLDATEN. By General Hans von Seeckt. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1928, 179 pp. M. 5.50.

Reflections upon military and other affairs by the famous German general, who at times seems to exaggerate the importance and novelty of his not very startling views.

PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC. By Johannes Mattern. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928, 682 pp. $5.00.

An admirable scholarly study of the fundamental principles of the German constitution, preceded by a useful survey of German constitutional development prior to 1918.

THE NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. By Walter Meakin. London: Gollancz, 1928, 284 pp. 9/.

A sound and competent study of the post-war tendencies of capital and labor, with special reference to the reorganization and revival of German industry.

THE ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF GERMANY SINCE THE WAR. By Dr. Peter P. Reinhold. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, 143 pp. $2.00.

Williamstown lectures of the former German finance minister.

CARTELS, COMBINES AND TRUSTS IN POST-WAR GERMANY. By Rudolf K. Michels. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928, 183 pp. $3.50.

The author surveys the movement and then gives a brief analysis of its working in the leading industries. The book is brief and to the point and should be welcomed by students of international economics.

TRANSFERT DES RÉPARATIONS ET LE PLAN DAWES. By Harry D. Gideonse. Paris: Payot, 1928, 124 pp.

A careful examination of the various theories of transfer, followed by an anlaysis of the problem and its connection with inter-allied debts.

DEUTSCHLAND UNTER DEM DAWES PLAN. By Max Sering. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1928, 237 pp. M. 10.

A general account of the origins, legal basis and economic effects of the plan, with suggestions for a just solution of the reparations problem.

DER NEUE DEUTSCHE IMPERIALISMUS. By Richard Sonter. Hamburg Hoym, 1928, 192 pp. M. 2.50.

A socialist tirade against the new imperialism.

GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZ WÄHREND DES WELTKRIEGES. By Jacob Ruchti. Bern: Haupt, 1928, 554 pp. M. 12.

Volume I of an authoritative history, dealing with the political history of Swiss neutrality.

TIROL UNTERM BEIL. By Eduard Reut-Nicolussi. Munich: Beck, 1928, 245 pp. M. 4.80.

The latest exposition of the Italian policy as seen with German eyes.

Eastern Europe

DAS TSCHECHISCHE VOLK. By Alfred Fischel. Breslau: Priebatsch, 1928, 234 pp. M. 8.

An outline of Czech history, written by a leading German authority.

BÉLA KUN. EINE HISTORISCHE GRIMASSE. By Géza Herczeg. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1928, 188 pp. M. 5.75.

Béla Kun reduced *ad absurdum*.

POLNISCHE AUFERSTEHUNG. By Vladimir von Korostowetz. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1928, 278 pp. M. 10.

The Poles in a rather unfavorable light, as seen in the post-war years by a Russian official and newspaper correspondent.

POLAND'S WESTWARD TREND. By Ernest R. B. Hansen. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928, 92 pp. 3/6.

Basing his remarks on Polish ambitions as expressed by Polish writers, the author writes a rather unconvincing essay on the menace of Polish aspirations.

LA STABILISATION MONÉTAIRE EN POLOGNE. By Valère J. Zbijewski. Paris: Gebethner and Wolff, 1928, 104 pp. Fr. 10.

A competent treatise on the Polish monetary problem.

DANZIG, POLEN UND DER VOELKERBUND. By Hans A. Harder. Berlin: Stilke, 1928, 134 pp. M. 5.

A fair, well-documented account of the whole Danzig problem.

LA POLOGNE ET LA MER BALTIQUE. By Dr. Wiktor Rosinski. Paris: Gebethner and Wolff, 1928, 253 pp. Fr. 16.

The Polish need for an outlet to the sea once more set forth with the usual eloquence and warmth.

LE TSAR NICOLAS II OU LES PEUPLES AVEUGLES. By N. de Pavlov. Paris: Bossard, 1928, Fr. 12.

The old régime presented in a rather unusual light.

RASPUTIN, DER ALLMÄCHTIGE BAUER. By Aron Simanowitsch. Berlin: Hensel, 1928, 360 pp. M. 8.

A sympathetic and valuable account written by Rasputin's adviser and collaborator.

RASPUTIN THE HOLY DEVIL. By René Fülöp-Miller. New York: Putnam, 1928, 326 pp.

The English translation of a striking book already noted.

RASPUTIN UND DIE UM IHN. By Alexis Markow. Königsberg: Hartung'sche Zeitung, 1928, 144 pp. M. 3.50.

The author views Rasputin as an unscrupulous and clever peasant rather than as a holy devil.

STATE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY IN RUSSIA DURING THE WAR. By S. O. Zagorsky. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, 370 pp. $4.00.

A valuable volume in the Carnegie series, indispensable for an understanding of the development of the crisis.

RUSSIAN PUBLIC FINANCE DURING THE WAR. By Alexander M. Michelson and others. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, 484 pp. $5.00.

One of the most useful and welcome volumes in the Carnegie series, for it contains a much-needed history of Russian war finance and monetary policy, as well as an excellent authoritative account of the pre-war and war credit operations of the government.

THE MURMANSK VENTURE. By Major-General Sir C. Maynard. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1928, 334 pp. 20/.

The British Commander-in-Chief gives a vivid account of the campaign and adds materially to our knowledge of this phase of the war.

LENIN. By Valeriu Marcu. New York: Macmillan, 1928, 412 pp. $5.00.

A noteworthy book on Lenin, the French edition of which has already been noted.

ELITA BOLSZEWICKA. By Konstanty Strokowski. Cracow: Krakowska Spolka Wydawnicza, 1927, 124 pp.

A leading Polish journalist attempts to explain why a small group of intellectuals succeeded in securing and keeping control of Russia.

A NEW PARTY IN RUSSIA. By P. Malevsky-Malevitch. London: Routledge, 1928, 126 pp. 3/6.

The first extended account of the "Europasian movement," which accepts the Russian Revolution as a necessary break with Imperial ("Westernized") Russia, views the rule of Communism ("a Western doctrine") as a phase to be somehow endured, and looks forward to a new order to be based on the moral and religious forces of the Russian masses, strenghtened by new bonds with the civilizations of the East.

DIE ZUKUNFT SIBIRIENS. By Ivan A. Jakuschev. Prague: Legiografie, 1928, 217 pp.

A thorough systematic study of the resources and trade of Siberia.

PRAVA NA SEVERNIE POLIPNIE PROSTRANSTVA. By W. L. Lakhtine. Moscow: Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, 1928, 48 pp.

An official exposition of the Russian claims to Arctic territory.

POLITICA EXTERNA A ROMANIEI. Bucharest: Cultura Nationala, 1927, 706 pp. Lei 150.

Very interesting lectures published by the Rumanian Institute of Social Science.

LETTERE DI COSTANTINO RE DI GRECIA. By P. di Ostheim. Milan: Mondadori, 1928, 511 pp. L. 40.

The King's correspondence. An important source for Greek history during the war.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE TRAGEDY OF EDWARD VII. By W. H. Edwards. London: Gollancz, 1928, 392 pp. 18/.

A rather too impressionistic psychological study which fails to convince the reader that Edward was a great statesman.

MEMORIES AND REFLECTIONS 1852–1927. By Herbert Henry, Earl of Oxford and Asquith. Boston: Little Brown, 1928, two volumes, $10.00.

Lord Oxford's earlier books, "The Genesis of the War" and his "Fifty-Years of Parliament," were disappointing in that they did not add substantially to our knowledge of the events of the period with which he was so closely associated. It was to be hoped that in his memoirs he would throw light on the many obscure phases of recent English history, but it cannot fairly be said that he has made many revelations of prime importance. English statesmen seem to have a constitutional aversion to speaking out, and their books often are valuable principally as reflections of the character and outlook of their writers. This was true of Lord Grey's book and it is true of Asquith's. The first volume is devoted entirely to the pre-war period and is largely taken up with recollections of men and affairs, many of which have no permanent importance. The second volume does, indeed, throw some interesting side-lights of the conduct of the war and makes interesting reading, but one lays down the book with the feeling that the writer, amiable and conciliatory though he may have been, was not the man of the hour. There is nothing of the Churchill about him and his book is not to be compared with "The World Crisis."

THE LIFE OF LORD CURZON. By the Earl of Ronaldshay. Volume III. London. Benn. New York: Horace Liveright, 1928, 250 pp. $15.00 the set of 3 vols.

The last volume of this interesting biography, reviewed elsewhere in this issue.

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. Volume III. London: H. M. S. O., 1928, 495 pp. 10/6.

The third volume of these important documents covers the period from 1904 to 1906 and is entitled "The Testing of the Entente." The central theme throughout is the Moroccan crisis of 1905–1906, which has always presented to the historian so many difficult points of British policy. The reader will find here material of the greatest value not only on the general question of the Moroccan problem, but on such crucial matters as the British guarantee to France and the beginnings of the Anglo-French and Anglo-Belgian military conversations. Particular attention should be called to the long memorandum prepared by Sir Eyre Crowe after the crisis. This review of the British position after the Algeciras Conference is bound to take rank with the greatest British state papers of all time.

DIE ENGLISCHE PRESSE ZUM AUSBRUCH DES WELTKRIEGES. By Walter Zimmermann. Charlottenburg: Hochschule und Ausland, 1928, 269 pp. M. 15.

An exhaustive study of British press opinion in July, 1914, based upon an examination of over fifty newspapers.

DAS GEHEIMNISVOLLE SCHIFF. By Karl Spindler. Berlin: Scherl, 1928, 256 pp. M. 3.

The story of the *Libau* which ran the blockade and went in support of the Irish revolutionaries.

BRITISH FOOD CONTROL. By Sir William H. Beveridge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, 447 pp.

A volume of the Carnegie series dealing with the all-important question of England's food supply during the war.

PAX BRITANNICA. By B. G. de Montgomery. London: Methuen, 1928, 7/6.

A review of imperial problems and general international relations.

EMPIRE GOVERNMENT. By Manfred Nathan. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928, 256 pp. 10/.

A good general text, with an excellent discussion of the problem of dominion status.

L'ODIERNO IMPERA BRITANNICA. Giambattista Mazzoleni. Pavia: University of Pavia, 1928, 142 pp.

The author analyzes the organization of the Empire in 1914 and traces the changes brought about during the war and the post-war period.

LA RÉFORME MONÉTAIRE ANGLAISE. By Georges Gaussel. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1928, 163 pp. Fr. 20.

A scholarly review of the work of the Bradbury committee, the Gold Standard Act, and the more recent developments.

IRELAND. A CATSPAW. By Elizabeth Lazenby. London: Boswell, 1928, 254 pp. 6/.

The situation as the writer found it in the critical year 1922. The book is vividly written and reports some interesting conversations with Irish leaders.

L'IRLANDE ET SES INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES. By Raoul de Warren. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1928, 496 pp. Fr. 50.

A scholarly review of Anglo-Irish relations followed by a detailed analysis of present arrangements and problems.

A HISTORY OF CANADA. By Carl Wittke. New York: Knopf, 1928, 439 pp. $7.50.

An excellent and much needed general text on Canadian history, in which the political, diplomatic and economic problems are all adequately treated.

CANADA AND WORLD POLITICS. By Percy E. Corbett and Herbert A. Smith. London: Faber and Gwyer, 1928, 244 pp. 10/6.

The authors deal primarily with the constitutional position of the Dominion and its place in the international relations of the empire.

INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. By Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer. Bombay: Taraporevala, 1928, 384 pp. 12/6.

A moderate, sane discussion of the burning questions of Indian government, by a former member of the Executive Council of Madras.

UNHAPPY INDIA. By Lajpat Rai. Calcutta: Banna, 1928, 536 pp.

A hot and vituperative reply to Miss Mayo's book.

MODERN INDIA. ITS PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTION. By V. H. Rutherford. London: Labour Publishing Company, 1928, 268 pp. 2/6.

The radical view of the problem.

The Near East

THE TURKISH ORDEAL. By Halidé Edib Khanum. New York: Century, 1928, 407 pp. $4.00.

The second volume of the memoirs of the prominent Turkish feminist, covering the period of the national revival.

TURKEY TODAY. By Grace Ellison. London: Hutchinson, 1928, 288 pp. 18/.

An enthusiastic picture of Turkey under the new régime.

LE DODÉCANÈSE. By Antoine Tsacalakis. Alexandria: Cassimatis, 1928, 97 pp.

An outline of the history of the islands, followed by a study of their present position. The author prints all the relevant documents.

SUR LES ROUTES DE SYRIE APRÈS NEUF ANS DE MANDAT. By Comte R. de Gontaut Biron. Paris: Plon, 220 pp. Fr. 12.

A veritable handbook of the Syrian question in the later period, cataloging the French accomplishments and the present problems.

THE NATIONALIST CRUSADE IN SYRIA. By Elizabeth P. MacCallum. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1928, 299 pp. $2.50.

The best available treatment of the great rising of 1925–1927.

THE SEVENTH DOMINION. By Josiah Wedgwood. London: Labour Publishing Company, 1928, 131 pp. 4/6.

A member of parliament criticizes the working of the mandate system in Palestine and calls for its organization on a Dominion basis.

GREAT BRITAIN IN EGYPT. By Major E. W. Polson Newman. London: Cassell, 1928, 304 pp. 15/.

On the whole the best single account of the Britain's record in Egypt, especially valuable for the detailed account of war and post-war developments.

LE NATIONALISME ÉGYPTIEN. By Bertha G. Gaulis. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1928, 204 pp. Fr. 15.

The authoress, well-known as a writer on Egyptian affairs, here reviews the situation from 1924 to 1928.

Africa

DEL DESASTRE A LA VICTORIA. By F. Hernandez Mir. Madrid, 1927, 144 pp. Pes. 4.

The Spanish campaign in the Rif from 1921–1926.

LA RÉFORME MONÉTAIRE AU MAROC. By Pierre de Roux. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1928, 212 pp. Fr. 25.

A scholarly study dealing with the introductiou of the franc and its effects.

THE LAST OF FREE AFRICA. By Gorden MacCreagh. New York: Century, 1928, 361 pp. $4.00.

An attractively written general descriptive work on Abyssinia.

The Far East

A HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST IN MODERN TIMES. By Harold M. Vinacke. New York: Knopf, 1928, 479 pp. $5.00.

A good systematic text, dealing primarily with the history of China and Japan, but noteworthy for the stress laid on social and economic aspects.

THE FAR EAST. By Payson J. Treat. New York: Harper, 1928, 560 pp. $5.00.

Another good text, covering much the same field as the preceding, and written in an attractive style.

THE KUOMINTANG AND THE FUTURE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. By T. C. Woo. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928, 278 pp. 15/.

A very important book, reviewing the whole history of the nationalist movement. The writer was head of the diplomatic department in the Hankow foreign office and relies largely upon documents.

THE DRAGON AND THE FOREIGN DEVILS. By Johan G. Anderson. Boston: Little, Brown, 1928, 352 pp. $4.00.

A noteworthy book on China, written by a Swedish scientist thoroughly acquainted with all parts of the country.

CHINA. WHERE IT IS TODAY AND WHY. By F. F. Millard. London: Williams and Norgate, 1928, 350 pp. 10/6.

The latest book by the well-known journalist, setting forth his familiar nationalist views.

CHINA'S MILLIONS. By Anna Louise Strong. New York: Coward-McCann, 1928, 413 pp. $4.00.

A fascinating picture of the social changes taking place in China as seen during an extended journey in 1927.

THE SOUL OF CHINA. By Richard Wilhelm. New York: Harcourt, 1928, 382 pp. $3.75.

The translation of a good German book already noted.

DROITS ET INTÉRÊTS ÉTRANGERS EN CHINE. By Jean Escarra. Paris: Sirey, 1928, 90 pp. Fr. 25.

A brief reliable statement, written by one of the counsellors of the Chinese Government.

THE MODERN MALAY. By L. Richmond Wheeler. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928, 300 pp. 15/.

A useful historical survey and sound analysis.

Latin America

MEXICO. By James F. Rippy and others. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1928, 264 pp. $1.50.

Three valuable essays published for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

RED MEXICO. By Captain Francis McCullagh. London: Brentano, 1928, 360 pp. 15/.

The observations of an experienced traveller and political writer.

MEXICO AND ITS HERITAGE. By Ernest Gruening. New York: Century, 1928, 747 pp. $6.00.

A careful and substantial review of Mexico's history, revolutions, church struggles and present situation.

EL CLERO Y EL GOBIERNO DE MEXICO. By Luis C. Balderrama. Mexico: Cuauhtemoc, 1927, two volumes.

An exhaustive statement from the governmental viewpoint.

NABOTH'S VINEYARD. By Sumner Welles. New York: Payson and Clarke, 1928, two volumes, $7.50.

An outstanding book, sympathetically and exhaustively treating the history of the Dominican Republic from 1844 to 1924, by the former chief of the Latin American Division of the Department of State and former American Commissioner to the Dominican Republic.

THE CENTRAL AMERICANS. By Arthur Ruhl. New York: Scribner, 1928, 284 pp. $3.00.

A sane and well-balanced travel book which deals fairly with the problems raised by American interests.

HISTORIA DE LAS RELACIONES INTERESTATUALES DE CENTRO-AMÉRICA. By Landerino Mofeno. Madrid: Compañía Ibero-Americana, 1928, 507 pp. Pes. 20.

An exhaustive scholarly treatment.

GEOGRAFIA E HISTORIA DE HONDURAS. By Antonio Bones Quinones. Choluteca: Portillo, 1927, 212 pp. Pes. 1.25.

A good general book.

LA TYRANNIE AU VENEZUELA. By José Rafael Pocaterra. Paris: Delpeuch, 1928, 234 pp. Fr. 12.

Deals primarily with the domestic difficulties of the country.

THE NEW MAP OF SOUTH AMERICA. By Herbert A. Gibbons. New York: Century, 1928, 400 pp. $3.00.

A general survey of the present situation, written in the style of the author's well-known earlier works.

Miscellaneous

THE NEW WORLD. By Isaiah Bowman. New York: World Book Company, 1928, 803 pp. $4.80.

The fourth edition, entirely revised, of an excellent handbook which needs no new introduction.

GEOPOLITIK. By Richard Hennig. Leipzig: Teubner, 1928, 338 pp. M. 14.

The first systematic presentation of the new science which attempts to interpret political and international affairs in terms of geographic forces.

WHITHER MANKIND? Edited By Charles A. Beard. New York: Longmans, 1928, 408 pp. $3.00.

A series of essays, many of them brilliant and some of them provoking, surveying various aspects of our civilization.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: United States: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. Great Britain: British Library of Information, 44 Whitehall St., New York. France: Terquem, 14 rue Séguier, Paris (6e). League of Nations, Int. Labor Office and Perm. Court of Int. Justice: World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

ARBITRATION AND SECURITY

DOCUMENTS of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference entrusted with the Preparation of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Series VII. Minutes of the Third Session of the Committee on Arbitration and Security. Geneva, 1928. 131 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. IX. 8.)

PACIFIC Settlement of International Disputes, Non-Agression and Mutual Assistance. Report of the Third Committee to the Assembly. Annex 1. General Act. Annex 2. Bilateral Convention for the Pacific Settlement of All International Disputes (Convention a). Bilateral Convention for Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation (Convention b). Bilateral Conciliation Convention (Convention c). Annex 3. Introductory Note to the Model Collective Treaties of Mutual Assistance and of Collective and Bilateral Treaties of Non-Aggression. Collective Treaty of Mutual Assistance (Treaty D). Collective Treaty of Non-Aggression (Treaty E). Bilateral Treaty of Non-Aggression (Treaty F). (League of Nations, A. 86 (1). 1928. IX.)

PREPARATORY Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Committee on Arbitration and Security. Report of the Committee on Arbitration and Security on the Work of its Third Session held at Geneva from June 27th to July 4th, 1928. 78 p. 32½ cm. (League of Nations, 1928. IX. 9.)

ARMAMENT

PAPERS regarding the Limitation of Naval Armaments. London, 1928. 46 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. pap. Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1928), Cmd. 3211.) 9d. Net.

A French edition also issued by the Ministère des affaires étrangères.

WORK of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Report of the Third Committee to the Assembly. Geneva, 1928. 3 p. 32½ cm. (League of Nations, 1928. IX. 11.)

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND CHECKS

ECONOMIC Committee. Committee of Legal Experts on Bills of Exchange and Cheques. Report to the Economic Committee. Geneva, 1928. 26 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. II. 13.)

BULGARIA

BULGARIAN Stabilisation Loan. Protocol and Annexes approved by the Council of the League of Nations and signed on behalf of the Bulgarian Government on March 10th, 1928. With Relevant Public Documents. 55 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. II. 32.)

CHINA

PAPERS relating to the Settlement of the Nanking Incident of March 24, 1927. London, 1928. 6 p. 24½ cm. (China No. 1 (1928), Cmd. 3188.) 2d.

CLAIMS TO PROPERTY

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Government of the German Reich relating to the Surplus of German Property in China. London, 1928. 10 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 21 (1928), Cmd. 3204.) 3d.

EXCHANGE of Notes between His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Government of the United States of America respecting the Reciprocal Release of Property sequestrated in both Countries under Trading with the Enemy Acts. London, 1928. 6 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 23 (1928), Cmd. 3208.) 2d.

NOTES Exchanged between His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Haytian Government for the establishment of a Commercial "Modus Vivendi". London, 1928. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 17 (1928), Cmd. 3182.) 2d. Net.

COMMERCE AND CONSULAR RIGHTS

TREATY Between the United States and Honduras. Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights. Washington, 1928. 26 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series, No. 764.)

TREATY Between the United States and Latvia. Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights. Washington, 1928. 13 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series, No. 765.)

COMMUNICATIONS

ARRANGEMENTS between United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Newfoundland effected by exchanges of notes providing for prevention of interference by ships off the coast of these countries with radio broadcasting. Washington, 1928. (Treaty Series, 724-A.) 5 cents.

DELEGATION of United States of America to International Telegraph Conference of Brussels, tabulations of data furnished by American users of international communication facilities in response to questionnaire based on the Cortina majority report. Washington, 1928. 30 p. 5 cents.

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

COLLECTION of Advisory Opinions. Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of December 1st, 1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV). Leyden, 1928. 29 double pages. 24½ cm. (Series B. No. 16.)

COLLECTION of Judgments. Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865, between China and Belgium. Leyden, 1928. 7 double pages. (Series A.-No. 16.)

FOURTH ANNUAL Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice (June 15th, 1927-June 15th, 1928). 548 p. 24½ cm. (Series E. No. 4.)

TWELFTH Session. Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila. Volume III. (Other Documents. Continued.) Leyden, 1928. 1642 p. 24½ cm. (Series C. No. 13-IV.)

CUSTOMS NOMENCLATURE

COMITÉ économique. Sous-Comité d'Experts pour l'Unification de la Nomenclature Douanière. Projet de Cadre pour une Nomenclature Douanière et Projet de Répartition des Marchandises dans les Divers Chapitres du Cadre avec Notes Explicatives. Genève, 1928. 96 p. 32½ cm. (League of Nations, 1928. II. 37.)

HOLY SEE—MEXICO

LAS RELACIONES entre Mexico y el Vaticano. Por Joaquin Ramirez Cabañas. Mexico, Secretaría de relaciones exteriores, 1928. 238 p. 23 cm. (Archivo Historico Diplomatico Mexicano, Num. 27.)

IMPORT AND EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

INTERNATIONAL Agreement relating to the Exportation of Bones (with Protocol and Final Act.) Geneva, 1928. 17 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. II. 35.)

———. Supplementary Agreement to the Convention of November 8th, 1927, for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (with Protocol and Final Act). Geneva, 1928. 22 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. II. 36.)

INTERNATIONAL Conference for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (October 17th-November 8th, 1927). 52 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1927. II. 71.)

INTERNATIONAL Conference for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions. Geneva, October 17th to November 8th, 1927. Proceedings of the Conference. Geneva, 1928. 257 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. II. 7.)

INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION

INSTRUCTION of Youth in the Aims of the League of Nations. Report by the Secretary-General. Geneva, 1928. 8 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. XII. A. 3.)

INTERNATIONAL Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. Tenth Plenary Session. Report of the Committee, submitted to the Council and the Assembly. Geneva, 1928. 61 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. XII. A. 2.)

INTERNATIONAL Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. Report on Scientific Property. Geneva, 1928. 8 p. 32½ cm. (League of Nations, 1928. XII. A. 1.)

NOTABLE Books published in various countries during 1927. 47 p. 18 cm. Paris, International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1928. (League of Nations, International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation.)

RAPPORT Général du Directeur a la Commission de Coopération Intellectuelle sur l'activité de l'Institut en 1927-1928. Paris, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle (Société des Nations), 1928. 51 p. 35 cm.

UNIVERSITY Exchanges in Europe. Paris, The League of Nations Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1928. 203 p. 22 cm.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRIVATE

CONFÉRENCE de la Haye de Droit International Privé. Actes de la Sixième Session Tenue du 5 au 28 janvier 1928. La Haye, 1928. 425 p. 32 cm.

CONFÉRENCE de la Haye de Droit International Privé. Documents relatifs à la Sixième Session tenue du 5 au 28 janvier 1928. La Haye, 1928. 531 p. 32 cm.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

RELATIONS between the League of Nations and Institutes or Bodies set up under its Authority. Report of the Second Committee to the Assembly. Geneva, 1928. 2 p. 32½ cm. (League of Nations, 1928. XII. A. 5.)

MANDATES

IRAQ. Laws, Statutes, etc. Index of the laws, regulations, proclamations, etc., relating to Iraq issued between the 31st of October, 1914, and the 31st of December, 1926; comp. by C. A. Hooper. Bagdad, 1928. 26 p.

MANDATED Territory of Western Samoa (Eighth Report of the Government of New Zealand on the Administration of) for the year ended the 31st March, 1928. New Zealand, 1928. 64 p. 33 cm.

MANDATES. Observations of the British Government on the Council's Decision concerning the Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the Work of its Twelfth Session. Geneva, 1928. 1 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. VI. A. 10.)

PERMANENT Mandates Commission. Minutes of the Thirteenth Session held at Geneva from June 12th to 29th, 1928 including the Report of the Commission of the Council. Geneva, 1928. 238 p. 32½ cm. (League of Nations, 1928. VI. A. 9.)

PERMANENT Mandates Commission. Thirteenth Session. Comments by the Accredited Representative of the British Government on the Observations of the Commission concerning the Report for 1927 on the Administration of Tanganyika. Geneva, 1928. 1 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. VI. A. 11.)

PERMANENT Mandates Commission. Report on the Work of the Thirteenth Session of the Commission. Geneva, 1928. 10 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. VI. A. 8.)

RAPPORT ANNUEL adressé par le Gouvernement Francais au Conseil de la Société Des Nations conformément à l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'administration sous mandat du territoire du Cameroun pour l'année 1927. Paris, Imprimerie Générale Lahure, 1928. 140 p. 31 cm.

RAPPORT ANNUEL adressé par le Gouvernement Francais au Conseil de la Société Des Nations Conformément à l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'administration sous mandat du territoire du Togo pour l'année 1927. Paris, Imprimerie Générale Lahure, 1928. 198 p. 30½ cm.

REPORT by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the British Cameroons for the Year 1927. London, 1928. 128 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 34.)

REPORT by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 'Iraq for the Year 1927. London, 1928. 212 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 35.)

REPORT by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika Territory for the year 1927. London, 1928. 112 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 32.) 3s. 9d. Net.

REPORT by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Togoland under British Mandate for the Year 1927. London, 1928. 78 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 36.) 3s. Net.

RÉPUBLIQUE Française. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban (Année 1927). Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1928. 231 p. 30½ cm.

UNION of South Africa. Report of the Government of the Union of South Africa on South-West Africa for the Year 1927. Cape Town, Cape Times Ltd., 1928. 123 p. 32 cm.

NICARAGUA

A BRIEF History of the Relations between the United States and Nicaragua 1909–1928. Washington, 1928. 77 p. 23 cm. 15 cents.

POOR

LEGAL AID for the Poor. Part I. Laws, Regulations and Treaty Provisions regulating Legal Aid in Certain Countries. Part II. List of Agencies for Legal Aid established in Certain Countries. Part III. List of Authorities or Persons appointed in Certain Countries to answer Enquiries from Abroad. Geneva, 1927. 472 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations. 1927. V. 27.)

PROPERTY, INDUSTRIAL AND LITERARY

CONVENTION Creating an International Union for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed at Berlin November 13, 1908, Revised and Signed at Rome June 2, 1928. Washington, 1928. 5 cents.

CONVENTION de Berne pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques du 9 septembre 1886, revisée à Berlin le 13 novembre 1908 et à Rome le 2 juin 1928. [Berne, 1928.] 24 p.

INTERNATIONAL Agreement regarding False Indications of Origin on Goods signed at The Hague, November 6, 1925. 9 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 15 (1928), Cmd. 3166.) 3d.

INTERNATIONAL Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property signed at The Hague, November 6, 1925. London, 1928. 41 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 16 (1928), Cmd. 3167.) 9d.

RENUNCIATION OF WAR

THE GENERAL PACT for the Renunciation of War. Text of the Pact as signed; notes and other papers. Washington, 1928. 71 p. 23½ cm. 15 cents.

SANITARY CONVENTION

ADDITIONAL Protocol between the United States and Other American Republics Amending the Pan American Sanitary Convention Signed at Habana on November 14, 1924. Washington, 1928. 6 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series, No. 763.)

CONVENTION between the United States and Other Powers Revising the International Sanitary Convention of January 17, 1912. Washington, 1928. 140 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series, No. 762.)

INTERNATIONAL Sanitary Convention of Paris of June 22, 1926, ratified by Senate, Mar. 22, 1928, ratified by President, Apr. 7, 1928, ratification deposited with the Government of France, May 22, 1928, proclaimed by the President, June 21, 1928. Washington, 1928. 70 p. (Public Health Reprint 1236.) 10 cents.

INTERNATIONAL Sanitary Convention signed at Paris, June 21, 1926. London, 1928. 144 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 22 (1928), Cmd. 3207.) 2s. 6d.

TANGIER

FINAL PROTOCOL of the Conference for the Amendment of the Tangier Statute. London, 1928. 16 p. 24½ cm. (Morocco No. 1 (1928), Cmd. 3165.) 3d. Net.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RELEASES

The Department of State, Division of Current Information, issues to the press copies of documents made public from time to time. Recent releases are listed below, with identifying numbers. Application for authentic copies should be made to the Division of Current Information, Department of State, Washington, D. C. They are mimeographed and are to be distinguished from publications of the Department which issue from the Government Printing Office.

ADDRESSES — Secr. Kellogg at banquet in his honor by President of the Executive Council, Irish Free State, Aug. 30, at Dublin, Ireland, S. D., 424, Aug. 30.
Secr. Kellogg at dedication of Severance Memorial Hall, Carleton College, Northfield, Minn., Oct. 18, S. D. 425, Oct. 18.
Secr. Kellogg's remarks broadcast over radio on occasion of the visit of the Argentine training ship, the *Presidente Sarmiento*, Oct. 25, S. D. 426, Oct. 22.

ALBANIA — Note extending recognition to the Kingdom, S. D. 427, Sept. 13.
Telegram from the King to the President thanking the latter for message, S. D. 428, Sept. 20.

ARGENTINA — Remarks of Ambassador and reply of President Coolidge on presentation by the Argentina Ambassador of his letters of credence, S. D. 429, Sept. 17.

ARMAMENT — Identic notes delivered by the American Ambassadors at London and Paris, with regard to the Franco-British naval compromise, S. D. 430, Sept. 28.

AUSTRIA — Registration of titles in Vienna, S. D. 431, Aug. 4.

CHINA — Communication signifying readiness of the American Government to commence negotiations for a treaty dealing with tariff relations, S. D. 432, July 26.
Text of treaty regulating tariff relations between the U. S. and China signed at Peiping (Peking), July 25, S. D. 433, July 27.

CONFERENCES AND CONVENTIONS — Supplementary agreement to the convention of Nov. 8, 1927, for the abolition of import and export prohibitions and restrictions, S. D. 434, Aug. 1.
U. S. Government accepts Belgian invitation to the International Telegraph Conference, Brussels, Sept. 10, S. D. 435, Aug. 7.
Delegates to International Telegraph Conference, S. D. 436, Aug. 11.
Protocol adopted, S. D. 439, Oct. 18.
Appointment of Prof. T. S. Adams, as expert to attend League of Nations meeting on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, S. D. 437, Sept. 5.
Communication to Secretary General of the League of Nations regretting inability to participate in selection of the Permanent Central Board set up by Geneva Opium Convention, S. D. 438, Oct. 4.

COLOMBIA — Exchange of notes regarding sovereignty over Serrana and Quito Sueno Banks and Rencador Cay, S. D. 440, Sept. 21.
COSTA RICA — Remarks of minister and reply of President upon presentation by the Costa Rican Minister of his letters of credence, S. D. 441, Oct. 2.
ECUADOR — Note delivered to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador extending *de jure* recognition of Ecuador, S. D. 442, Aug. 15.
HONDURAS — Text of note dated July 27 from Honduran Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American minister at Tegucigalpa, regarding Honduran and Guatemalan boundary, S. D. 443, Aug. 1.
Note delivered to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Honduras by George T. Summerlin, American Minister at Tegucigalpa, S. D. 444, Aug. 8.
HOOVER — Letter addressed to a correspondent by Assistant Secr. William R. Castle, Jr., regarding the citizenship status of Herbert Hoover, S. D. 445, Oct. 17.
LIBERIA — Text of a telegram from President of Liberia to the Secretary of State regarding statements made by Raymond L. Buell, on the Firestone concessions, S. D. 446, Aug. 31.
Resignation of Sidney de la Rue as financial adviser to the Republic of Liberia and appointment of John Loomis as his successor, S. D. 447, Aug. 1.
NETHERLANDS — Understanding concerning reciprocal access to petroleum resources, S. D. 448, Sept. 17.
NICARAGUA — Letter from State Department to Benjamin C. Marsh regarding Dr. Cumberland's report having been left out of "A Brief History of the Relations Between the United States and Nicaragua, 1909–1928," S. D. 450, Aug. 15.
Copy of dispatch dated Aug. 4 showing organization of the American Electoral Mission in Nicaragua, S. D. 451, Aug. 22.
Text of treaty between Nicaragua and Colombia settling the dispute with regard to the ownership of the San Andres Archipelago, Great and Little Corn Islands, and the Mosquito Coast, S. D. 452, Sept. 21.
Text of reports addressed to the Secretary of State by Brig. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, U. S. A., President of the American Electoral Mission in Nicaragua, S. D. 453, Oct. 12; S. D. 454, Oct. 22.
NORWAY — Notice of recent legislation relative to modifications of the laws of Svalbard, S. D. 455, Aug. 10.
PANAMA — Statement of the Secretary of State re Presidential elections in Panama, S. D. 456, July 27.
Message to American Legations in Panama and Costa Rica, felicitations of the United States upon resumption of formal relations between Panama and Costa Rica, S. D. 457, Oct. 8.
PASSPORTS — Comparative figures of passports issued by the Department during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1928, with the number issued during each of the five preceding years, S. D. 458, Aug. 3.
TACNA-ARICA — Chile and Peru agree to suspend the work of the Boundary Commission for four months, S. D. 459, Oct. 10.
TREATIES — Announcement of beginning negotiations between the United States and Siam for Arbitration and Conciliation Treaties, S. D. 460, Aug. 10.
Poland, S. D. 461, Aug. 16.
Czechoslovakia, S. D. 462, Aug. 16.
Austria, S. D. 463, Aug. 16.
Egypt, S. D. 464, Aug. 16.
Luxemburg, S. D. 465, Aug. 16.
Albania, S. D. 466, Oct. 22.
PARIS PACT — Message from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Secretary of State wishing the latter a safe and enjoyable journey to Paris for signing, S. D. 467, Aug. 20.
List of names and official titles of plenipotentiaries who signed, S. D. 468, Aug. 25.
Message from President Coolidge to President Doumergue of France extending congratulations on success of negotiations, S. D. 469, Aug. 27.
Text of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War signed in Paris, Aug. 27, S. D. 470, Aug. 27.
Text of identic note addressed on August 27 through American Missions abroad to the Governments of 49 countries to adhere, S. D. 471, Aug. 27.
Bolivia signifies intention to adhere, S. D. 472, Aug. 29.
Cuba signifies intention to adhere, S. D. 473, Aug. 29.
List of countries which have officially adhered, and those which have stated intention to adhere, S. D. 474, Aug. 29.
Peru adheres, S. D. 475, Aug. 29.
Liberia adheres, S. D. 476, Aug. 29.
Note from Brazil re pact, S. D. 477, Aug. 31.
Cuba adheres, S. D. 478, Aug. 31; S. D. 489, Oct. 5.
Switzerland signifies intention, S. D. 479, Aug. 31.
The Netherlands signifies intention, S. D. 480, Aug. 31.
Congratulatory message from Nicaragua, S. D. 481, Sept. 1.
Rumania adheres, Estonia signifies intention, S. D. 482, Sept. 4.
Egypt, Portugal and Sweden signify intention, S. D. 483, Sept. 4.
Honduras signifies intention, S. D. 484, Sept. 5.
Costa Rica signifies intention, S. D. 485, Sept. 5.
Greece, Denmark signify intention, list of countries which have adhered and those which have signified intention, S. D. 486, Sept. 6.
Treaty for the renunciation of war not to be made a party issue, statement by Secretary of State, S. D. 487, Sept. 10.
Soviet Republic adheres, S. D. 488, Oct. 4.
Hungary signifies intention, S. D. 490, Oct. 11.